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

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THE REAL, THE RATIONAL AND THE ALOGICAL

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BEING SUGGESTIONS FOR A PHILOSOPHICAL RECONSTRUCTION

BY

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PREFACE

In the years that have elapsed since *The Roots of Reality* was first thought out and written down, the currents of philosophical opinion in English-speaking countries and elsewhere have considerably shifted their ground. The old Hegelian positions which dominated English speculative thought during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and were still powerful in the opening years of the present, have been deserted by the exponents of up-to-date philosophic thought. They are no longer fashionable. Hence the amount of space in this book devoted to the refutation of the main Hegelian position—which I have called " Pallogism " but which it is fashionable now to term " Intellectualism " and which constitutes the basis of the Hegelian philosophy, namely, the assumption of the intellectual concept as the sole ultimate principle of Reality—may be regarded as excessive and the argument itself as unnecessarily laboured. I have nevertheless left the portions dealing with " Pallogism " mainly intact. The position itself has played too great a part in the history of speculative thought, from Plato downward, to be treated as though it were affected by the mere passing philosophical fashions of the hour.

Perhaps the two most noteworthy recent portents in the early twentieth-century philosophical world are " Bergsonism " and " Pragmatism." These two doctrines, so fashionable within the last few years, have, in the present work, received fuller consideration.

At the time, indeed, when *The Roots of Reality* was published, the ideas of M. Bergson were hardly known in England.

There is much in M. Bergson's speculations that harmonises with the principles set forth in these pages. On the other hand, his failure to connect his doctrine of time and its content with the fundamental position of philosophic idealism—of the doctrine, that is, which sees in reality simply modifications of

consciousness possible and actual—leaves us in some doubt as to his views of their ultimate bearing.

As it stands, M. Bergson's philosophy strikes one rather as an imposing fragment, a torso, than as a systematic interpretation of Reality in all its deeper issues.

A similar objection holds as regards "Pragmatism," and this even to a greater extent. The theory of truth as "practical postulate," the best working hypothesis available for the satisfaction of needs, is, it seems to the present writer, only admissible on the basis of a metaphysic such as that of Schopenhauer. Otherwise it stands surely self-condemned as the clumsy statement of a half-truth. It is clear that Truth, in the sense of psychological interpretation of reality, is more than a mere "practical postulate," unless we are prepared to admit that "Reality"—*i.e.* conscious experience itself—is no more than the "practical postulate" of an absolute, self-realising, creative Will.

The fact remains that at the present time neither Hegelianism nor the Pallogistic theory generally any longer holds the paramount place in philosophy that it did some years ago. The Pallogism, for example, of the late Thomas Hill Green has no attractions for the modern student or thinker. What I have termed in this book the "Alogical" as opposed to the "Logical" has certainly come into its own.

It can no longer be said that the thinker of to-day is inclined to subordinate, much less to ignore, sensation, will, etc., in favour of the pure form of thought. The philosophisings of the present decade all aim at doing justice to the "alogical" element of experience in one or other of its aspects. The typical exponent of this most up-to-date order of philosophic thought is undoubtedly M. Henri Bergson.[1]

[1] I may here mention, as illustrating the way in which a thinker, not in possession of a professorial "chair" in philosophy, is handicapped as to the recognition of his own ideas as belonging to him, that Professor Baldwin, in a work of his, has credited the expression "Alogical" (in antithesis to "Logical") in the sense first used in the present work, to M. Bergson, by whom the term has never been used at all. So unwilling is the professorial academic mind to acknowledge not merely "any good thing," but even any serviceable phrase as coming "out of Nazareth"—to wit, from a source unhallowed by the possession of academic dignities.

I may say I have not in the following pages taken any special pains to humour the pedants of delusive simplicity and short words. I speak of " delusive simplicity " since all philosophic writing implies distinctions which, it is no use attempting to deny, can only be grasped by an effort of thought. Now most people do not want to make an effort of thought, they want the proverbial " royal road " to philosophic learning. The use of short and familiar words and expressions by a philosophic writer seems to furnish them with this royal road, but it does not really do so. The familiar words and expressions, which seem to facilitate matters so much at first sight, as a rule fail to convey the philosophical meaning which the author intends. The short words and simple phrases so much bepraised by a certain order of critics carry with them their ordinary concrete meaning, which inevitably obscures the philosophical sense they are intended to convey.

Not to prolong these remarks unduly, I will give one illustration only, out of many, of what I mean. Let us take the aggressive-looking technical term " potentiality." Now it may be said : Why not employ the plain English word " power " ? The answer is that the word " power " does not convey in the same unmistakable manner the precise shade of meaning that is conveyed by the word " potentiality." For one thing, the word power has physical associations which the word " potentiality " has not.

The latter precisely hits off the element of *nisus*, of *drang*, the infinite becoming (as opposed to actual presentment) which is inherent in all Reality. This the word " power " certainly does not. Both words, I fully admit, have a common origin, but usage has given the one a physical and concrete sense and the other a metaphysical and abstract sense.

And so it is with philosophical terminology in general. The attempt to translate the fine and recondite distinctions of metaphysical analysis into the language of everyday life can, in the long run, only result in misapprehension and confusion.

The serious philosophical writer must not allow himself to be intimidated by the gibes of the Philistine and his calling of names such as " jargon " and the like. The word " jargon " is simply a term of abuse that anyone may apply equally to

any system of terminology which happens to displease him or which he is too indolent to master.

The present work incorporates, it should be stated, the material of *The Roots of Reality*, but amplified, brought up to date and treated in its relation to the later phases of philosophical thought, especially in this country. My intention has been to help to clear a foundation for the systematic philosophy of the future, rather than to expound a theory in all its ramifications. It remains for those for whom the positions here worked out are suggestive to elaborate and apply them throughout the various departments of knowledge—*i.e.* of concrete conscious experience. In order to do this successfully it is necessary to be a *Fachmann* in the department treated of, no less than to possess the faculty of insight into the deeper and wider bearings of the philosophic problem more especially. The days when one man, however eminent his genius and learning, could successfully embrace in one purview, philosophically speaking, the whole of human knowledge up to date, are undoubtedly passed.

INTRODUCTION

The restlessness so characteristic of modern thought generally is even more noticeable in philosophy than in other departments.

The problems of metaphysics naturally form a favourite hunting-ground for negative criticism to disport itself. The young man fresh from the university, whose bent leads him into the region of speculative thought, feels it incumbent upon him to show his quality by the attempt to scuttle some hitherto established philosophic position.

Unfortunately the net result in positive knowledge of the heavy artillery of criticism so freely brought to bear on existing statements and solutions of speculative problems is exiguous in the extreme, recalling the relative proportions of "bread" and "sack" in the well-known quotation. It is much easier nowadays to snatch a measure of success as a critic than as a constructive thinker.

Let us take in review the main philosophical attitudes that have prevailed within the memory of the present generation and then consider in greater detail some of the more important positions of recent and current thought. Empiricism, now better known as the theory of the "Associational school," was the dominant attitude in the fifties and sixties of the last century in this country and to a large extent also on the continent of Europe.

This theory, the national output *par excellence* of British speculation, from its origin in Hobbes and Locke and its working out by the Scottish psychological school (setting aside for the moment its idealistic and sceptical reduction by Berkeley and Hume respectively), in the main took sense-perception as an irreducible basis and the mind in a psychological sense as the mere receiver and co-ordinator through its thought-function of the ready-made perceptions, as they were assumed to be, which it obtained through the special senses. The theory won

popularity owing to its plausibility and apparent accordance with plain common-sense. A closer analysis, however, discloses the fact that the doctrine of Empiricism really evades the main problems of philosophy, that its postulates are not ultimate in themselves, but presuppose conditions which the theory ignores, that its truth, such as it is, is little better than platitude, and that the truth claimed for it by some of its exponents is not truth at all but fallacy.

" Empiricism " or " Associationism " may indeed be regarded as historically a one-sided pendant to the equally one-sided dogmatism of the earlier Continental schools deriving from Descartes and Leibnitz.

It is also indirectly in the line of tradition of the old scholastic Nominalism.

Empiricism, however, it may be noted, though in itself mainly a psychological doctrine, had two important offshoots in what we may term popular philosophy—viz. the materialism of the eighteenth century and the agnosticism of the nineteenth century. I regard the latter as deriving from British Empiricism, although some might be inclined to affiliate it to the " Criticism " of Kant. In this connection we must not forget, however, the part played by British Empiricism, through Hume and Reid, in Kant's thought.

We may state the theory of the Empirical or Associational school, as presented by its best accredited exponents of the Mid-Victorian era, somewhat as follows :—There exists an external world of matter in an external space—*i.e.* one independent of experience. This material world was commonly identified with the so-called primary qualities of matter of Locke. Where this was not so, it was spoken of in a vague way, implying that it was a " sort of a something " outside the intelligence of the percipient but of which no further account could be given.

Over against this is the mind which apprehends and comprehends a world of objects as perceived through its sensory consciousness.

Locke and the earlier Empiricists, while regarding the primary qualities of matter (extension, resistance, figure, motion) as inhering in the objects themselves apart from their perception, credited the secondary qualities (colour, smell, taste, etc.)

solely to the perceiving consciousness. What followed is elementary commonplace of the history of Philosophy.

We all know how Berkeley got rid of the primary qualities of matter as existing independently of the mind by his famous formula of *esse est percipi*: how Hume similarly invalidated the claim of the mind or soul to an independent existence apart from the succession of impressions and ideas, which, as he contended, the term alone denoted. But the "Empiricism" of Locke, which on this line resulted in idealist scepticism, on another side issued in the Materialism of the French school chiefly through Condillac and Helvetius.

The former, with his theory that not only did the mind not contribute anything of itself to knowledge but that all thought was simply sensation refined and transformed, furnished apparently a firm, logical foundation for the principle: *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu fuerit.* It is well known how this order of ideas developed into the systematic Materialism of a d'Holbach and a La Mettrie.

The great crisis in the history of modern philosophy occurred when Kant, taking up the general problem, drew the crucial distinction between consciousness-in-general, consciousness that apprehends reality, and this consciousness as reproduced in reflection as the content of the individual mind. By this distinction Kant became the pioneer, in modern times, of an entirely new method of philosophical investigation. His analysis of the conditions presupposed in concrete experience, or consciousness-in-general, as he termed it, in which reality or the real world is given, opened up all the main issues of modern metaphysics. The problem with which Kant started was the apparently simple and unpretentious one as to how certain of Hume's impressions and ideas proclaim themselves as possessing a character of universal and necessary validity as opposed to others which, it is plain, are merely particular and contingent. He found that certain thought-forms or categories, acting through the sense-forms of space and time, transformed the raw material furnished by the senses into the conscious experience we term reality. Fichte, abandoning as untenable the assumption of an unknowable world of "things in themselves" which Kant, with more or less reserve, had postulated as at

the basis of the impressions of sense, exhibited the whole-world process as having its Alpha and Omega in the Subject of consciousness itself. Fichte's Subject of consciousness or ego, like Kant's consciousness-in-general, was not the personal ego or individual mind, the "object of the internal sense," as Kant termed it, but the eternal principle of consciousness—*i.e.* of knowing or experiencing, irrespective of the particular mind of the individual through which it functions in any given content of time or space. Schelling continued to pursue this line of thought, though with some important modifications, and finally Hegel identified this principle of consciousness-in-general, of knowing, which displays itself as reality, with Pure Thought.

For Hegel, therefore, all that is—*i.e.* experience itself—consists in nothing other than a system of thought-determinations or categories, such as for Kant formed merely one side or element in experience. This doctrine of Hegel, which is *au fond* but a development with modifications of the old Platonic theory of ideas, so famous in the classical world, has been termed *Panlogism*.[1]

There was a period in the nineteenth century, the mid-Victorian period as it would now be termed, when it was the fashion to treat Philosophy as a "dead dog." Philosophy was supposed to be a branch of human thought and inquiry that had been superseded by physical science. This period, which as regards its attitude towards philosophical investigations is typified in England by Lewes' *History of Philosophy*, has been followed by one which shows a revived interest in philosophical problems. The revival began with the rediscovery of Hegel by a younger generation of English and Scotch thinkers. The fundamental principles involved in the great German philosophical development from Kant to Hegel were for the first time grasped by English-speaking students. The young Hegelian movement of the eighties and nineties of the last century made an end of Empiricism as the fashionable English philosophy. If it failed in resuscitating the old Hegelianism

[1] It may be remarked, however, that philological analogy undoubtedly points to *Pallogism* being a more correct form, and as such this latter will be adopted whenever there is occasion to use the word in the course of the present work.

in any permanent form in an English dress, it was in large measure at least owing to the inherent weaknesses of the Hegelian system as a system.

Hegel's was a vast attempt, the most thorough-going in the whole history of Philosophy, to disentangle the leading thought-syntheses or categories that help to make up the woof of conscious experience. This it is that gives Hegel his unique place in the history of thought. But his attempt to unravel in reflection and present in a somewhat crabbed literary form the almost unfathomable complexity of these thought-forms as in a water-tight system was beyond even his intellectual powers. The Hegelian system as a system fell to pieces although the Hegelian influence remained. In addition to the difficulties of the task which the great German thinker set himself in the attempt to reconstruct in abstraction the complete system of the thought-forms of real experience, we cannot but regard the Pallogistic assumption on which his procedure was based as in itself a fatal flaw, which has wrecked his system no less than those of other great thinkers with whom he may be compared. This question of Pallogism, by which I mean the assumption of the thought-form or relation as being the sole ultimate factor in reality, we shall have occasion to discuss subsequently in the present book. The widespread tendency of what is known as the Victorian era to treat philosophy in the sense of metaphysics as a "dead dog" has not even yet entirely spent itself. Even in Philosophy, in the narrow sense, though the Empiricism of the Associational school which dominated the middle decades of the nineteenth century has no longer any following worth mentioning, yet, nevertheless, negative criticism is still the dominant note in modern metaphysical writing, more especially in Great Britain and America. There is still a strong tendency, even with academical exponents of the subject, to imply that all metaphysical analysis rests upon a shifting basis of sand.

Modern philosophical writing has a distinct tendency to run to seed in meticulous and frequently pedantic criticism. Far be it from me to disparage the critical habit of mind in Philosophy or in other departments. But there is criticism and criticism. There is criticism that has a distinctly con-

structive end, and which never loses sight of this end as its objective; and there is criticism for mere criticism's sake, which has no constructive object, which leads nowhither and which, as a rule, degenerates into aimless and vapid logical hair-splitting—*Spitzfindigkeiten*.

Now I venture to think in modern academic writing on Philosophy we have enough and to spare of criticism of this latter sort. The Criticism of Kant was of the former order. It was a Criticism preparatory to Construction. It aimed at clearing away superincumbent strata and at getting down to bed-rock. But much of the critical analysis to be found in the newest philosophical literature begins and ends with what has been termed "logic-chopping," by which I understand the fabrication by the logical faculty of at best relatively unimportant and often quite trivial points of distinction.

These are elaborated as though of the first importance, often to the neglect of the really salient problems of metaphysic. The atmosphere of scepticism in Philosophy which is engendered by hypercriticism naturally leads to emphasising the theory of the "shifting basis of sand" in the mind of the philosophic student. Now we have to consider whether the results of philosophic thought as they stand to-day do really amount to nothing else than a treacherous sand-bank or whether, covered up in the undoubted wealth of sand which philosophic writing has produced, there is not to be found a basis of bed-rock.

Unfashionable as it may sound to say so, I venture to suggest that in the apparently shifting character of philosophic thought there are, nevertheless, certain principles which proclaim themselves as belonging to such a bed-rock basis.

The crucial principle of these I hold to be the central position of modern Idealism—to wit, that all Reality, all Existence means nothing other than possible or actual determination of Consciousness. I am aware, of course, of the many recent attempts to invalidate this fundamental position of Idealism, but a careful perusal of the literature embodying these attempts has only strengthened my conviction of the irrefutability of the main Idealistic thesis.

It will, I submit, be invariably found that the attempts made to rehabilitate Realism or Dualism beg the point at issue.

The only even plausibly tenable argument against the main thesis of Idealism, according to which the Object-world exists only in and for a Subject—in other words, as Content of Consciousness—is the criticism that though Object is only known as determination of Subject, this is no proof that it may not have other aspects besides the one of Knownness or Conscious Content—in other words, that it may not exist *per se*. The answer of modern Idealism to this position (which, of course, is not new, being essentially that of the "thing-in-itself" of Kant), is that the question is not merely of there being no evidence of, or reason for, assuming any possible independence *per se* of an object, but that the assumption of any such independence is self-contradictory and meaningless. If it were merely that we have no evidence of the existence of an independent Object-world in itself, says the Idealist, we might, it is true, adopt the agnostic attitude with regard to the question. We might confine ourselves to saying: *For us* the Object-world is nothing but determinations of Consciousness. But such an attitude in the present case is ruled out *ab initio* by the fact that when analysed it is obvious that the very concepts, nay, the very words, we are bound to employ to express our Realist contention, themselves imply much more than this. It requires but a slight analysis of our thought to see that the very word Reality itself means possible or actual presence in Consciousness, and that otherwise *it has no meaning*. The distinction we make between Reality and Ideality is solely a psychological one. It does not mean a distinction between Consciousness and independence of Consciousness, but one between Consciousness as particularised—*i.e.* as limited by an individual self-focus—and Consciousness with no such limitation, or, as Kant expressed it, "Consciousness-in-General."

No so-called Realist has ever yet been able to get over this fundamental contention of Idealism. He will talk round it and seek to obscure it by raising extraneous issues, but meet or refute it he never does, and, as I submit, for the very good reason that it is in itself irrefutable.

By way of illustrating what has just been said, I take the defence of the position of what is known as "Modern Realism" by Professor Ralph Barton Perry, of Harvard, in his recently

published work entitled *Present Philosophical Tendencies*. It has at least the merits of clearness and conciseness, which cannot be said of all contributions to the controversy from this standpoint.

The author distinguishes between the new Realism and the old dualistic Realism of the Scottish school of Reid and Hamilton, which was, of course, substantially that of the Cartesians. The New Realism he terms Monistic Realism. It is important, we are told, to distinguish two opponent theories as entering into the New Realism.

"The first I shall call the theory of 'immanence.' This is the same theory as that which I have in another connection termed 'epistæmological monism.' It means that when a given thing, *a*, is known, *a* itself enters into a relation which constitutes it the idea or content of a mind. The second I shall call the theory of 'independence'; and it means that though *a* may thus enter into mind, and assume the status of content, it is not dependent on this status for its being or nature" (p. 308).

Now it is clear from the above that if *a* is not exclusively or even essentially Content of Consciousness, but stands for something independent of consciousness altogether, the *a* in question is in effect indistinguishable from the Kantian "thing-in-itself" and hence the whole force of the criticism which brought the latter into discredit applies equally to the "independent" things of the New Realism. According to this theory it is all a question of relation, "so that at the same time that it is bodily by virtue of one relation, it [the thing] may also be content of perception by virtue of another relation" (p. 311).

Professor Perry illustrates this proposition by the somewhat naïve example that the same man may be in one relation his uncle and in another his father's brother! The elements of the New Realism which enter into experience only find a place, we are told, when they "enter into relationships": but we are further told "they bring into these relationships a character which they possess quite independently and *by themselves*" (p. 316. The italics are my own). The New Realism also, it is said, "postulates the *external* or *extrinsic* character of relations" by which we are to understand that "terms

acquire from their new relations an added character, which does not either condition or necessarily alter the character which they already possess" (p. 319). Now, what I want to know is, in what way all these arbitrary and in some cases, I venture to say, unintelligible contentions and assumptions in any way weaken, not to say destroy, the Idealist position. The argumentative extremities to which the New Realist is reduced in the defence of his theory is aptly illustrated by the quibble between "yellow" and the "sensation of yellow" referred to on p. 321 of Mr Perry's book.

The failure to see that the assumption of the existence of a thing or a quality colour apart from the sensation of colour is a bald begging of the whole question is one more instance of the intellectual twist produced in otherwise capable men by obsession with a theory. The fact that Sensation possesses distinctions of quality within itself is obviously no justification for the erection of such distinctions or modifications of quality or character into independent entities separable from their ground basis—*i.e.* from that of which they are the modifications.

I have said that Professor Perry's exposition of the theory of modern Realism is clear. This, however, must only be taken relatively to the subject. To me the whole theory is a hopeless tangle of question-begging assumptions and evasions of the real point at issue. The fact is, as I said before, the so-called Modern or "New" Realism is not new at all. The important issues have been raised before, though perhaps in other words, in the earlier controversies on the subject. You cannot get over the fact that all Realism, in so far as it implies independence of Consciousness, means the postulation of a meaningless and unthinkable abstraction, a "surd" cut off from all intelligibility and even from mere sensation.

Another attempt to resuscitate Realism in recent times is that of the late Dr Richard Avenarius. Here, however, we have to do with a Realism more approaching the naïve common-sense Philosophy of Reid than the one we have just been considering. It is, of course, covered up with modern elaborate formulæ based largely on Kant's description of the Object as being "common to all." The "human world-notion," as Avenarius terms it, is compounded, according to Avenarius,

of two formally unequal values, the one experience, the other hypothesis.

"Experience—the presented—encompasses myself and my surroundings with its components to which also my fellow-men belong, besides certain dependent things pertaining thereto. The hypothesis consists in the explanation which I give of the movements of my fellow-men, including those of their organs of speech, together with the sounds produced by the latter—that is in the explanation that they are *statements* (*Aussagen*), by which is meant that they in their turn refer to sounds, to tastes, to a will or to a feeling just as much as is the case with my own words and acts. And these sounds, feelings, etc., assumed as pertaining to my fellow-men, become through this assumption just as much a *statement* (*Aussage*), the *content* of something said, as my own words and acts receive a sense through their being referred to my will" (*Der menschliche Weltbegriff*, p. 7).

This is the basis of Avenarius' Realism, which he claims to be a philosophical justification of what he terms the "human world-notion" (*Der menschliche Weltbegriff*). He proceeds to develop his main thesis by means of his theory of "introjection." We do not propose to offer any detailed criticism of Avenarius' system. I have only quoted it as another instance of the failure of Realist theorisers effectively to meet the main argument of philosophical Idealism. All their efforts consist in attempts to turn the position. They talk round it, they cover up their failure with new formulæ, but, when analysed, their arguments will be found to rest on one of two time-honoured foundations—either (1) the assumption of the old Kantian "thing-in-itself" in some form or shape, it may be the "elements" of experience themselves being hypostatised as things in themselves or what-not; or (2) the appeal to common-sense familiar to us from the Scotch Empiricists downwards. The first of the Realist theories noticed belongs to the former category; that of Avenarius to the latter.

A good deal of the criticism, in the earlier stages of the present controversy, of the champions of the New Realism was in truth the criticism of Idealism in its form of pure Intellectualism—*i.e.* the Pallogistic Idealism which came into favour in this

country during the last two or three decades of the nineteenth century under the ægis of the late Professor T. H. Green and the " Young Hegelians," and which is the subject of a polemic of my own in the present work.

All things considered then, and in spite of a certain " cocksureness " in some of the younger writers of the present day to the contrary, I still maintain that we may regard the fundamental principles of modern Idealism as a definitive achievement in philosophic thought, upon which there is no going back, and hence as a bed-rock axiom of all future metaphysical inquiry.

The real crux of the contention between the supporters of modern Realism and that of philosophic Idealism seems to me to lie in the following consideration :—In the Consciousness of an objective world over against the perceiving, the knowing, subject, it is recognised that there is a community, an identity. Kant defined the Object as that which was " common to all." Now, common-sense, what Avenarius calls " the human world-conception "—*i.e.* the view of the " man in the street "—assumes this community and identity to have its ground in the Object. But philosophic Idealism is prepared to show that this assumption of our ordinary common-sense Consciousness, when analysed, is untenable, by the well-known arguments, with the immediate result of suggesting to the unwary student what is known as Solipsism—*i.e.* the view that the world exists merely in himself as individual perceiver and thinker.

The absurdity of this position soon makes itself manifest and forces to a reconsideration of the problem. It is quite clear that the Object is, as Kant had it, " common to all." There is no getting away from the fact, if common-sense Consciousness is to have any meaning at all, that the content of this Consciousness as manifested in a world of external objects is one and the same world for all conscious beings.

And yet the apparently obvious and irrefutable theory of the common-sense mind that the identity of the world as perceived by all conscious beings resides in the Object itself, whereby an existence apart from its perception is ascribed to it, is demolished by the ordinary arguments of the Berkeleyan Idealism. At this point the critical idealism of Kant and his

successors comes in as offering the only possible solution of the problem by pointing out that the identity of the object-world lies not in any independence of the object itself but in the perceiving Subject, though this perceiving Subject is not to be identified with the particular *ego* or mind of myself as individual. It lies deeper than this—to wit, in the Subject which is the condition of this very self-consciousness of the individual—in other words, in the Subject of Consciousness-in-general, which on analysis discloses itself as involved in the *particular* subject or *ego* called *myself* as distinguished from yourself and himself. It is that through which all experience arises, the experience of my own mental states no less than my experience of the so-called outer world. This position of philosophic Idealism I hold to be bed-rock.

The arguments as stated have never been refuted, and no valid refutation of them seems possible. The attempts made by our modern Realists to get round them only bring their incontrovertible nature into stronger light. Like all axiomatic propositions—*i.e.* such as we arrive at by the analysis of common-sense consciousness after argumentatively clearing away superincumbent strata—this fundamental axiom of metaphysic, I say, may be formally denied or cast in doubt by superficially plausible arguments, but it cannot be got rid of. Similarly the axioms on which physical and even mathematical science rest may be in appearance disputed.

We have all heard of the man who alleged that he could very well conceive that the principle of universal causation might not obtain in other regions of the universe—for instance, in the moon. Now the late George Henry Lewes actually brought this gentleman forward in evidence in his early *Biographical History of Philosophy*, in support of his Empirical doctrines. There is no one in the present day, however, of any pretentions to philosophic thinking, who would fail to recognise the absurdity of the suggestion which Lewes in his youthful days took *au grand sérieux*. Even the formal axioms of geometry may be repudiated in words. I can well remember, as a boy, calling in question the Euclidian axioms, contending that after all there is no proof that under certain circumstances two straight lines could not enclose a space! On the grounds

given, then, which resolve themselves into the fact that in the last resort one is driven back by the very self-consistency of thought itself upon the Idealistic position, I contend that it is a position upon which all future metaphysic must base itself implicitly where not explicitly.

It may be formulated as follows :—that Reality is synonymous with Conscious experience, possible or actual, that the words "Existence" and "Reality" have no meaning except as connoting the content of an experience.

Stated baldly in a single sentence this, the position of modern Idealism, is the only possible one for philosophy or metaphysic properly so-called. This is the first of four propositions which I contend must be similarly regarded as of an axiomatic character.

In dealing with the above question of Idealism I have impliedly assumed *the self-consistency of Consciousness as a whole,* as constituting the ultimate test of truth in the philosophic sense. It means that any proposition which is at variance with the coherence of experience or with the consistency of Consciousness with itself is invalid or false.

That which cannot be taken up into the system of experience or its expression in reflection, by which I mean any proposition which, viewed in relation to experience as a whole, is meaningless, must also be ruled out as incompatible with the self-consistency of Consciousness.

Thus the position taken up by some would-be Realists—that though the evidence for the independent existence of an Object-world may be nugatory, yet that such a world may be hypothetically assumed, inasmuch as there is no positive proof to the contrary—is invalid in so far as the Idealist can show that to talk of the independent existence outside Consciousness or Experience of that which by its only possible definition is exclusively made up of determinations of Consciousness, although *formally* admissible, is *really* nonsense—as being outside the coherence of Experience—in short, meaningless. (*Cf.* Ferrier's *Institutes of Metaphysic*, which, though an old book, is strong in its effective emphasis on this point.)

Herbert Spencer has somewhat clumsily expressed this principle in his well-known formula, "the inconceivability of

the opposite," by which he meant that that proposition of which the opposite is unthinkable must be accepted as true. The formula itself, I say, may be open to criticism, but it undoubtedly expresses in substance the only intelligible test of truth in the last resort which is possible. This principle of the coherence of experience or the self-consistency of Consciousness as a test of truth, is inseparably bound up with the Idealist position that Reality means ultimately a system of determinations of Consciousness and nothing else. For if Reality is co-equal in extension with Consciousness, potential and actual, it is plain that truth in the philosophic sense, which is the formulation of Reality in the terms of abstract thought, must have as its ultimate test its inseparability from the fundamental conditions of consciousness as a whole. The two positions, in fact, mutually imply each other.

The third position that I regard as of a bed-rock character is that Reality in its ultimate expression implies the most comprehensive totality or system of relations of conscious experience conceivable, though the term Reality, as commonly used, simply means a system within certain very narrow limits —*i.e.* a *relative* totality.

This last position referred to—to wit, that Reality in the last resort implies the systematic coherence of all conceivable elements and relations of experience in a given synthesis, and hence that truth, in the philosophic sense, which is the formulation in reflective thought of this same system of Reality, does not properly obtain except in so far as it embraces and takes account of Experience conceived as a whole in the above sense —this last position is one which is continually being insisted upon, hammered down, so to speak, by almost every systematic thinker. Historically, we find it emphasised, to mention only two or three well-known names, in Spinoza, in Hegel, less explicitly in Kant, though it is implied throughout the *Critical Philosophy*, and it is especially prominent in many modern writers, otherwise divergent—*e.g.* Mr Bradley, the late Professor Avenarius and many others. Among the latest exponents of the doctrine is Mr Joachim, who has devoted his book, *The Nature of Truth*, to discussing it at great length. Mr Joachim, however, after an exhaustive treatment of the subject and an

insistence on Truth in the strict sense of the word as being impossible outside the assumed totality of all possible relations, for therein alone lies complete coherency, arrives at the conclusion that this complete coherency is unattainable.

As an ideal principle, notwithstanding, it represents the nearest approach to an adequate definition of Truth at which we can arrive, all other definitions of Truth being only tenable in so far as they are implied in it. It is worth remarking here that this "coherency" theory of Truth, as it is termed by Mr Joachim, taken as it must be taken in its strict sense, as implying a complete and all-embracing, and hence static synthesis, an Absolute like Spinoza's *unica substantia* or Hegel's *idee*, falls under the criticism of Pallogism given in the following pages. It belongs, in fact, obviously to the order of philosophic conception which I have termed Pallogism. This is not to say, however, that it is destitute of all justification. In so far as it postulates the Absolute as a once for all complete and self-subsistent Whole and the universe as the complete expression of this Whole, the "coherency" theory of truth is, of course, obnoxious to the same reasoning which tells against Pallogism generally. But on the other hand, the recognition that truth in philosophy, no less than in science, means the expression in reflective thought of some (more or less extended) systematised Whole, even though only a provisional Whole—*i.e.* a system leaving open its supplementation through incorporation in a larger Whole—nevertheless furnishes us with the most adequate theory of truth obtainable by us.

This I take to be substantially the conclusion at which Mr Joachim himself arrives. The more comprehensive the synthesis of relations satisfactorily explained in any given theory, the nearer is that theory to absolute truth. The approach may be always asymptotic, if you will, but approach to Truth there is nevertheless in the more comprehensive as against the less comprehensive expression in reflection of Reality as given.

The fourth point I would emphasise as a bed-rock principle is that an analysis of Consciousness discloses every concrete experience or reality as consisting of at least two elements, corresponding generally to the Aristotelian distinctions of

matter-and-form, potentiality-and-actuality—in the union of these two elements objectivity or reality alone consisting.

Apart from their synthesis these two elements do not *exist* at all—they are not *Real*, but obtain merely as abstract notions distinguished and isolated in reflective thought. These elements I identify in the following pages with the Alogical and Logical. To me this last antithesis seems the most ultimate within the range of Experience. In the sense used by me it embraces the Aristotelian antitheses. These are included under those of the Logical and Alogical. This latter point is so exhaustively dealt with in the body of the present work that it is unnecessary to enlarge upon it further in this introduction.

If I am right in what I have said as regards the practical irrefutability of the foregoing "bed-rock" principles as I have termed them, if the positions in question have really been "won from the void and formless infinite" of doubtful metaphysical speculation, they may well serve as an answer to those who maintain that the movement of philosophic thought is destitute of results. It must be admitted, I think, by all competent to judge, that these positions, if sustainable, represent very important results.

The third principle discussed, that of "coherency" in an organised system constituting the essence of truth in a philosophic or scientific sense, as will be seen, is intimately connected with the second position—viz. that of the self-consistency of Consciousness, or, as Spencer had it, the "unthinkability of the opposite" as being the test of Truth. Only the embracing of the whole of Experience, of the whole body of Knowledge in one synthesis can give us complete Conceivability. Otherwise there is a *residuum* left over more or less in conflict with the self-consistency of Consciousness. Now the theory of Intellectualism or Pallogism, as it is called in the present work, regards this whole as a literal fact rather than as an expression of mere ideal approximation. On this theory, therefore, in the last resort Conceivability is absolute, the Logical is finally triumphant. But, as will be sought to be shown in the following pages, the analysis of the conditions of Consciousness gives no indication of such being the case, but, on the contrary, points to the Alogical as the invariable con-

stituent of every real synthesis, the permanent co-efficient of the Logical in all Reality. Now this Alogical element can only be expressed in the abstract thought of Reflection symbolically. But this symbol of thought is never adequate. The Alogical element in Reality is never really absorbed by reflective thought.

Hence complete Conceivability, perfect Truth, is a chimera as such, though it serves rightly enough as an indication of direction. The result of the foregoing consideration is that thought as such, the thought of reflection, never attains or can attain to complete self-consistency, which, if you will, is of course only another way of saying what we have just pointed out—viz. that absolute or perfect Truth in philosophy is an impossibility.

The principle of approximate coherency as the essence of Truth finds an apt illustration in the theory of Causation. The theory of Causation, whether in its cruder form as one-sided or mechanical Causation or in its higher form as reciprocal determination, ultimately rests on the doctrine that all things hang together and that the more things in heaven and earth that can be brought under the law of Causation the more complete and true is the theory of Cause.

But it will be seen from the sections in Chapter III. dealing with Cause and Chance, that, extend the category of Cause as we may, we nevertheless not only fail to get rid of the chance element in real happenings, but we do not even diminish it. Every Causal system in so far as it obtains in the real sequence of events is inextricably involved with its ineluctable shadow, Chance. It is only in reflective thought that by disregarding the chance side of things we can get the illusory appearance of a system or systems of pure Causation. In the real world of happenings in time Chance is always there as an element in the happening. Even in reflection when we take the whole synthesis of Reality into account we find that while it is true that the sphere of Causation seems infinitely expansible, ever new facts and new groups of facts being brought within its system, yet that nevertheless, as already said, the realm of Chance does not become less in consequence but expands with it.

It remains before concluding this Introduction to say a few

words on the dialectical method of which Hegel is the typical protagonist. The dialectical method, or the method of trichotomy, as it is sometimes called, assumes that the experienced universe viewed in its ultimate Coherence presents itself as an articulated system in which the following *momenta* continuously recur—*i.e.* (1) a positive affirmation of being; (2) its negation or contradiction, and (3) the negation of this negation which presents the return of the first position but as defined and determined—in other words, as realised. The first positive phase of the real synthesis presents unconditioned, undifferentiated—in a word, unreal—Being or position; the second phase gives us the mere bare negation of this Being; in the third, which is nothing else than the unity of the first and second, we have conditioned, differentiated Being—*i.e.* Reality. Such is, in brief, the principle of the dialectical method. But with its great expositor Hegel, the whole dialectical movement was one solely of pure thought from first to last. The whole process of Conscious Experience is for him nothing but a logical process; it is throughout a movement of thought.

Hegel did not recognise an alogical element at the root of all Consciousness and reappearing in every Conscious synthesis, an element which is reproduced, though symbolically only, in a conceptual guise, in the abstract thought of reflection. For Hegel the whole process of Reality was purely and simply a logical process alike in the real world as given, and as reproduced as the truth of reflective thought. This position is traversed in the course of the following pages as what I term the Pallogist fallacy. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the dialectical method necessarily stands or falls with this, as I deem it, one-sided and hence fallacious view of Reality.

On the contrary, it is equally consistent with the position expressed in the present work.

The dialectical method has fallen into disrepute of late, indeed, for wellnigh two generations past, owing, as I take it, to two causes—firstly, owing to the one-sided metaphysical position of Hegel, which forces him on occasion to obvious tricks and devices of language to carry the method through; and secondly, to the crude and superficial applications of it made by some of the *epigoni* of Hegel for a generation or so after his

death. As I shall indicate later on the mode in which, as I conceive it, the dialectical method is given in the fundamental elements of Consciousness, it will be unnecessary to go into this matter in the present Introduction. I may point out, however, as bearing upon what has just been said, that the method in question involves many possible pitfalls for the unwary. In the more complex departments of knowledge the temptation is sometimes only too great to make shift with artificial constructions—to mistake superficial aspects of a real process for true trichotomic *momenta*. For this reason it would be premature at the present time to treat the dialectical method in any form in which it has hitherto been presented as in the nature of a bed-rock principle in philosophy. In the existing state of our knowledge more superficial methods are in most cases the utmost to which we can aspire. An up-to-date formulation and application on a large scale of the dialectical method is a task for the future. But as I hold, the case for the method is sufficiently made out to warrant us in accepting it as *per se* valid, however much we may consider ourselves justified in criticising any given application of it.

We ought, I think, never completely to lose sight of the crucial truth that all evolution, all existence, the world and all that is therein, is a complex living and moving synthesis, and that this synthesis contains within it, as of its very essence, a trichometric system which it may be the task of ages adequately to unravel and present in detail as a relatively coherent formulation, in terms of reflective thought, but which, judiciously used, may serve as the guiding principle in our investigations, even while we are awaiting a more satisfactory and thorough treatment of it than we have at the present time.

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

All knowledge whatever consists in the bringing of a content of possible knowledge under a new unity, of the particular under a new universal term. Every unification of this kind constitutes what is called an apperception, or an apperceptive synthesis, and every act of knowing implies such a synthesis. In this way Science may be regarded simply as a continuation of the same process as common-sense experience on a higher plane, the bringing of particular contents under new unities or universal forms. The more comprehensive is the unifying thought-form, the higher is the point of view as science. This process of the reduction of the content of consciousness to a higher thought unity is also termed Categorisation, every apperception necessarily meaning the reduction of given fact with its infinity of particulars under some thought-form or category. The sensible impressions given me immediately at the present moment of a certain hardness or resistance, a limitation in space of this resistance, conjoined with a visible extension and colour also having a corresponding limitation in space (shape or figure) are for common experience practical ends reduced by me under the category or apperception of writing-desk.

I further identify this synthesis of sensible qualities under the category of wooden object. I may still further reduce the wooden writing-desk under a still wider category, that of organic matter. Yet again, I may bring it under the category of matter-in-general. In physical science this process of the reduction of the manifold content of experience to unity reaches its highest point in the generalisation of all objects in space as matter-in-motion.

It is now indeed thought to simplify still further the content of space by recourse to the conception of force, ether

or (now) electricity as representing the root category in physics.

The hypothetical unit of matter, the atom, up till recently conceived by physicists as an ether-stress, as a focus of vibrations, or in a vague way as a force-centre, is now assumed to be based on the electron. These ultimate physical hypotheses only concern us here as indicating the direction towards which the highest generalisation of science tends. But no conceivable category of physical science is all-embracing. Science assumes space and a content of space as its last word. But space and its content are not ultimate.

The content of space presupposes something other and wider than itself, in which it is included and by which it is conditioned. This highest and most comprehensive point of view, which science no less than common-sense implicitly presupposes while ignoring it in its judgments, is conscious experience as such. In the last resort all the objects of science as of common-sense, together with the judgments they imply, are determinations of Consciousness, possible or actual. But what does Consciousness itself involve? Clearly, an apperceiving subject or ego at one end and a somewhat apperceived at the other. When closely viewed, however, this somewhat discloses itself as in its turn a modification of the apperceiving Subject itself.

Now, the totality of the processes of apperceiving and apperceived, conceived as referable to a primordial subject, is included under the term Consciousness. Consciousness may be actual or may be potential merely. In common language the word is generally used in the former sense as opposed to the Unconscious. But philosophically the Unconscious belongs to Consciousness. It is a part of the universe, so to say, of Consciousness. It is the potentially Conscious.

(For the distinction between the *un*-Conscious and the *extra*-Conscious, see pp. 75-76.) Actual Consciousness arises out of the Unconscious or the potentially Conscious. Actual Consciousness always implies a background of potential Consciousness. Consciousness as concrete—that is, as Reality or Experience—consists of a synthesis of possible or potential[1]

[1] Amplifying what has just been said in the text, I may observe here that though all things may be reduced to determinations of Consciousness,

and actual elements, as we have said. But of this, more later. Our aim here is to emphasise the fact that the supreme generalisation under which all things can be brought is expressed in the term Consciousness regarded *per se*.

The recognition of this fact does not imply any slur on the terms in which science reduces all things to unity from *its* point of view.

The criticism of philosophy as the branch of human knowledge dealing with the world in terms of Consciousness, as defined, is not that the formulation of science is wrong as far as it goes. The terms under which science interprets Reality may be unimpeachable within its own purview no less than from the standpoint of ordinary experience. What philosophy insists on is the recognition of the fact that they are not ultimate. Philosophy claims that its view-point includes that of physical science, and while not abrogating the results of physical science, in a manner modifies them. But there is no greater error than to suppose that philosophy is science "gone wrong." Its method, aim and outlook are essentially different from those of science.

In physical science this process of the reduction of the sense-manifold to concept-unity reaches its highest point in the bringing of the world of particular objects, the content of space and time, under the universal concept matter-in-motion. Recently it is noticeable that it is sought to reduce, as before stated, the dual generalisation matter-in-motion to the conception of force or to the notion of ether as the root-category in physics. The hypothetical spacial unit of matter, the atom, is conceived by modern physicists either as force-centre or as focus of vibrations, or as based on the "electron."

innumerable things are not determinations or objects of any *actual* Consciousness. Let us take a striking instance from the material world as transformed in science. The "ether" or the "atom" of science, assuming the conception of such as valid, does not certainly enter into any actual perceptive Consciousness at the present time, nor could it do so, given our present faculties. They are objects of possible or potential Consciousness only. Science in postulating the existence of "ether" and "atoms" assumes them as possible objects of Consciousness. It assumes that were our present senses magnified or intensified to the *n*th power, "atoms" and "ether" would be *per*ceived as science now only *con*ceives them.

These ultimate physical hypotheses only concern us here as illustrating the direction towards which the highest generalisation of science inevitably tends. But the highest possible or conceivable unification arrived at by physical science is not all-embracing. The latter is exclusively concerned with the Object. By its very nature physical science, in all its generalisations, from the lowest to the highest, tacitly assumes something which, whilst it is presupposed by these generalisations, is not included in them. Hence out of physical science can never come the most exhaustive category of all. Science cannot give us that most comprehensive view of the world which the widest category in its system of articulations should open up to us. This highest and most comprehensive point of view, which science no less than empirical consciousness (common-sense) presupposes, while ignoring it in its judgments, is *consciousness as such*. In the last resort, all the objects of science, no less than of "common-sense," together with the judgments to which they give rise, are determinations of consciousness, possible or actual. In other words, they presuppose an apperceiving *ego* or *subject* at one end, and a *somewhat* or *object* apperceived at the other. When closely viewed this *somewhat* discloses itself in the last resort as nothing but a modification of the aforesaid apperceiving subject itself according to the old Berkleyan "saw" *Esse est percipi*.

Now, the totality of the processes of apperceiving and apperceived, subject and object, is included under the term consciousness or experience. Consciousness may be actual or may be potential merely. In common language it is generally used in the former sense as opposed to the "unconscious." As a matter of fact, consciousness, as concrete—that is, as reality or experience—is a synthesis of potential and actual elements, as we have said.[1] It is sufficient here to recognise the truth that the highest, the supreme generalisation under which all things can be brought, is expressed in the term *consciousness*, regarded *per se*. The recognition of this fact does not imply any slur on the terms in which science ultimately unifies all things from *its* point of view. The claim of phil-

[1] In this sense, the unconscious itself belongs to the unity or universe of consciousness—it is the *potentially* conscious.

osophy, the branch of human knowledge dealing with the world from the point of view of, and in terms of, consciousness as above defined, is not that the formulation of science is wrong as far as it goes, but merely that the terms under which it formulates reality are not *ultimate*, unimpeachable as they may be within the purview of physical science itself, as well as from the standpoint of ordinary experience. I must once more repeat that philosophy must not be regarded as science gone wrong. Its method, aim, and subject-matter are radically other than those of science. There is a story told of a contested election in the old bribery days. Two rival candidates on the eve of the poll were entertaining the electors with the best of their cellars. Port and sherry, we should mention, were then the only wines known to the average Englishman. One of the candidates, finding that his port was becoming exhausted, furnished the constituents with a very fine old Château Lafitte, but this cost him the election, the voters declaring that they would have nothing more to do with a man who fobbed them off with sour port. Men of science, like Häckel, are only too fond of denouncing the methods and results of philosophy as though it were a kind of sour science, and not, as it really is, an altogether different department of knowledge as regards which the conventional criticisms of the man of science are as irrelevant and as pointless as the free and independent electors' criticism of the excellent Château Lafitte offered them by their would-be representative.

Philosophy maintains that its own outlook, from which the world is viewed as a system of articulations of consciousness-in-general, although it includes that of science, nevertheless differs from it inasmuch as it transcends it, since it is the most comprehensive aspect from which the world can be regarded. "The world is my presentment" ("*Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung*"), says Schopenhauer, at the opening of his *Welt als Wille*. This is another way of expressing in a few words that the idealist position, in the wider sense of the term, is the one to which the thinker is forced who is not content to rest satisfied with half thoughts, but who presses forward to a coherent and self-consistent grasp of what we call reality.

In addition to what has been above said, it may be desirable

in the interests of the reader unversed in these matters to explain once more the sense in which the term Consciousness is employed in philosophic writing. As commonly understood, Consciousness is regarded as the attribute of the individual. Each individual is supposed to have his own consciousness over against other individuals, and the world without. But Consciousness, in a philosophical sense, does not mean consciousness conceived as appertaining to this or that individual, which at best constitutes the subject-matter of empirical psychology, but consciousness considered in its essential nature. This is what is meant by consciousness-in-general, or consciousness as such. To say that the whole system of things stands or falls with your, or with my, individual consciousness or *psyche* (the position of Solipsism) is a palpable absurdity. The "world" is plainly not "my presentment" in this sense, nor is it yours. But notwithstanding this, on analysing this "world," we fail to find that it consists of anything else than a system of facts or, in other words, of possible or actual experiences; and experience is only another name for consciousness, as above defined. Hence, although it is absurd to regard reality as exhausted within the limits of any personal consciousness or individual mental experience, nevertheless, since it is a system of experienced facts and of inferences or judgments from those facts, in short, a system of sensations or feltnesses knit together by thoughts, it is nothing else than, as we have said, a system of affections of consciousness.

The non-philosophical reader will say: "But is not consciousness always particular, always individual?" In one sense, yes; in another sense, no. Unreflective experience, common-sense as it is termed, itself automatically draws the distinction between those thoughts and feelings that are special to oneself, the content and products of one's own mind, and those that constitute reality, independent of the individual's own mind, or, as it is the current fashion to say, those that have an "objective reference" attaching to them. But common-sense so called, as philosophy shows, falsely ascribes the elements of reality, implicitly or explicitly, to something independent of consciousness altogether. The crux of the philosophical problem, therefore, may be stated as being the

existence within consciousness of a universal and necessary element not limited to the individual *psyche*, and the further existence within consciousness of an element apparently foreign to itself, an object as opposed to itself as subject, which element again discloses itself, on analysis, as the subject's *own negative determination*.[1] The relation of consciousness-in-particular, which concerns the individual mind, to consciousness-in-general, which concerns the system of things, or reality, is the sempiternal mystery, to find an adequate formula for which has been the constantly recurring preoccupation of philosophy in its wider issues from Plato downwards. The most elaborate of these attempts is undoubtedly the philosophy of Hegel, the culmination of the great German philosophical movement taking its rise in Kant.

From the foregoing it will be evident how mistaken is the notion of some scientific thinkers that there is any necessary opposition between the conclusions of science and those of metaphysic, using the latter word in its true Aristotelian sense. The standpoint of science is inevitably materialistic, and as scientific or "cosmic" philosophy—that is, an attempted solution of the world-problem on the basis of physical science will be successful and convincing precisely in proportion to the thoroughness with which the materialistic position is adhered to.

The philosopher *pur sang*—*i.e.* the metaphysician—can accept all the conclusions of scientific Materialism in so far as it is not attempted to formulate them dogmatically as absolute and exclusive. Yet none the less, the standpoint of philosophy is necessarily idealistic in the sense above explained. And inasmuch as philosophy's highest generalisations are presupposed in the conclusions of science, no less than in those of our ordinary common-sense experience, philosophy claims to have the last word in the solution of the world-problem, or, to put it otherwise, claims that its problem is the *ultima ratio* of the world-problem altogether.

Metaphysic—*i.e.* philosophy proper—it is almost needless to

[1] *Cf.* Spinoza's "*omnis determinatio est negatio.*" I (viz. my actual consciousness) am determined by the system of my perceptions (*i.e.* of the synthesis of my sensations and thoughts) to realise an objective world.

say, is not what it is popularly supposed to be—that is, is not mere speculation on things in general. It is an inquiry into the truest, the most comprehensive significance of reality. It reduces the world of our common-sense experience, no less than the same world as metamorphosed by scientific thought, to what is at once its most immediate and most ultimate expression—to wit, to a system of determinations of consciousness-in-general. In this way, the radicalness of the opposition between thought and thing is abolished.

Were thought and thing utterly distinct from each other, as is commonly supposed, the world of philosophic thought would, of course, be impossible, but so would be also the world of common-sense reality. A reality containing no thought element would be unapprehensible, since every apperception or general term is nothing but a form of thought. This is true from the lowest to the highest. To know a thing, whether in ordinary experience or in science, is the same as to define it under thought-forms or general concepts.

All reality is object of either possible or actual knowledge, or it could not be spoken of. An *unknown* reality, a reality not an actual object of knowledge, may be spoken of, but certainly not an *unknowable* reality, a something that is not a possible object of knowledge. I do not mean to say that all knowledge is primarily logical, for, as I shall endeavour to show later on, undoubtedly the *a*logical is not only an element, but a primary element, in all experience. An element, however, *qua* element, is not a reality, but an abstraction. Reality, as already pointed out, necessarily implies a synthesis of at least two elements, and nothing short of reality can be *content* or *object of consciousness*, the two terms being, in fact, synonymous. In ordinary consciousness—external perception—the ultimate elements of a reality or thing are an alogical feeling or sensation, and a logical form or category. What, for example, is meant by the terms we use to express the objects of ordinary consciousness—"table," "house," "tree," etc? We affirm a thing to be a "table" by virtue of connecting in thought certain sensations under certain universal forms or categories. Its reality as "table" involves at once its distinction from other realities that are not "table," and its

relational identification with certain other realities under certain universal concepts common to all objects.[1]

The empiricists of the Associational school, like the scholastic nominalists, are fond of dilating on the fact that the repeated experience of a particular object builds up in the individual mind the universal notion of the object in question. This may be quite true if it be meant that the individual mind becomes aware of the fact that an object is what it is through reflection on experience, and that it is thus enabled to abstract in reflective thought the universal concept from the object. But this does not prevent this universal concept from forming part of the object in the original perception of it. The thought-element or concept-relation which the mind abstracts, is originally there to be abstracted. All that Empiricism, therefore, has to teach us in this connection resolves itself into the truism that the abstract concept of reflection, or, to apply the scholastic phrase, consciousness in its "second intention," cannot be identified precisely with the same concept as element of the concrete world, or as entering into consciousness in its "first-intention"—to wit, as in the original perception. The

[1] Two elements are to be detected here—viz. in perception: (1) the sensation or feltness which is immediate and pure particularity. By this I mean that in the perception constituting an object, while I recognise the total synthesis as "common to all" (as Kant had it) I cannot *know* that the element of sensation is the *same* to me and other conscious beings. I can never tell that what I call red is identical with what my neighbour calls red in the concrete necktie we both perceive; (2) we *infer* from the feltness or sense-datum a common object producing the same sense-impression in both of us, but the sameness is an inference merely, though it may be a necessary one.

Objection may, however, possibly be taken to my using the term "feltness" as an equivalent for "sensation"—*i.e.* for the affections of all the five senses. It may be said that "seeing" or "hearing" are not "feeling" or even "feltness." This, of course, refers to the popular identification of the verb "to feel" exclusively with tactile sensation. This narrowing of the verb "to feel" and its derivatives to the tactile sense, though it may have its practical convenience for popular phraseology, I cannot but regard as otherwise untenable. All sensation belongs to the sphere of feeling. Seeing and hearing are sense impressions, and as such are in their own way even tactile. I prefer the word "feltness" as representing the sense-element in the object apperceived, since the word "feeling" seems to have too subjective a savour in the psychological sense. Moreover, there is a tendency nowadays to confine it to those personal feelings involving a pleasure-pain reference.

universal and necessary element which all reality, all objectivity, involves, is clearly *thought* into the object. Yet although thought into the object, it is as clearly not thought into it by the individual mind, since the latter finds it already there in the object as perceived. If we take it away from the object, the object ceases to be object and becomes a mere cluster of sensations. In ordinary perception, the individual mind finds the category embedded in the object presented to it.

Now, as to the second element. In an ordinary perception of our common-sense consciousness, if *per impossibile* we abstract from the thing, the table, tree, or house, all the special categories under which it is apperceived, up to those that are involved in the nature of every object, such as substantiality, causal connection with the universe of objects, etc., we shall find that all that remains over is divers modes of feltness—to wit, the sense-impressions we term the primary and secondary qualities of matter. Once the universal and necessary element in the synthesis, the element of thought-forms, of categories, is gone, the reality, the object, has vanished, leaving the *caput mortuum* blind sensation or feltness in its place. The formal, the logical element, in the synthesis under which the alogical feltness was apperceived, is thus seen to be as essential an element in the concrete object as the feltness itself. The element of feltness in the object represents the passive and particular side in the primary conscious synthesis; the concept-form represents the active and universal side. The first appears as the contingent, the second as the necessary, element. Further, the feltness is primary, immediate, and through and through particular in consciousness, while the apperceiving thought is secondary, mediate, and through and through universal.

Thought presupposes the sense-element as its substratum, its Aristotelian "first matter." The relations that thought strikes out are struck out of feltness. Thought reduces the inchoate feltness to definiteness by bringing it under an apperceptive unity. But the form of apperception, the concept-form, is always universal, from its highest to its lowest determinations. For example, the very specialised concept "Northampton shoemaker" is no less universal than the

supremely general concept "pure being," familiar to us in Porphyry's "tree." From "being" *per se*—that is, "pure being"—to "being" as differentiated in the concept "Northampton shoemaker" is a far cry, but in its lowest specialised shape, no less than in its most highly generalised, the concept-form remains equally universal. It is never particular. It has no *thisness* accruing to it. Another peculiarity of the concept-form is that it is outside *number*. It *de*-notes a possible infinity of particulars, which is tantamount to saying that it has no *de*-notation. Its significance is purely *con*-notative.[1]

Hence it is that the concept-form never touches the *thisness* of the object. The latter is always distinguished from it as immediate feltness, as its raw material. Thus the logical, or thought *per se*, is exclusively universal, and never touches the particular at any point. For this reason, language, the empirical sign of thought, can never express anything except through logical universals. The very *this* of language, like its *here* and its *now*, is necessarily universalised. It has passed through the mill of thought, and has therefore become, as Hegel long ago pointed out in the opening of the *Phänomenologie* (pp. 73-80), any *this*, any *here*, and any *now*. In other words, it has been universalised by the action of reflective thought, and thereby been turned into a psychological *notion*. The true *thisness* or particularity, having thus been mediatised by reflective thought, has ceased to be its original self. The true *this* cannot be expressed in thought or language. It is essentially immediacy, and when mediatised disappears, leaving behind it a mere simulacrum of its former self. This is at basis the gulf that always separates thinking from being, or thought from feltness. I am here speaking of the abstract thought of the reflecting mind. The mere remembered object has, of course, its own existence as a mental image, even though it has no existence in space in the sense in which the original object had

[1] This distinguishes the true concept-form, the true logical universal, from what may be called a false general concept, denoting a definite congeries of particulars—for instance, the name of a committee standing for an assignable number of definite persons. This false general concept has no connotation, but merely a denotation.

existence. The element of feltness which enters into every determinate consciousness is always antithetical to the thought-form. The one is the foundation of the particular, the other of the universal. The one is through and through alogical, the other through and through logical. Yet these two elements, the material, the sense-particular, and the formal, the thought-universal, antithetical though they be, have a common root and presupposition—to wit, the potentiality of all consciousness expressed in the term "I" ("ego"), the fathomless "that which," whence all conscious experience, possible and actual, arises, and into which it returns. This ultimate subject of all knowledge and knowability, though always becoming object through its primary negation, feltness, and its reaction thereupon, thought, yet is never exhausted in the object (*i.e.* in the synthesis of its sensation and thought), but always maintains itself as the centre in a process out of which these elements well up, and into which they return.

Here we come to an important point. In the primary synthesis of consciousness as such, in the ultimate apperceptive unity of knowing *per se*, we can distinguish, as already pointed out, three elements—(1) a "*that which*," an "I," feeling or sensating; (2) a *somewhat* felt; (3) a reacting of the former on the latter, termed *thought*. This last, the logical process of defining—that is, of at once distinguishing and connecting—completes the primary synthesis, implied in the countless subordinate syntheses constituting the woof of experience. Now, in orthodox Hegelianism, represented in England by the late Professor T. H. Green, Lord Haldane, and others, what is called the objective reference—that is, the determination of feltness as independent object—accrues solely to the third, the formal, element, that of thought, or logical determination. That the definiteness of the reference is logical is, of course, clear; but is it not primarily contained in the mere blind alogical feltness—what Fichte termed the "*Anstoss*"? In that negative element within the subject of consciousness itself, do we not find the very condition of the determinate objective reference of thought, the original opposition within the subject itself? Is it not the opposition between the feeling self and the feltness that confronts it as its negation or limita-

tion? The answer to this question given by the school referred to—namely, that out of thought alone is reality constructed—is connected with a widespread tendency, hitherto dominant in speculation more or less from Plato downwards, to hold that the concept-form, or at least thought as relating activity (of which the concept-form is regarded as the product), is absolute.

In Plato we have the classical expression of the hypostatisation of the concept-form *per se*, in Aristotle and Hegel that of the activity generating it. This way of regarding the primary synthesis of consciousness, and hence the complex of reality which is its content, I term Pallogism. It reappears in various thinkers who have concerned themselves with constructive metaphysic, or Theory of Knowledge. We find it in the more constructive schoolmen as well as in Spinoza, and considerable traces of it in Kant. In the νοῦς ποιητικός of Aristotle, Hegel saw with justice an adumbration of his own theory of the "*Idee*," which is also nothing else than the hypostatisation of the relating activity of thought.[1]

The subject, as the presupposition of this activity, Hegel rejected as a relic of the thing-in-itself, treating it as a mere product of thought-activity. With him the ego was a function of thought, and not thought a function of the ego. May we not surely regard the formalism of which the Hegelian system bears the impress, and which led to its collapse, as the Nemesis brought upon him by this very hypostasis of thought? That the apperceptive activity of thought is a necessary element in all conscious experience is plain, but it is quite the reverse of plain that this thought-activity is itself the root-principle of the conscious synthesis. But this assumption, that thought itself constitutes the totality of all things, had become so deeply ingrained in modern speculation that until quite recently to attack it was like desecrating the holy of holies of metaphysic. Yet it amounts to nothing less than the assertion that in the last resort the world of reality is nought but a mere system of thought-forms subsisting, so to say, *in vacuo*. All that is not

[1] By hypostatisation is, of course, meant the treatment of a metaphysical element of a concrete as though it were itself an independent concrete—*i.e.* a reality *per se*.

form, all that is not logical, is ignored or assumed to be absorbed in the final synthesis of thought.

Viewing the question from another standpoint, the moment of conscious immediacy, the actual, is similarly regarded by this school of thinkers as the only valid element in the synthesis. Yet why this mere moment of immediate apprehension, the mere surface of consciousness, should be of such transcendent significance over the infinity of implications it connotes—in a word, over the potential element in which it is embedded—is never demonstrated, although it is assumed. Why is that vanishing moment, the actual, regarded as absorbing the potential, and as the ultimate factor of all reality? In every concrete consciousness the vanishing moment is surely the least important factor. The mere look, the actual awareness of any object of external perception, is simply the sign or indication of an indefinite number of potentialities behind the mere present appearance, that is, of elements that are outside actual consciousness.

When we consider the conditions of knowledge rather than its object, a corresponding result of the analysis discloses itself. The subject which knows or is conscious—which constitutes its own determinations into a world of objects—knows itself under the form of individuation—that is, as a memory-synthesis within which it continuously becomes realised. This is the self-object, the individual mind or soul of psychology, sometimes termed the "empirical ego." But it may be said that the subject of knowledge is merely a name for the universal element in experience, just as the sense-factor, the feltness therein, refers to the particular element. It may be said that they are correlative, and that neither is more fundamental than the other. My reply to this is that the categorised feltnesses constituting the world of perception—that is, the world of common-sense reality—presuppose a subject of consciousness, of which they are the determinations. Although a bare ego, undetermined even as mere feltness, a subject without object, may be unimaginable, it is not therefore self-contradictory and absurd, as is the notion of a bare object cut off from a subject—in a word, a system of conscious determinations out of relation to any *that* of which they *are* the determinations. The object

is always reducible to an affection of the subject. On the other hand, a conscious subject does not presuppose its own object in the same sense, although it may be quite true that it is unimaginable without object.[1] It is clear, then, that the potentiality of consciousness-in-general, which we term Subject or "pure ego," is not on precisely the same level with its own actualised expression, the object-world. It has a presuppositional value, a "genetic" priority, over the latter. This relation is reproduced within the object-world itself as the infinity of implications contained within this world, in contradistinction to its actuality as perceived, its mere superficial appearance as isolated phenomenon. It is this potential element in the object, its "permanent possibilities of sensation," to adapt Mill's well-known phrase to a somewhat extended meaning, by virtue of which we intuitively postulate it as a *somewhat* existing independently of our individual consciousness with its particular acts of perception. Modern Idealism shows us, indeed, that it does not exist apart from ourselves in the sense of apart from that ultimate element in ourselves, the Subject which all knowing presupposes, but that it does nevertheless obtain independently of ourselves as concrete individual minds—that is, apart from the particular memory-synthesis that knits together our experience as a particular whole in time, as "mine" as opposed to "thine" or "his."

But if the world resolve itself on analysis into a system of presentments or determinations of a Subject-in-general, the "I" of self-reference, as it is termed, it follows that this latter assumes the place of a *materia prima* of consciousness, of which the world of reality is the form. All that exists is referable to this one root, whilst the Subject is not referable to aught beyond itself. This ultimate postulate, this ground of all feeling, willing, and thinking, is yet never exhausted in feeling, willing, and thinking, but always maintains itself as the radiating centre from which these elements of sensation, self-activity, and thought, come, and to which they return. The primary sense-element is related to the subject of consciousness in a double manner. Firstly, it is related as the mere negation of

[1] We are of course in no way concerned here with the materialistic conclusions of science, legitimate in their own sphere.

the subject, the "*Anstoss*" of Fichte; secondly, this self-negation is at once distinguished from, and related to, the Subject under certain thought-forms and the sense-forms of time and space, as a connected system of possible and actual feltness—that is, as object-world. In these three terms or momenta—(1) the abstract "I" of self-reference, or subject-in-general; (2) the bare object as such, the mere antithesis within itself of the subject; (3) the at once distinguishing and unifying action of thought-activity integrating the inchoate feltness, the bare object, as a system or world—in these three terms we have the framework of the trichotomy or dialectic that Hegel attempted to formulate in his own way.

It is not our intention in the present work to discuss the question of the special categories that help to make reality what it is. This is a topic upon which much has been, and may be, written on various lines. It is sufficient for our purpose here to point out once more that, of the salient categories of objectivity—viz. substance, cause and reciprocal action—the last-named is pre-eminently the working category at once of the higher sciences and of philosophic thought. The one-sided determination expressed by the thought-form "cause-and-effect" inevitably yields when a given department of reality is viewed from a more comprehensive standpoint, to the thought-form "mutual-determination" (*Wechselwirkung*).

The principle of individuation or particularity, and therewith of number, first arises within the object-world integrated by thought as a connected universe. The "world" displays itself as numerical infinity. As opposed to this, consciousness-in-general acquires in the individual mind, in the "object of the internal sense," as Kant terms it, a numerical unity antithetical to this numerical infinity. But it is a pseudo-unity only, in the sense that it is not an absolute unity like the primary Subject, which is conscious of *it*, just as it is conscious of other objects. There is, moreover, another difference. The world of external objects as content of experience is given immediately as a plurality. My personality or individual mind, on the contrary, is only indirectly given, as a unit. The immediate apperception of *myself* as this and no other memory-synthesis, gives colour to the notion that my individual mind

is absolute, and hence, to the time-honoured fallacy of the subjective idealist—Solipsism. But thought revolts against such an assumption as inconsistent with its apperception of the world-system as a whole. It thereby reduces the memory-synthesis or personality, the *myself*, from the rank of an *absolute unity* to that of a relative unit, in fact, in one sense to the level of external objects in space, as being a sensible, particular representative of a logical universal, a class or kind—namely, " minds " or " personalities." Myself as personality or memory-synthesis is an object—*i.e.* a particular determination of consciousness-in-general, just as much as any external object in space. But this psychological object, Kant's " object of the internal sense," in that it is identified in its immediacy with the subject of consciousness-in-general, is unique in its character. The phrase " I am self-conscious " simply indicates the immediate identification of the Subject of consciousness-in-general with this my particular memory-synthesis, here and now, as object.

In the consciousness of external objects no such identification is made. In the external perception of common-sense experience, we have a more or less definite unity of possible or actual feltnesses as terms knit together by thought-forms. Such is what we term the external universe. The relations of this same external universe are reproduced in the memory-synthesis of the individual mind as abstract psychological concepts. This fact that objective thought-relations, when reproduced as abstract mental concepts within an individual memory-synthesis, are no longer the same as they were in their other capacity as entering into the synthesis of the real world—in other words, as immediate determinations of the Subject of consciousness-in-general—has led to the confusion of which Empiricism is guilty, of regarding thought and thing, knowing mind and known world, as radically disparate entities or (if one will) " series of phenomena." Modern Idealism dissipates this confusion in showing that mental and material facts are " cut out of one block," that *things* are but sense-modifications of consciousness brought into unity in a system of apperceptive syntheses, and that *ideas* in the mind are but these same apperceptive syntheses reproduced at second hand, *in abstracto*, by

reflection. But both alike are modifications of conscious experience. That the abstract notion is not the same as the corresponding thought-form as entering into the original apprehension of reality, that the one cannot take the place of the other, is obvious, but on their *essential* identity rests the possibility of our primary concrete consciousness itself no less than of the "ideas" which the reflective consciousness of the individual abstracts therefrom, and which are so scornfully opposed to "things," alike by the common-sense Philistine and the empirical philosopher. From this it will be clear that philosophy does not impose mental figments on reality, or mistake them for reality. It simply analyses concrete consciousness, or reality as given, and presents the results of this analysis, the elements of which reality is composed, in the form of abstract notions.

It is at the point of self-consciousness that the Subject, as the eternal possibility of knowing, and the Object, as the eternal possibility of the known, coalesce, and thus proclaim their essential unity. The difficulty of the ordinary man in understanding that reality is nothing else than a system of related impressions of consciousness-in-general, of which his memory-synthesis is simply the temporary determination—the notion he has that his mind truly apprehends a reality subsisting *per se*—rests upon his inability to grasp the cardinal distinction just indicated. He fails to distinguish between the mental world on the one hand—that is, the sum of thoughts and feelings knit together by memory and called mind—and, on the other hand, the subject or "I" to which this mind-object is referred (together with all other objects though in a manner *sui generis*). Alike the "mental world," of reflection and memory and the "material world" of direct perception are parts of the experience of this latter—*i.e.* the "I" of Kant's "original unity of apperception," termed here the Subject of consciousness-in-general. The assumption of a world outside myself, in the last resort, means nothing but the ascription of a certain section of my sensations to a universal element in my consciousness valid for all alike—that is, an element not peculiar to myself as individual, as is the play of my personal thoughts and feelings, which are given in the synthesis, and which

I recognise as belonging exclusively to me and to no one else.

We will now sum up the foregoing argument. The central truth that metaphysic has established is that reality is nothing but a system of modifications of consciousness possible and actual. When we talk of the real world, what we mean is the related and articulated system of these modifications. To speak of an existence that does not belong to the system of consciousness is a self-contradiction—a meaningless absurdity. On analysis then, as already stated, the primary form of the unity of consciousness presupposed in all its modifications implies three elements—(1) an "I" as subject which feels; (2) an opposing feltness, the negation of this "I" as such; and (3) the reciprocal fixation of the feltness by the subject which feels and conversely. The first two of these elements constitute respectively the possibility of apprehending and the possibility of apprehendedness. We may term them the *matter* of consciousness. The third element, that of reciprocal relation, which we call thought, reason, or the logical, as *form* of consciousness completes the primary synthesis—*i.e.* consciousness-in-general—the universal synthesis which all more concrete modifications presuppose. Such, and nothing else, is the ultimate nature of reality. The above synthesis is the eternal framework of reality, and when we postulate reality in any sense whatever, this it is that we wittingly or unwittingly postulate. On close inspection this primordial synthesis resolves itself, strictly speaking, into its primary element, as Fichte showed, for Feltness is nothing but a modification of "I" as feeling, and Thought is again nothing but the reaction of the *that* which feels upon the *what* of its feltness. *Thatness* means ultimately bare subject; *whatness* bare object. The function of philosophy as metaphysic is to analyse the conditions of experience, and in doing so it finds a synthetic process eternally passing through the same elements, which elements, though clearly distinguishable in thought, never appear separate in fact. This primary synthesis, implied in all consciousness whatever, and discernible in the immediacy of every conscious moment, furnishes the mould or *schema* for all reality in its dynamic aspect—that is, for every real process

of experience. Throughout the whole system of the universe we have the selfsame elements recurring in a transformed guise. Hence the ultimate aim of philosophy is the tracing of these elements in every plane of reality, and their exposition in the forms of reflective thought. The attempt to do this was made by Hegel, but the result was vitiated, in part at least, by the assumption that the formal element, thought or the concept, was ultimate, and that the alogical elements in the real were finally resolvable into thought-forms. This led necessarily to a hypostatisation of thought or the logical *per se*.

Even time itself has no meaning except within the primordial synthesis of experience above spoken of, the triple momenta of which are eternally translating and re-translating themselves as time-content. Here we have the true inwardness of causation and evolution. From this it follows that the highest point to which any science can be brought is where its subject-matter can be presented as a dialectical process—that is, where the elements of the original conscious synthesis referred to are discerned as transformed and translated in the various aspects of the real world, and are accurately expressed in the forms of abstract thought. This, though the highest ideal of scientific analysis, has not yet been fully realised in any department.

CHAPTER II

MODERN IDEALISM

The great achievement of the German classical philosophy from Kant to Hegel is the definite overthrow of the old materialist, spiritualist, and dualist, standpoints respectively, by its having made clear once for all, the futility of attempting to explain consciousness by any system of its own modifications, by anything that lies *within* consciousness, an attempt resembling that of Baron Münchausen to pull himself out of the water by his own wig. This should be obvious, since these modifications necessarily themselves presuppose consciousness. All the three standpoints referred to involve the absurdity of subordinating consciousness as a whole to something less comprehensive than itself, to something that is itself a content of consciousness, such as physical substance, or mind, in the psychological sense, as particularised in the personality. The gist of the standpoint arrived at by Modern Idealism initiated in the Kant-Hegel movement, as we have seen in the last chapter, consists on the recognition of the fact that existence or reality must mean knowableness and knownness—in other words, that it obtains only in and for conscious experience—a conscious experience not limited by any particular memory-synthesis or individual mind, but constituting the eternal possibility of the infinite number of memory-syntheses that co-exist with and succeed each other in the time-order.

The distinction between what is conventionally termed Realism and Idealism in Philosophy may be briefly explained as follows :—

The world of objects, and the sensations we regard as referable to it, presents itself as something *toto genere* distinct and apart from our personal or empirical ego. Of this we have no doubt whatever—it presents itself as a somewhat common to all. You and I and the rest of us, provided, of course, our

organs of sense are in fairly normal condition, perceive the same objects, see the same colour, hear the same sound, smell the same smell, if it is really "there," as the expression is. But whence comes this identity of this consciousness of our personal and particular egos in the sensated and perceived object which we assume justifies us in expecting our fellow-humans and may be our fellow-animals to be conscious of the same perceptions and sensations as ourselves if the latter are really "there" and not due to some abnormal condition of our personal organs of sense—in other words, are not "hallucinations"?

Now the philosophic realist, so far as this point goes, postulates his perceptions and sensations, in so far as they are not personal hallucination, to be referable to a world of external objects as their ground. The idealist, on the other hand, does not admit the validity of the assumption of a world of objects obtaining *per se—i.e.* independently of consciousness altogether —but would refer the sameness, the identity, behind the given perception of yours or of mine by virtue of which the consciousness of our respective personal egos unites in the object-world as identically the same object-world, though perceived by numerically distinct sense organs and minds, to a common basis of consciousness behind the actual consciousness accruing to the indefinite series of individual percipients. Respecting this common basis or potentiality of all consciousness we know nothing and can assert nothing save that it is of the nature of a subject or ground of consciousness in some sense radically identical with but yet infinitely more than any or all of its particular focalised manifestations. It is true that some philosophical Idealists have, starting from this postulate of the ultimateness of the principle of Subjectivity, sought to erect thereupon a quasi-philosophical superstructure and to convert a metaphysical postulate into a psuedo-personality to which they can give the appellation—God. They do not see, however, that in the process of doing this they deprive the postulate in question of its meaning as the ultimate ground of all conscious reality. As pointed out later on, the moment you convert this principle of Subjectivity into a personality, the moment you endow it with the attributes of our mind and will, you have merely got one more personal focus of consciousness

over against others, which in its turn would equally presuppose the postulate in question, and so on to infinity. This ultimate principle of Subjectivity—the Pure Ego of Philosophy—can never exhaust itself in any single or any finite number of empirical egos. Its full realisation in this direction presupposes Infinity—an Infinity of such empirical or object egos. Hence it is that the moment you personalise it you destroy it as a postulate and so deprive it of all meaning.

Now this general position, when conceded, opens up more than one controversial issue, apart from what is known as philosophical Theism, above indicated, but which we will now consider more closely. The hypothesis of philosophic, as distinguished from popular, Theism, is that consciousness-in-general not merely obtains as a bare potentiality realisable in the infinity of individual minds, of whose consciousness it forms the basis, but is realised apart therefrom in a mind that overshadows all such individual minds, a mind having at least a quasi-individual existence as personality in a manner independent of them. It is maintained that only by participation in the consciousness of this individuo-universal mind is reality apprehended. On this theory two or three sufficiently pertinent criticisms may be made. If this divine mind be conceived pallogistically as hypostasis of thought-forms, and nevertheless in some undefined sense as a personality, as by the old Hegelian "right," it may be objected that all personality as such involves alogical as well as logical elements. (*Cf.* Chapter III. on "The Alogical and the Logical.") A personal intelligence composed of pure concepts would be a pure abstraction, and no intelligence at all. But, apart from this, the assumption in any form or shape of the absolute element at the basis of our consciousness obtaining under conditions fundamentally different from those known to us, remains an assumption merely, an assumption which could only be justified if it could be shown to be a necessary postulate involved in the self-consistency of experience as a whole. This, however, is surely not the case. All that the analysis of the conditions of our experience discloses to us is that consciousness is realised primarily in a so-called "external" world or material complex as reflected in a mind or mental complex. The things composing this external world

are commonly called "real," a word which in popular discourse is used in contradistinction to the word "ideal," which is used for the feelings and thoughts exclusively pertaining to the mind. Now we submit that no analysis of the conditions of experience can discover this "divine mind" to us, if by a "divine mind" we are to understand in this connection, an eternally concrete and actual self-consciousness. But apart from the pallogistic difficulty referred to above as regards such a self-consciousness, it is, we must again insist, impossible to show, not only that it is a *necessary* assumption, but that it is an assumption subserving any purpose of explanation whatsoever. It does not do so for the simple reason that an eternally complete and yet personal consciousness must be just as much independent of our consciousness as any one individual mind is independent of another. Where you have concrete personality in whatever shape, you have the element of particularity introduced, that very element of individuation that separates one human mind from all others. The conception of one more personality distinct from mine, no matter how much wider and more magnificent the range of its personal consciousness might be, cannot possibly add anything to, or substract anything from, the explanation of my personal consciousness here and now, or serve in any way to elucidate the processes of my consciousness. Consciousness-in-general is, *qua* the actual self-consciousness of the individual, merely potential, and in any other connection it cannot concern us as *philosophers* (however it may otherwise). The foregoing objection is, of itself, fatal to the claims of philosophical Theism even as a useful hypothesis in philosophic analysis, let alone as a necessary postulate of speculation. Such being the case, our only attitude with regard to the question must at best be the agnostic one.

We have already repeatedly insisted on the fact that all the apperceptive unifications or thought-forms of Consciousness presuppose two alogical factors—a subject feeling and a sensation felt—or, as I have termed it in this book, a "feltness." This is the most generalised expression of their matter or content. Now it has been the habit of many thinkers and exponents of the main issues of the metaphysical problem to treat the alogical element in experience merely as an imperfection,

a clumsy vehicle of the logical. According to this view the alogical is merely a negation or a passing phase of the logical principle itself. The potentiality of the subject and of the blind feltness or sensation which is at once the affirmation and limitation of the subject is regarded as absorbed and abolished in the logical categories that are necessary to its actualisation as reality (Hegel). The Platonic *universalia ante rem* is perhaps the earliest and crudest expression of this doctrine of Pallogism, which would constitute the thought-form as Reality.

It is also traceable, though in a less crude form, in Plato's nominal critic, Aristotle, and through him in the "Realistic" Schoolmen. Coming to modern times, we find most of the great synthetic thinkers as representing it. Specially notable among these is Spinoza, with whom, in spite of the initial assumptions of his system, the attribute of Thought undoubtedly occupies a position of exclusive predominance. The thinker with whom the doctrine of Pallogism is more intimately connected than any other is Hegel. Hegel is emphatically the philosophical hierophant of Pallogism for modern times. His system represents the most complete working-out of the principle of Pallogism in philosophy which the world has seen. The extreme Pallogism of the Hegelian position was met, even during Hegel's lifetime, by a counterblast from one who, like himself, belonged to the main stem of the Modern Idealism that dates from Kant—namely, Schopenhauer. The protagonist of modern Pessimism, whatever else he did, postulated an alogical principle—impulse or will—as the *prius* of consciousness, and therewith of the reality that is its product. For Schopenhauer, and metaphysicians influenced by him, the alogical is the presupposition of all things, and the logical merely the post-supposition. Herbart also from another point of view undoubtedly represents a reaction against the pallogistic formalism of the Hegelian system. It is to Hegel therefore, and to those followers of Hegel who, like the late Thomas Hill Green, are inclined to accentuate rather than otherwise this side of his system, that criticism is more especially directed in discussing Pallogism. With Hegel, *taking him in his most uniform and consistent attitude*, reality is simply thought-

process, the timeless evolution of the concept. Hence it is for him merely an eternally evolving system of logic or synthesis of thought-relations. The antithesis of form and matter is unessential. In the last resort, matter is absorbed and abolished in form. The primal elements of consciousness, the subject constituting the possibility of knowing and that self-negation or feltness which is the root-principle of the object as such, are alike for Hegel mere momenta or incomplete terms in the one process of the "thinking of thought." They are treated as *Ansichseyn*, *Fürsichseyn*, and *Anundfürsichseyn* (In-itselfness, For-itselfness, and In-and-for-itselfness), which are, with Hegel, the triple momenta at the basis of all reality.[1]

The logical in its highest form as "*Idee*," the eternally complete system of thought-determinations, is, in the Hegelian philosophy, the Alpha and Omega of all things. There is no subject of thought proper, but the mere thought-activity with Hegel hypostatised as "*Idee*" creates what we call the Subject. Subject is its self-determination, just as Object is its self-determination, no more and no less. Hence the Hegelian concept or "*Idee*" has been compared to a bridge without ends. It is a system of relations *in vacuo* without a *that* or a *what*, which is related. We observe throughout in Hegel a dread of the *thing-in-itself*—the *thing-in-itself* being the absurd guise in which the alogical elements in the general synthesis of consciousness had appeared in earlier philosophies, especially in Kant. Hegel evidently suffered from noumenophobia. Hence his Pallogism is more uncompromising and thorough-going than that of other thinkers. Now, the notion of the thing-in-itself, if by this be meant a reality or object existing outside all possible consciousness, is a manifest contradiction in terms. But though there may be no thing-in-itself, there is

[1] "*Ansichseyn*" represents in Hegel's system the immediacy of the "I" as feeling; "*Fürsichseyn*" represents the self-negation of the "I" as feltness; "*Anundfürsichseyn*" represents the completed experience or reality as mediatised by thought, the reciprocal relation of the alogical antitheses. This terminology is of use even for those who do not accept the Hegelian Pallogism. The middle term, the "*Fürsichseyn*," is the moment of separation and antithesis, or of isolation. This isolation is abolished in the third term and the unity re-affirmed, no longer embryonic as in the first term, but fully-fledged and developed—a unity in difference.

undoubtedly an in-itselfness in the thing—that is, in reality—and not merely as a passing phase, but an ineradicable *in-itselfness* that is never abolished by *for-itselfness*. This stubborn truth at times gives Hegel trouble, and forces him to strange devices of language in order to save the situation for his pallogistic thesis. But in spite of the colossal ingenuity displayed in the attempt to evolve reality out of thought-forms alone, the suspicion that, after all, we are wandering through what Hegel himself calls a "world of shadows," pursues us as we follow his exposition. The philosophic need, on the other hand, demands an adequate formulation in reflective thought, of reality as such, and not merely of its relational forms. On this rock of Pallogism his system therefore made shipwreck. The conviction that out of *thought* alone *thing* can never be deduced, that all thought-determinations are determinations of a *somewhat*, which *somewhat*, though not distinct from consciousness, is nevertheless distinguishable from the *thought-element* in consciousness, and that not merely in *degree* but in *kind*—this is a conviction against which Pallogism dashes itself in vain, and which in the long run it hopelessly endeavours to circumvent by the devices of exposition. If words have any meaning, conceptivity does not constitute in itself the whole synthesis of experience.

The gist of the standpoint of Modern Idealism dating from Kant is undoubtedly the explicit recognition of the truth that all existence must mean knowableness or knownness, or that the universe exists only as experience. And if, as I have heard certain Hegelian friends contend, this is all that is meant by Hegel's "*Begriff*" or "*Idee*," the criticism resolves itself into one of terminology ; but the consequences of the pallogistic abstractness of the Hegelian main position are abundantly evidenced in the working out of the system. Any formulation that makes Thought the Alpha and Omega of all things issues in a stasis. In its final result it inevitably takes the form of a complete and perfect divine mind composed of pure concepts, from which is eliminated all the material element in reality, all that is alogical, all feeling, all particularity, all contingency, all impulse or will as such—in a word, the whole of the dynamical factor in experience. Now, it ought to be at once evident

to the practised thinker that this reduction of all things to pure logical determination, to a consciousness that is nothing but one vast self-sufficient system of thought-forms, to a consciousness, to put the matter in another way, that is pure actuality, in which consciousness the shadow of the potential is not, means bidding farewell to the real altogether. For all concreteness, all reality, as such, discloses itself on analysis as presupposing the alogical elements above referred to, and presupposing them not as mere vanishing phases of the logical, but as *permanent* and *necessary* elements of every real synthesis, without which elements the reality vanishes, leaving behind an abstraction as its *caput mortuum*.

It is impossible even to conceive of any real synthesis from which elements that are through and through alogical are excluded. An absolute thought, if it mean anything at all, must mean a disembodied relation without a *that* which is related, and no system of such disembodied relations can even represent reality for reflection, let alone give us reality. What gives us reality is certain primary alogical elements, of which the logical category, under which they are apperceived, is the mere relational *form*, and which are hence presupposed by this *form* as its condition. The postulate of all thought is the feltness of an "ego" or subject, which becomes realised as experience through this very feltness, which is its own negation (the "*Anstoss*" of Fichte). This subject of knowledge, which is the primary postulate of all consciousness, may be conceived, as with Fichte, as the eternal possibility of knowing, or, with Schopenhauer and to some extent with Schelling, as the infinite *nisus* or impulse towards an end, into the attainment of which conscious experience enters. Hegel thought that he was making an advance on Fichte and Schelling (of Schopenhauer he was probably unaware) in eliminating the material element in the system of experience in favour of the hypostatisation of the formal element. In doing this, he claimed to be getting rid of the last relic of the old Kantian thing-in-itself. What he really did get rid of was, as already said, the *material* side of experience, thereby taking leave of reality altogether and entrenching himself in a castle of abstractions. Get rid of the alogical elements entirely he could not, and therefore

he had to fit them into his system and serve them up for reflective thought under the guise of categories, while ignoring their real nature in doing so. Now this may be a juggle, but it is a juggle that is very plausible, as we shall see later on, and it has undoubtedly imposed upon many thinkers of eminence and acuteness. In the modern English Hegelian school, for example, this point is particularly noticeable.

The way in which the juggle accomplishes itself is, we submit, as follows :—Philosophy as metaphysic is the formulation in the terms of reflective consciousness of the conditions involved in the constitution of our primary apperceptive consciousness (consciousness-in-general). Now, reflective consciousness always operates through abstract thought-forms—that is, through thought-forms not as constituting an element of a real apperceptive synthesis, but as reproduced in the mind, crystallised as abstract mental notions. Even within the realm of the Logical itself—*e.g.* in thinking of any objective relation or law—it necessarily takes on the form and colour of such an abstract mental notion. It is not the same thing as it was as constituting part of the object-world, but is translated by reflection into its own psychological terms.

It is clear, therefore, that the *material* element, the alogical, the element of blind feltness or sensation, by the very fact that it is the antithesis of thought, cannot appear in the reflective consciousness (which is nothing if not logical) save as represented by a mental concept as its sign. Hence it seems unimpeachable to treat the alogical groundwork of experience as an attenuated concept. ("Being," itself, in this way, becomes merely the poorest and most barren of categories.) And this is done by the Hegelians in the case of all such alogical elements as "being," sense-quality, etc.

"Being" means simply the *possibility* of knowing and knownness as opposed to their *actuality*, in the last resort the subject as opposed to the object. In this sense it is identical with the bare subject of knowledge and with its ultimate opposition within itself, Fichte's "*Anstoss*," or, as we have termed it here, primary feltness, which represents the elementary form of the object as opposed to the subject. (See discussion in Chapter III.) Now these elements, presupposed in every apperceptive

synthesis, are certainly alogical. They may be distinguished by reflective thought as components, nay, the very groundwork of reality, but they cannot be expressed by the former save, as above said, in the unsatisfactory guise of a mental notion with a very poor content. The same applies to the attempt to translate the alogical element of sense-quality into the forms of reflective thought. Here logicians and psychologists have recognised an anomaly, and endeavoured to explain it away. The outcome of the apparent reduction of alogical elements to the logical notion may be termed pseudo-concepts as opposed to true logical forms. One of the tests of the alogical, it may be here remarked, is that it always involves infinity as opposed to the logical, which is always *de*finite. (*Cf.* Chapter III. on "The Alogical and the Logical.")

It may be here not out of place to discuss briefly the attempts that have been made to eliminate the notion of the primary Subject or pure "ego" from philosophy. If there is anything in the present day that acts as a red rag to the metaphysical critic, it is to talk about the "ego." He bristles up at the bare mention of the word. The metaphysical or epistemological "ego" is a windmill against which he tilts at once. He will tell you how the idea of an ultimate "ego," or ground of knowing, is merely based on the grammatical necessity for every predicate to have a subject. Perceptions, therefore, are taken to involve a perceiver, consciousness to involve a something that is conscious, and so on; in other words, it is assumed that this metaphysical postulate is based upon a mere necessity of grammar. In talking thus it never enters into the critic's calculation that he may be putting the cart before the horse, and that this admittedly deep-lying grammatical principle may be itself derivative from a still deeper lying metaphysical principle—that the grammatical requirement that every predicate shall have a subject does not hang *in vacuo*, but may itself be the reflection of a fundamental postulate presupposed in all consciousness, and *a fortiori* in all thought, alike whether expressing itself in grammar, in the terms of ordinary logic, or otherwise.

Then again, confusing between the metaphysical and the psychological use of the word "ego," the critic will assure you

that the notion of an "ego" altogether is traceable to the *ensemble* of organic sensation, a fact which probably does play a part in the notion of the empirical self. (*Cf.* Chapter IV. on "The Individual Consciousness.") There are indeed a dozen different ways in which the smart critic will prove to you that the notion of a pure "ego" is illegitimate, and show you how the fallacy involved therein arises. But if you examine his arguments you will find that they take for granted throughout the very assumption it is their business to controvert. The pure "ego" has been sometimes described (*e.g.* Professor Ward, *Ency. Brit.*, ninth edition, article "Psychology") as "an imaginary subject" behind the psychological "ego." This, I take it, is also inaccurate. The "pure subject" is not an imaginary subject in any ordinary sense of the word "imaginary." It is the ultimate postulate of all thought and action whatever. In a word, it is the supreme postulate involved in the ultimate coherence or self-consistency of consciousness itself. You may disprove its legitimacy in showing its want of justification by a formal process of ratiocination, but rid yourself of implying it you cannot. We may call this ultimate postulate by whatever term we please. We may speak of it as a "somewhat," an "it," if we will, as *that which* feels and thinks in us. But there is no gain in this. Whatever we may say, what we mean is always an "I," which is the basis of feeling and thinking. Schopenhauer, in terming the pure Subject "will" or "will to live," was in a sense justified, and what is substantially his position we find recently adopted by various writers as the latest word on the philosophic problem. (*Cf.* F. C. S. Schiller, William James, *passim*; also Hugo Munsterberg in "Psychology and Life," etc.) When we hear the determinations of consciousness (which we term in their assumed totality the object-world) described as *au fond* "practical postulates," when we read of the will as being the real subject, and of object as being act of will, we see plainly that we are following on the lines of the *Welt als Wille*, and even on those of the Fichtean philosophy in its later form. As above said, whether we use the term "will" for the pure subject as such, or reserve this term for its primary function, what we mean is the same. It is the primordial apperceiving principle that is

meant, as opposed to the thought-forms in which its fundamental opposition within itself, the object, becomes realised. It is emphatically the alogical and the potential, which the logical and the actual presuppose, in the composition of the real world.

Those who endeavour to lay before the uninitiated the general principle of philosophic Idealism, that consciousness embraces all things, are usually confronted with some such popular observations as the following :—" Consciousness is an attribute of living beings, and is only an incident in the reality of things. A blow on the head will make me unconscious, but the world goes on just the same." If the interlocutor is a modern up-to-date physiologist, he will, of course, point out the obvious truism that consciousness, as the attribute of living beings, is indissolubly bound up with the brain and nervous system, and here, confounding the physiological and psychological standpoints, will probably describe consciousness as a function of the brain. He will duly expound how the lobes of the brain " think "—he means, of course, " cerebrate "—and give us the benefit of sundry other established commonplaces of modern science, which, in themselves, no one worth considering calls in question in the present day, whatever exception may sometimes be taken to the phraseology in which they are stated, or to the metaphysical inferences fastened upon them. The non-philosophical man, whether common-sensible or scientific, cannot understand that philosophic Idealism does not in the least impugn the premises of scientific Materialism, so long as the latter keeps within the four corners of its own problem and does not make poaching excursions into the domains of metaphysic, theory of knowledge, or psychology, attempting to translate its own abstract point of view, its own solution of its own problem, into a solution of the wider problem with which philosophy deals. The representative of the philosophic point of view, after hearing his scientific or common-sense friend's exposition with due respect, might put to him the following :—" What, then, are brain lobes, nervous systems, animal organisms themselves, other than modifications of physical substance, and what is physical substance but resistant extension, and what does resistant extension mean save a

modification of perception—in other words, the content of consciousness, possible or actual? " The friend may be posed for a moment, but he will probably remain unconvinced that there is anything fundamentally wrong in his initial attitude, which consists in a confusion between consciousness-in-general, the *ultima ratio* of philosophy, and consciousness viewed as a particular fact—that is, abstracted and isolated as a concomitant of certain physiological conditions and functions of living beings.

Even the psychological view is, properly speaking, abstract. Our own mind is regarded from the standpoint of psychology as object among other objects of a certain class or kind, not as Subject in the true sense of the word. Abstraction is made even in psychology from the conditions of consciousness-in-general, and the mind is treated as an independent somewhat or thing. It is torn up from its roots, as a particular determination or content of the potentiality of all consciousness *per se*, and is held in solution as a more or less isolated fact.

We have already dealt in the course of the present chapter with the priority of elements constituting this " permanent possibility of consciousness " (to adapt Mill's phrase). This question is the chief point with those thinkers who take their stand on the only tenable philosophical position, according to which the object-world is nothing other than the content of a possible consciousness, of which position the development of philosophy in Germany, from Kant to Hegel, is typical. Kant attempted to place these elements side by side. With Fichte it was from the outset uncertain whether the " ego," which was his fundamental postulate, was conceived as the pure form of thought or as will, that is, as alogical impulse, though in the later period of his system the latter view seems to predominate. With Schelling this position becomes further accentuated, and by Schopenhauer it is definitely made the corner-stone of his philosophical construction. Hegel, on the contrary, is the consistent apostle of the thought-form or the logical. Reality is for him nothing but the system of all possible thought-forms, of all logical relations. These various positions we find cropping up at the present day, both in Great Britain and on the Continent. But we may note the fact that,

whatever view be adopted on this point, most prominent thinkers who handle the ultimate metaphysical problem at all, are practically at one in occupying the standing-ground that, let the nearer definition be what it may, the Absolute is at least identical with consciousness *as such* rather than with any given *content* of Consciousness.

CHAPTER III

THE ALOGICAL AND THE LOGICAL AS ULTIMATE ELEMENTS

We have seen in the preceding chapters that the most comprehensive view from which the world can be regarded is that of a system of modifications of consciousness possible and actual. This point of view will be familiar to everyone in the least acquainted with the literature of modern philosophic Idealism. Here we have the philosophical standpoint *par excellence*. It is different, as we have pointed out, alike from the common-sense *a*pprehension, and from the scientific *com*prehension, of the world, and cannot be reduced to any terms wider than itself. The position occupied by philosophic thought in its strict sense is therefore ultimate, since, while all reality can be formulated in its terms, these terms cannot in the last resort be brought under any higher principle of explanation than themselves. The task of philosophy in its technical application (Theory of Knowledge and Metaphysic) is the analysis of the conditions at the foundation of the conscious synthesis, for the latter is the framework of the system of our experience—namely, of those modifications of consciousness that all others presuppose, and hence that form the warp and woof of the world of our knowledge and *a fortiori* of its translation into the abstract terms of reflective thought. Now, we have found that conscious experience implies in the last resort (1) a potentiality of *knowing*, which we call subject; (2) a potentiality of *known-ness*, which we call object; and (3) a determinate relation involving at once the distinction of the one *from* the other, and the identification of the one *in* the other. Here we have the elementary synthesis discernible in all *immediate apprehension* or *thisness*. The object, we can see, is ultimately no more than the subject's own modification, while, similarly, the subject is no more than an abstraction apart from its modification in the object. In this relation of reciprocal distinction

and identification we have the primary germ of the logical, or of the *form* of experience in contradistinction to the two previous terms implied therein (its *matter*), which are therefore non-logical (alogical). The subject as alogical is practically identifiable with what in Theory of Knowledge and Psychology appears as feeling and will.[1]

Hence in analysing the above ultimate elements or aspects of consciousness, which, as we have already remarked (pp. 51-52), reappear in a disguised form on every plane of experience, however complex its conditions may be, we have come upon a salient distinction that interpenetrates the whole of reality. This distinction, which has already been forestalled in the previous chapter, I have expressed by the words the "alogical" and the "logical" elements in experience. The antithesis in question coincides in the main, although not entirely, with the Aristotelian antitheses of matter and form, and of potentiality and actuality. Alike in the elements of consciousness and in the content of consciousness, be that however far removed in point of complexity from those elements, we can trace this salient antithesis or its derivatives. The history of philosophy in its more vital bearings, as we have seen, mainly hinges upon this antithesis and upon the relative importance assigned to its terms respectively. From Plato downwards the tendency has been to hypostatise the logical at the expense of the alogical. We have criticised this doctrine chiefly with reference to its most thorough-going and consistent expression—namely, in the Hegelian philosophy, that "ballet of bloodless categories," as Mr Bradley has called it.

It may be well here, before entering upon any more detailed discussion of the subject, to enumerate the principal modes in which the aforesaid antithesis manifests itself. *Quoad* the elements of consciousness, we find will and sensation or feeling, as the alogical in antithesis to the thought-form as the logical. *Quoad* the content of common-sense consciousness we have the same opposition in the shape of the becoming of that which

[1] I am far from regarding the opposition of sensation or feeling to will as ultimate, any more than that of its correlate object to subject. It seems to me that feeling might admissibly be defined as static will, and will as dynamic feeling.

is not, and of a completed reality as given. The primary antithesis of sensation to thought becomes the starting-point of certain leading antitheses in the concrete world that we may term *modes* of the primary antithesis of the ALOGICAL AND LOGICAL. The chief of these may be enumerated as the antitheses of *particular and universal, being and appearance* (*phenomenon*), *infinite and finite*, and *chance and law*. In addition to these leading antitheses there are any number of subordinate ones, which are also in the last resort resolvable into the fundamental antithesis of alogical and logical. To take two instances only, and those from psychology, there is the antithesis of instinct and reason, or again of action from blind passion, and from an intelligent recognition of means and end.

The antithesis of *particular and universal* lies at the root of all experience whatsoever, of all definite apperception of reality. From Plato to Kant the blind "sense-manifold" has been repeatedly opposed to the intelligible principle; in Plato to the idea, in Kant to the constitutive category. Recently (*cf.* Professor Ward, article "Psychology," *Ency. Brit.*, ninth edition, and elsewhere) exception has been taken to regarding the matter of sense as a discrete manifold at all—in other words, to introducing the notion of number, in favour of regarding it as an indefinite continuum. This latter view, however, will not alter the fact that the first modification of this sense-continuum, by its reduction under temporal and spacial relations, is in the direction of changing the indefinite unity of the continuum into a numerical infinity. It is, indeed, as such that it is immediately distinguishable, in the synthesis of consciousness, from the system of categories under which it is apperceived, and hence which give it its reality. Every apperceptive unity, every thought-form or logical universal, presupposes an infinite number of particulars as potentially coming under it. Hence although in the last resort the matter of sense may perhaps be properly postulated as a continuum, yet for the purpose of a working theory of knowledge it seems to me that we cannot avoid treating it from the old point of view as a sense-manifold. It is this sense-manifold in space and time that gives us the particular and individual as opposed to the universal —the first being the matter, the second the form, of reality.

This sense-manifold supplies the particular element in experience, and the particular itself, as thus given, has two modes, an *extensive* and an *intensive*, or, as they might otherwise be expressed, a *quantitative* and a *qualitative*. As *extensive*, particularity is given as numerical infinity; as *intensive*, as a finite unity—as immediacy or *thisness*.

In speaking, or even thinking, of particularity and its modes, as in all other cases of the alogical, we are of course compelled to regard it under the form of the concept. As thought of in reflection, it necessarily takes on the form of thought. But this must not blind us to the fact that in its "first intention," to use the scholastic phrase, as a basal element of reality itself, it is essentially antithetic to the thought-form.

Infinite numerical repetition in space and time, and a correlative finite unity in immediate apprehension or *thisness*, are, then, the hall-marks of the alogical particular, as opposed to the logical universal. The universal, on the other hand, as distinguished therefrom, is always a unity without a *thisness*. It is never immediate, but always *mediate*—in other words, a formal unity, as such, independent of time ("time apart").

The logical universal has three forms, the class-name, the abstract quality, and the relation pure and simple. Let us take them in order. The universal in its first form may descend from the most rarefied regions of abstraction in a succession of gradations towards the concrete. But however low it descends, it always remains universal—that is, a thought-unity without a sense-thisness, and hence *per se* can never touch the concrete. This we have already pointed out in passing, in the last chapter. It remains eternally an abstraction. The universal terms "dog" and "cricket-ball" are, strictly speaking, no nearer to the concrete thing with its particularity —to wit, its potentially infinite numerical repetition and its actual *thisness*—than is "pure being" or "object" (in general), as universal terms. Both alike are abstract notions. With the other form of the universal, abstract quality, the antithesis to the particular is of itself sufficiently obvious. A quality (attribute, property, adjective, etc.) apart from an object into which it enters can plainly never be anything else than a pure abstraction. That the class-name universals "dog," "horse,"

" tree," in so far as they have no *thisness*, are no less abstractions, is, as just said, equally true, though not quite so obvious at first sight. Finally, the relation-universal is the basis of the concept-forms, which are pre-eminently termed categories —namely, those concept-forms that enter into the construction of experience itself, the Kantian categories of the " Transcendental Analytic " or the leading categories of the Hegelian Logic, etc. Of these the principal are, substance (unity of qualities), cause, reciprocal action. It is, however, unnecessary to say anything more here concerning this leading department of the logical, except to point out that we call this the *relational form pure and simple*, inasmuch as it has no content save that of the relation itself, whereas the class-name and the (adjectival) quality respectively, have a content other than *mere* relation— namely, the indefinite sense-reference.

It was Kant who pointed out that primarily time and secondarily space were the connecting links between the thought-universal and the sense-particular. In the loose language of popular philosophy, space and time are often referred to as, according to Kant, " forms of thought." This only illustrates the confusion of the popular mind on philosophical questions. If there is one thing Kant made clear, it is that space and time are not forms of thought, but forms of sense. Hence, formal as they are, they are through and through alogical, and thus have no direct affinity with the categories or true forms of thought, which are through and through logical. On the basis of the principle of space and time being forms of sense-perception, Kant showed that number or infinite repetition, temporal or spacial, as the quantitative mode of the particular, is that which mediates between the concept-form and the particular instance in its immediate or qualitative mood as *thisness*.[1] The category realises itself in a possible infinitude of particulars in time and space. Particularity and individuation has always been regarded by thinkers, from Plato and Aristotle through the schoolmen down to Kant, as pre-eminently the potential factor or matter, which the concept *in*forms. For Plato it was the non-existent element of sense ;

[1] Plato seems to have had an adumbration of this when he speaks of " number " as coming between the world of sense and the world of ideas.

it was the blurring or confusion of the Logical (the Platonic Idea). What we find, however, on analysis of the conditions of experience is, that this alogical element of particularity is as essential a principle in the completed synthesis as the universal itself in all its forms. (This is a point which the modern Platonists, the orthodox Hegelians, overlook.) But, on the other hand, it is no less true that the particular, the element over and above the universalising thought-form, has just as little meaning apart from this thought-form as the thought-form has apart from it. (This is what the Associational school overlook.) The contention of the Associational Empiricist, therefore, that the many alone can be said to exist, and that the unifying *one* that is discoverable therein is no more than a psychological abstraction, is just as invalid as the Platonic *universalia ante rem*, according to which the universal or conceptual element has an independent existence apart from the manifold of particular instances in which it is realised. The elements of sense-manyness and conceptual one-ness respectively are equally unreal apart from their synthetic union. Neither is *per se* more or less unreal than the other.

The two modes of particularity are correlative. The qualitative *thisness* (or simple immediacy) is unstable, and this instability is corrected by the possibility of repetition *ad infinitum* in time. The two modes may also be viewed respectively as potential and actual. The infinite repetition of the sense-world is, of course, purely potential; the *thisness*, on the contrary, may be defined as pure actuality. *Now* and *here* themselves indeed are in the last resort simple abstract forms of *thisness*. Kant obviously meant as much when he spoke of them as forms of sensibility as opposed to the pure intelligibility of the concept-form. *Thisness*, as such, the immediate conscious moment, always appears in reflection as the centre of infinite time. We speak of the "flow of time," but how is that flow to be regarded, as from past to future, or from future to past? Ought we to conceive of time as carrying us ahead along with it, or as meeting us and going by us? The time-content, as subordinated to the category of cause and effect, must undoubtedly be considered as moving from the past to the future, from that which has happened to that which shall happen; but, from

another point of view, we are also compelled to regard the future as approaching us. Language itself indicates this. We speak of a time that is coming, and of a time past and gone. There would, therefore, seem to be a double flow of time and its content. Viewed under the category of causation, time and its content undoubtedly flow from past to future; but, looked at in another way, we are as undoubtedly meeting time and its content. The actual moment of consciousness, whence its content derives the *thisness*, is the contact between these two flows; it may be called literally a metaphysical point. Every given moment presupposes a past moment. Past time and future time, alike non-existent—non-actual—in themselves, are the essential elements of the actual moment. Past time and future time are alike, in a sense, potential. The *now*, the actual moment of consciousness, which is nothing but at once the point of contact and of separation between them, and which hence appears always as at the middle of time, alone represents the actual. The content of past time we describe as *real*, notwithstanding that it is not realised, or even realisable, in any empirical consciousness. We say that Cæsar's crossing of the Rubicon is a *real fact* of history; yet this event, by the conditions of time, can never become actualised—can never acquire a *thisness*—for any intelligence. Similarly the events that happened to us yesterday we say are *real* by the same conditions of time, although they also cannot as events enter into any actual moment of consciousness. But there is an important distinction between the two cases. The events of yesterday, though no more actualisable than Cæsar's crossing of the Rubicon, are nevertheless contained within the limits of a present individual memory-synthesis, whereas Cæsar's exploits are not. Now the question arises: Is the attribute *real* which involves, in the former case, inclusion within the limits of a memory-synthesis, having its *point d'appui* in the present moment of immediacy or *thisness*, also applied in the latter case and for the same reason? If so, it may possibly have some corroborative bearing upon the speculation we shall have occasion to discuss later on. (See Chapter IV.)

So much for the past as time-mode, but what of the future as time-mode? The reaching forward towards the future

is as much an element in the actuality of the present moment in its *thisness* as the reaching backward towards the past. (1) There is no actual, there is no cognisable, *now* of consciousness, the content of which is not ultimately analysable into a series. An indivisible metaphysical point of *filled* time is, strictly speaking, inconceivable. (2) But, paradox as it may seem, one element in this composite *now* is already future. The element of mere outlooking, of pure actuality or *thisness*, is future, *quoad* the content that it grips in its outlook. In this sense we may say that the past is only known by the future, the synthesis of the two constituting the present moment, the *minimum cognisabile* or metaphysical point of concrete consciousness. The future, therefore, though not itself *real*, is nevertheless as much a constitutive moment of actual consciousness as the past. Further, viewing the potential content of the future under the category of causation, it is seen to be really implicit in the content of the past. The actual moment above referred to of the union in synthesis of the two elements, the immediate past and the immediate future, may be compared to an eddy produced by two tides at their confluence.[1]

The antithesis of *being and appearance* is an extremely important one, especially for speculative thought. I must premise that now and always I use the word "being," not as synonymous with reality, but exclusively as referring to the *that* in the object in contradistinction to the *what*. The *that*, or, as I term it, the *being*, is purely alogical; while the *what*, which coincides with the appearance, always involves a relation, even if only in so far as it implies the relation of distinction, as in the case of bare quality. Reality, again, is constituted exclusively by the synthesis of these two elements—(1) the *being*, the *that*, of the object, and (2) the *what*, its essence, manifestation, or appearance. These two elements can be distinguished in reflection, but neither of them *per se* is concrete—that is, can become object; in their synthesis alone is reality

[1] There is a somewhat logomachous sense, it may be observed, in which time, as the source of flowing, cannot be described as itself fluent; just as motion cannot be spoken of as itself moving. But in each case this is, I need scarcely say, a mere verbal quibble. Time means the form of change or flow in the principle of *thisness*, just as motion means the form of change of an extended body in space.

given. In the same way I distinguish between "being" and "existence." Existence is synonymous with reality, with Being *plus* Appearance, with "that" *plus* "what." Appearance without Being is not real or existent, but neither is Being without Appearance real or existent.

Now, what do we mean when we use the verb-substantive? What do we mean when we say that something *is*? We mean more, I take it, than that it exists as mere object, even as object for all consciousness. When we say that a thing *is*, when we affirm *being* of it, I think we impute to it implicitly the primary and fundamental element of all conscious experience —namely, subjectivity, or that which we can only otherwise define in words as the potentiality of feeling, willing, and thinking. This principle of subjectivity (ego) we postulate immediately as the *that* which is *manifested* in the phenomenon that "appears" as a modification of our perceptive consciousness. It is this alogical element that we postulate as the groundwork of the appearance with its logical categories and implications. In this way the subject is translated over into the object, and serves as the basis of the latter's reality. The object is, in an undefined way, assumed to involve the principle of subjectivity within itself, in addition to its objective sense-qualities and logical categories.

This has its bearing on the latest formulation of the Materialism of modern science, which in definite terms attributes "a subjective side" to all physical substance from the hypothetical atom to the living animal organism. It is common to speak of inorganic physical substance as "blind unconscious matter." This is, no doubt, all right so far as it goes, but it is apt to be forgotten that the unconscious is not the extra-conscious; unconsciousness is not outside the realm of subjectivity or of *possible* consciousness. For example, we speak with perfect correctness of a stone as unconscious; yet, in so far as we postulate "being" of a stone, we are postulating, as I contend, a possibility of consciousness in the stone—in a word, the stone is for us *un*-conscious, but not *extra*-conscious. An abstraction alone is extra-conscious in this sense—to wit, that while it of course enters, as an element, into the object or content of consciousness—otherwise it would be nothing at all—yet it contains

no principle of subjectivity within itself. Being, or subjectivity, cannot be postulated of it. We should not say of an isosceles triangle, of the colour green, or of the virtue magnanimity, that it was unconscious, as we should of the stone, for the simple reason that we recognise these abstract notions immediately as *in themselves*, not, like the stone, *un*conscious, but *extra*-conscious, in the sense that they cannot possibly contain *within themselves* the principle of *subjectivity* or of potential consciousness. They are simply abstractions (at most, *elements* of objectivity) *within* an actual consciousness, deriving their sole validity therefrom. No special reality, no physical object, on the other hand, can be thought of as extra-conscious—namely, as outside the realm of subjectivity or *possible* consciousness, though it may very well be conceived of as unconscious—that is, as not *actually* conscious.[1]

In the thought and language of common-sense, no less than in that of philosophical speculation, the *being* of a thing will be found on examination to mean the alogical side imputed to it, the potential element in its constitution, in contradistinction to the logical determinations accruing to it as actualised phenomenon. For example, a delirious patient in the ward of a hospital sees a skeleton looking over the shoulder of the doctor who is at the foot of the bed. Now, both the doctor and the chair on which he is sitting are said to be *real* in the sense that "being" is imputed to them, while the skeleton is called an illusion, since "being" is denied of it. The distinction here does not lie in the actualised appearance, the phenomenon, for *qua* phenomena the doctor, his chair, the bed-post, and the skeleton may be equally good. It lies in the alogical, the potential, element, which is assumed as at the basis of the one, while it is absent in the other. This element it is which, involving, as it does, an infinity of implications, is meant when the object thought is said to be real. When we speak of the

[1] It is curious to notice, in connection with the above, that the limited and naïve language of primitive man scarcely contains the verb "to be," some verb signifying "to live" taking its place. Thus instead of saying, "The axe is in the hut," the savage would say, "Axe live in hut." The so-called verb-substantive is the outcome of a series of distinctions drawn by an instinctive metaphysic. The whole theory of animism common to primitive man is also in accordance with this view.

" being " of a thing, we mean precisely that element in it which is *not* appearance. The appearance (phenomenon) is regarded merely as the *sign* of the " being " ; it is the former side to which the infinite implications of all real objects in the world-order are relegated as their ultimate source. Similarly, in the word " reality," used as in common parlance, in opposition to " illusion," we have the stress laid upon the being-element in the synthesis which the word properly speaking connotes. The *reality* of the object means that behind any and all its *actual* appearances there is an inexhaustible continuum constituting a reservoir of *possible* manifestations indicated by the word " being," as postulated with regard to it. The antithesis of noumenon and phenomenon as applied to the object is based on the above distinction.

It is often said that the crucial difference between a reality and an illusion consists in the fact that the former can be assigned a definite place in the articulated system of things we call the universe—that it fits into the causal and reciprocal connection involved in consciousness-in-general—whereas to the latter no such place can be assigned, since it does not fit into the system of consciousness-in-general, but is the exclusive product of the individual consciousness considered as particular. There is, no doubt, a great deal of justice in this view ; but while conceding all its due claims, I still cannot admit that the assumption of an alogical basis, a *being* (in the sense in which the word is here used), is any the less necessary to constitute an appearance *real* as opposed to *illusory*. For a given perception to be real as opposed to hallucinatory we postulate, I should say, that it is not exhausted in the appearance, but that there is an alogical remainder behind, and the fact of our conceding to it this alogical remainder, or *being*, forces us to separate it from our individual consciousness, and to regard it as defined by the categories that determine the world for all possible experience—that is, for consciousness-in-general. Hence arises the independence of the object.

The antithesis of *infinite and finite* is an important mode of the cardinal antithesis with which this chapter deals—namely, that between the Alogical and the Logical. Infinity, properly speaking, accrues invariably to the alogical. I am aware that

a distinction has been drawn between the true and the false infinite, the latter term being applied to the infinite of the "sense-manifold." On the other hand, from Plato downwards, the concept-form, the eternal idea, is supposed to stand for the true infinite. The logical universal, however, is in its very essence *de*-fining, considered as such. The infinity that can be predicated of it falls, strictly speaking, to the limitless repetition of instances that it covers—in other words, it falls to its antithesis, the particular. The concept-form as such is nothing if not a principle of limitation. On the other hand, the subject as such—sensibility, will—has no such principle of limitation. Hence the impossibility of finding an adequate formula in the terms of reflective thought, whose medium is the logical concept, for anything involving infinity. Thought-activity, being in its very nature *de*-finitive, glances off the element of *in*-finity in every judgment it makes. No judgment, that is to say, can express an infinite content. The element of infinity in the content inevitably eludes it, just as does the element of particularity, or the element of "being," since they are all of them modes of the alogical, and hence antithetical to the judgment, which is nothing if not through and through logical.

But the objection may be taken here that the alogical in general, no less than in its special modes, is a notion, that it has a conceptual character, and that otherwise it could not be spoken of. This point has been already dealt with, but it may be well to recur to it here, in view of its apparent plausibility. In order to enter into abstract thought at all, these alogical elements must be indicable under the universal form of thinking. This indicability under the concept-form, as notion, does not mean that the alogical, in any of its modes, enters *per se* into abstract thought. Herein lies the kernel of the distinction between truth and reality; in its highest form, between philosophy and life. Truth, at least in its scientific or philosophic sense, is always abstract; all its determinations are, strictly speaking, concept-forms merely. When, however, abstract thought attempts to indicate the alogical, *per se*, in contradistinction to expressing *relations* between distinguishable alogical elements, the result is a pseudo-concept or *notion*, which reveals its inadequacy as soon as we press it or seek to draw

conclusions from it as though it were a true concept. We then become involved in all sorts of antinomies, contradictions, and unthinkabilities. We shall have an illustration of this directly, when we come to discuss the antithesis of chance and law. But it may further be objected: If the antithesis be so thorough-going as is implied, how can the alogical element be even indicated in the abstract thought of reflection? How can they meet together at all, even to this extent? The answer is that, thorough-going as is the antithesis as such, both its sides find their unity, their common ground, in consciousness as a synthesis, and in the Subject, which is the root-principle of consciousness. The Subject, primarily alogical though it be, creates nevertheless in its self-differentiation as subject-object that element of relativity necessary to all experience of which the abstract thought of reflection is the highest expression.

We come now to perhaps the most popular mode of the cardinal antithesis of alogical and logical—that in which it most effectively strikes the "man in the street"—*i.e.* the antithesis between *chance and law*. It is a favourite saw of popular Pallogism—one of the few occasions on which the philosophical theory of Pallogism appears in popular thought—that there is no such thing as chance in the world. Every happening in time, it is alleged, is capable of reduction to law and to some cause, so that an intelligence able to seize, in one eternal glance, the entire universe at this moment could construct therefrom the whole past and the whole future. Chance, it is said, is only the name that we give to our imperfect knowledge. Now, let us see how far this is true and where it breaks down. It will be observed that we have here to deal with the infinite particular and its modes. We are concerned with infinite time, with infinite space, and with infinite collocations of matter-in-motion—that is, with infinite collocations of the content of time and space. As we have just seen, infinity is a mode of the alogical. Infinity implies matter, not form; potentiality, not actuality. Now, to start with the popular metaphor of an "eternal glance." An eternal glance may mean one of two things; it may mean the apprehension of the content of an infinite time and of an infinite space—namely, of the particular as infinite repetition—or it may mean an "intelligible

apperception" that has nothing to do with time or its content. Since, however, we are dealing with particular happenings in a time-process, it is quite clear that it cannot be used in the latter sense. It must mean, therefore, in connection with chance and law, the immediate apprehension, as *thisness*, of an infinite time-content. But an immediate and actual apprehension of an infinite time-series is clearly self-contradictory. A limitless time-content plainly requires limitless time for its apprehension. Even if recourse be had to the second sense in which the phrase "eternal glance" may be used, not alone would this be, as above shown, inapplicable to the problem under discussion, but it would be no less inadmissible as hypothesis than the one above referred to. Neither of them represents the possibility of a real synthesis. In the former sense it is attempted to ascribe reality to the alogical *per se*, while excluding the logical. In the latter sense, the still greater absurdity, if possible, is committed of attempting to ascribe reality to the logical *per se*. In either case, we are hypostatising an abstraction, forgetting that the Real necessarily implies the synthesis of both these cardinal elements of consciousness. The Real is invariably and necessarily a synthesis of at least these two elements within consciousness; it cannot be reduced to a simpler expression.

As in the case of the alogical modes that we have already considered, so here in that of chance, the alogical side of the antithesis under consideration—as opposed to law, or the logical side—the element of infinity indirectly enters. Quantitative particularity implies unlimited repetition. "Being" implies infinity, in so far as it involves an infinite possibility of relations. For instance, in the example given of reality and illusion, of the too-too solid flesh and broadcloth of the doctor (or the solid wood or brass of the bed-post), on the one hand, and the airy nothingness of the alleged skeleton on the other, we have said that of the one *being* was predicated, as underlying the appearance, and of the other *being* was denied.[1] It was

[1] The illusory character of the skeleton, we may remind the reader, would in no wise be affected by its being seen by more than one person. For twenty patients in the same ward to see the skeleton would not make it one whit more real than if only a single patient saw it.

this fact that the one set of appearances was assumed to have its basis in "being," while the other was assumed to have no such basis, that justified us in characterising the one as real, the other as illusory. But we shall see on closer examination that this means, further, that the reality of the one set of appearances, by virtue of the element of being (self-subsistence, subjectivity) ascribed to it, yet again implies an infinity of possible relations with the whole universe of appearances, conceived similarly as grounded in "being." In other words, reality is taken to involve a connected system of relations possible and actual (to wit, a universe), which are expressed in reflection by certain determining categories. Here again we have an expression of the opposition of the alogical and the logical. In the present antithesis, that of chance and law, we are chiefly concerned with the category expressing the connection governing temporal and spacial change—that of cause-and-effect. This represents the logical side of the antithesis, or law, as we term it; the other, the alogical side, or chance. Chance may be defined as that element in the reality of change—that is, in the flowing synthesis of events—which is irreducible to law or the causal category. Now, popular Pallogism adopts the line that in the last resort there is in the real world no alogical remainder left over, but that the infinitude of particulars must be assumed to be reducible to the logical category, the law of cause. Here, as elsewhere, the fallacy of regarding the logical as capable of *entirely* absorbing the alogical, is best brought home to the mind by pointing out that the element of infinity in the alogical would alone preclude its comprehension, as such, under the limitations of the concept-form. In every real process, at whatever stage we choose to take as our starting-point, although there is much in it which is perfectly reducible to law, yet there is always a remainder left over that cannot be reduced to law, or the relation of cause and effect (in contra-distinction to the subordinate one of mere antecedent and consequent). Every matter of *fact*, every event or happening in time, is conditioned as consequent, not alone by one infinite series, but by an infinite number of such series of events, each event of which might have happened otherwise. Thus in tracing back any event, we are confronted at every step with

an infinite vista of converging rays of circumstances, without the occurrence of any of which the particular event in question would not have happened—or at least not in the precise way in which it did happen. But each of these events is yet, in its turn, similarly conditioned by infinite vistas of events without which *it* would not have happened, and so on.

It is difficult to render one's meaning adequately clear by illustration, since in the nature of the case one can always spin out such an illustration indefinitely without exhausting it. However, as an effort in this direction, let us suppose a certain student, Julius Schmidt, performing on the fifteenth day of July 1919, at 11 A.M., in the laboratory of the Zürich Polytechnic, the familiar chemical experiment of combining oxygen and hydrogen so as to produce water. The causal element is apparent. The combination of the two gases—which have been mixed in due proportion of volume (2 of hydrogen to 1 of oxygen) according to the chemical formula—that is, according to law—determined by the electric spark, is the cause of the water being produced. This is not, however, the whole event, but an abstract element in the event. The event, as concrete, as happening in the real world, embraces a great deal more than this. When water is chemically produced in this world, there is an agent, at a particular moment of time, and in a given place, effecting the combination. Now, that this should happen on the fifteenth day of July 1919, at 11 A.M., on the particular spot of the earth's surface named, cannot, I contend, be treated as a pure case of causality. There is no chance in the production of the water, once the conditions are given; but that the conditions should be so given is a matter utterly irreducible to causation, attempt it which way we will, for every condition was empirically contingent on another condition, and so on to infinity. It is a case of (particular) antecedent and consequent, but not of (universal) cause and effect. Each condition might have been absent, or might have been associated with totally different circumstances. That Julius Schmidt was in the laboratory at the hour named was consequent on the failure of a friend to keep an appointment with him on the previous evening. This was contingent on the said friend having met another friend whom he had not seen for a long time,

and this again on something else, and so on to infinity. Had the friend kept his appointment, Schmidt would have had such an attack of "*Kater*" that he would not have been in the laboratory at all. The fact that Julius Schmidt is in the laboratory under any circumstances rests upon the fact of his studying practical chemistry, which is again contingent upon the circumstances that his father's failure in business necessitates his applying himself to something that holds out to him an early prospect of remuneration, and to the further circumstance that, owing to his father's personal influence with a firm of colour-manufacturers, the desired field was afforded by applied chemistry. The existence of the laboratory in Zürich was contingent upon the existence of the polytechnic school and of a university, and that again upon other combinations of historical circumstances. Once more, the existence of Julius Schmidt himself is contingent upon the meeting of his father and mother at an evening party many years before the date of the experiment related, and upon their subsequent marriage. It is unnecessary to go further. Although in each of these events, taken absolutely and viewed as isolated, it is possible to trace the category of cause, yet, when considered as concrete, as a *focusing* of an infinite series of events proceeding from "all quarters," there is an element of contingency, of chance, of alogicality in short—utterly irreducible to causality, but which forms, nevertheless, a part of the very substance of the event as *real.*

The point here insisted upon may easily be illustrated in a more striking manner if a case be supposed where a serious event, an event of national or international importance, hinges directly upon a trivial matter. For instance, imagine a journalist A. in the act of walking down Fleet Street. He is for two moments obstructed by colliding with a shoe-black, and just fails, in consequence, to catch a certain train at Ludgate Hill. In the train next following, which he takes, he meets an editor B., who asks him to write an article upon a question of foreign policy. This particular article, from a casual paragraph in it, leads to controversy on a certain Government measure, questions are asked in the House of Commons, an agitation is started in the country, leading finally to a change of Ministry. Now,

directly owing to the change of Ministry, a European war, which might otherwise have been avoided for an indefinite time, is precipitated, and the affairs of the whole world are affected thereby. How? Really by the shoe-black. The breaking out of the war was contingent upon a particular change of Government. This change hinged upon a certain agitation arising out of a certain controversy in a certain journal, and this controversy would not have been started but for the meeting of A. and B. Finally, A. and B. would not have met, we assume, but for the fact that a certain shoe-black obstructed A. at a certain point of space at a certain moment of time. Here we have indeed the category. The war, the change of Ministry, the influence of A.'s article, all these are reducible to general principles or laws, psychological, social, or historical, but the actual happening, when, where, and how it did, is like the production of the water in the Zürich laboratory, on the 15th of July 1919, by Julius Schmidt, an element irreducible to any general principle or law—in other words, is *pure chance*.

The alogical, in its *media* of space and time, is indeed being continually used up and absorbed by the logical in its progressive categorisation; but the process not only can never reach completion, but never makes any true approximation towards doing so, any more than a dog, trying to catch up its shadow, gets any nearer the mark he aims at. At every stage of the process infinity remains confronting us. The logic of causation can not only never overtake the infinity of chance, but, in spite of the illusion of reflection, can never make any real step towards doing so.

Viewed abstractly in reflection, time apart, we have only the category before us; but, as an event immediately given in time and space, we always have an element over and above the mere category. The function of the logical is at once to combine and to distinguish—in other words, to *define* the alogical content of consciousness. Every concept is a defining, every law a determining, of something previously undefined and undetermined, or imperfectly defined and imperfectly determined. The celebrated tree of Porphyry is but a progressive reduction of the vague infinity of the content of consciousness under progressively determinate concepts, or

"finitudes," as we may term them. Similarly, every law of nature and of mind is a reduction of the infinite potentiality or mere agency (δύναμις), under certain determining forms. It limits the infinite possibility of the agency *per se* in that it says: "Thus shall the happening be, and not otherwise." The determining, law-giving, logical, is waging incessant war upon the indeterminate, lawless alogical. It is this eternal process that constitutes the ceaseless movement of existence in space and time—"*das Schaffen am sausenden Webstuhl der Zeit.*" Hence this antithesis of chance and law is a very good test-case of the capacity of Pallogism to establish its position. On the face of things, in every event we can trace an element reducible to law and an element not so reducible. But, on the theory of Pallogism, which, as we have said, has in this instance passed over into popular thought, the above is an illusion: law is in truth all in all, and chance is swallowed up in law. When we come to analyse any concrete event, however, we invariably find it to contain an irresolvable chance-element, which thought in vain endeavours to force into the mould of the causal category. This irresolvable chance-element is the infinite particularity of the happening, the infinite possibility of its *thisness* in space and time. Most assuredly no concrete event is wholly made up of the chance-element any more than it is of the law-element. There are certain events that apparently show a preponderance of the latter and others of the former, but every event is, in the last resort, an indissoluble unity of both.

If we would consider the absurdity involved in the attempt to force the infinite details of chance into the Spanish boots of law, we have only to analyse the mathematical theory or alleged law of probabilities. Put in its simple form, this theory has two sides. It affirms (1) that in the tossing of coins, in the throwing of unloaded dice, or the turning of an accurate roulette wheel, etc., the appearance of the opposed chances is, over a long series, evenly balanced; but also (2) that in every separate case the probabilities of the appearance of each of the respective chances is equal. Thus, at Monte Carlo, let us say, after a run of ten reds, it is maintained that the chance of an appearance of an eleventh red exactly equals the chance of the

appearance of a black. Now, I think that it is not difficult to see that the two sides of this "law," as thus stated, contradict each other. If, on a long series, the chances must—as the "law" states—equalise each other, it is quite clear that at the end of a long series of one colour we must necessarily be nearer to the reappearance of the opposite colour than at the beginning of such series. In other words, if the first half of the "law" be correct, the eleventh spin of a red series must necessarily offer us a greater probability of the occurrence of black than of red. Gambling theorists are fond of emphasising that there is no reason assignable why the one should turn up rather than the other after any number of repetitions of the same "even chance." For, say they, after ten reds the red compartments remain as numerous and as capable of receiving the ivory ball as at the beginning of the series. How, therefore, it is asked, can the mere fact of the long repetition by any possibility adversely affect the chances of red again repeating itself? Now, it is clear, we again point out, that one of two alternatives must obtain. If there is any circumstance that, in a long series of wheel-turns, somewhere compels equality in the results of the turns, then the chances cannot be equal at each turn. On the other hand, if they *are* equal at each turn, then there is no assignable reason why one colour should not turn up to all eternity, for if it has turned up once, there is no assignable cause why it should not turn up again, and so on to infinity.

Furthermore, this so-called law of probabilities defines nothing. A true law always defines something—that is, it proclaims one event as necessary, and another as impossible. Thus, while affirming that certain events must happen, we likewise affirm that certain other events cannot happen, basing our assertion on the fact that they are contrary to the law of gravity, or to the laws of chemistry, physics, physiology, etc. But no event can, strictly speaking, be affirmed to be irreconcilable with the "law" of probabilities, as theoretically stated. The turning up of red a hundred times in succession at Monte Carlo, or of any other even chance in any game of chance, may be thought to be in defiance of this law; but should this improbability take place, the apologist for the "law" is quite equal to the occasion, for he will tell you that there is no chance,

however improbable, that *may* not turn up. Thus this "law" decides nothing and determines nothing, since every conceivable event can, "with a little shuffling," be made to accord with its theory. It is no true law, because it seeks to reduce the *per se* alogical element in experience under the logical category. To bring the former under the domain of causation, it would have to show it as the product of some determinate agency operating in a uniform manner. This is always traceable in the real up to a certain point, but also always in conjunction with elements that are not so traceable. Our inability to formulate, without involving self-contradiction, any theory of chance, is revealed by the antinomies we find ourselves involved in, the moment we attempt to do so—the moment we try to formulate the alogical in the relational terms of abstract thought.

But there is another argument sometimes urged in favour of the non-existence of chance as such. It is similar in character to that of the "eternal glance," of which it is indeed another version. It is often said that what we call chance simply implies imperfect knowledge. Were we to know all things, we are told, we should see them conforming to a rational plan. There would be no chance, no remainder left over unaccounted for by law; all things would be seen to happen as through and through determined by the conditions of a rational causation. This may be described as a "pious opinion," but no ground for it is discoverable by an analysis of the conditions of reality. We have already pointed out that every event is conditioned in its actual happening by an infinite regress of other events, each of which events is in its turn equally conditioned by an infinite regress of yet other events, and so on to infinity. This is a philosophical commonplace if you will, but it is a commonplace to the bearings of which much less than due weight is given in philosophical literature, for it involves nothing less than the recognition of chance as a *positive* principle in the series of events—in the time-movement of the real world. Each of these events, taken separately, our judgment tells us, might not have happened, or might have happened otherwise. A law or general principle of causation is, on the contrary, valid apart from all the particulars making up the

sensible content of time and space. It is through and through logical. We are justified undoubtedly—the pedantry of empirical psychologists of the Associational school notwithstanding—in asserting that a causal principle must always make good, that, for example, oxygen and hydrogen chemically combined according to the recognised formula *must necessarily* produce water. This is the *law*, the causal element, in the particular events constituting the exploits of Julius Schmidt on the date and at the time mentioned, in the particular laboratory referred to. But to allege that the matter of fact of the water being produced thus by the person at the place, on the day, and at the time of day indicated, is equally necessary, that you can reduce these things also under a law or universal causal formula, suggests, I submit, a state of intoxicated Pallogism that ignores the most salient distinctions, and indeed all factors in the analysis that do not suit its preconceptions. It is alleged that, could the whole circumstances be known, we should see the whole occurrence to be necessary, and not partly fortuitous. But herein, be it observed, lies an illusion and a false assumption. It is assumed that the whole circumstances *could* be known, and it is assumed that the circumstances themselves are *finite*, and therefore could be spoken of as a *whole*. Could we speak of the entire circumstances, we might possibly conceive this whole as known, but when with every step we take we are confronted with ever-fresh vistas of conditioning particulars, each one of which particulars is a *terminus ad quem* of a similar vista, it is clear that the mass of details with which we are met is infinite (the " bad infinite " of Hegel, if you will), and hence that we cannot speak of it as a whole at all. But a complete knowledge or comprehension of an infinity, we again insist, is absurd. We can only comprehend the determinate or the determinable. All thinking, being an act of determination, is necessarily a negation of infinity. The understanding or grasping, in the form of complete knowledge, of infinity, or of any content of consciousness involving infinity, is plainly, therefore, a contradiction in terms.

Most persons who rail at the idea of chance have at the back of their minds the notion of an absolute *prius* in the order of time, a complex of events, either uncaused or having the will

of a Supreme Being for its cause, whence all subsequent events are derivable. It is, at basis, the notion of a machine being set going. But if we confine ourselves to the analysis of experience as we find it, and refrain from reading into it gratuitous and even unthinkable hypotheses, we come to see that we can assign no beginning to the flux of events in time, the flux being co-extensive with time itself, and hence with reality (*cf.* Kant on the "antinomies"). Once having grasped this, we see the notion of an absolute *prius* to be absurd and meaningless. Starting from actual consciousness, we have to deal with an infinity *a parte ante* and *a parte post*.

The domain of the alogical particular is ever invaded by the logical universal. Ever wider generalisations are being made; continually fresh masses of fact are being reduced to order and law or general cause—in order words, to the logical. But this process, in spite of its ceaseless advance, makes no impression on the infinite remainder of chance—on the domain of the alogical. The logical, although by its very nature continually devouring the alogical, never gets a step nearer towards *exhausting* it. The above is conspicuously noticeable in the mode of the great antithesis we are just now considering—namely, that of chance and law. The chance element, which involves infinity, defies our efforts to reduce it under any logical formula whatever. The same applies, *mutatis mutandis*, throughout the whole domain of mathematics. The sphere of mathematical science is, as Kant pointed out, the sphere of time and space. In other words, mathematics deals with the realm of the particular—of the alogical. Hence in all the formulations of mathematics an antinomy is found to lurk; every branch of mathematics leads to mutual impossibilities of thought. This is particularly noticeable in the higher mathematics. In the lower branches it is more or less concealed by the utility of the results obtained in their character of "practical postulates."

We have now completed our consideration of the leading modes in which the cardinal antithesis of alogical and logical manifests itself in reality, and translates itself into reflective thought. In the next chapter, which will deal with psychological issues, we shall have occasion to point out other minor modes of this cardinal antithesis. Meanwhile, before conclud-

ing the present chapter, it may be worth while for me to forestall certain objections that may be taken to my employing the terms alogical and logical for the two complementary elements discoverable in every synthesis.

It may be objected that the word used for one term of the antitheses is purely negative. The answer to this is, that only by a negative can one adequately express for reflective thought, as notion, the element signified, taken as a whole and in all its bearings. The antithesis in question may coincide in many respects with that between matter and form, or again between potentiality and actuality. But neither the one nor the other expression, it seems to me, so completely covers the ground as that chosen. The antithesis, matter and form, is a sliding relation, as we may term it ; what is *material* in one relation may be *formal* in another. Hence in the terms matter and form as commonly used, matter may involve the logical element. It is only *qua* the special form of the logical that is for the moment under consideration, that matter is spoken of as alogical. The πρώτη ὕλη (primary and formless matter) of Aristotle, as against the εἶδος, certainly, however, approaches the notion very closely, at least on one of its sides. Then, again, the potential and the actual, although in general coinciding with the great antithesis termed by us the logical and the alogical, is also unsatisfactory if attempted to be used as interchangeable with the latter. For example, particularity considered as immediacy or *thisness*, while undoubtedly falling on the side of the alogical, cannot certainly be regarded or accurately spoken of as a potentiality. It is, on the contrary, actuality itself, actuality " of the first water." On the whole therefore, while not unmindful of a certain clumsiness, if one will, about them, I can find no better terms to designate the distinction meant than those of alogical and logical. This antithesis interpenetrates, down to its innermost marrow, all reality, the elements constituting which, clearly distinguishable though they be, cannot present themselves in complete isolation from each other, even in thought, much less in fact.

Let us sum up the results arrived at in the present chapter. We have seen how philosophic Idealism proves that all reality means experience, and that this again implies synthesis.

Within the primary synthesis of conscious experience, analysis discloses three fundamental terms as the ultimate terms to which this synthesis is reducible—an ultimate subject-element, an ultimate object-element within this subject as its otherness or self-negation, and the reciprocal relation between these primary terms. The primary elements themselves we have, for want of a better word, termed the alogical, and the relation between them we have indicated as the ultimate, the most generalised, form of the logical, or of thought in its strict sense. We have seen that in the antithesis here given of the alogical and logical, as primary terms or elements of all possible consciousness, we have the ultimate aspect of certain important antitheses interpenetrating reality, which I have termed the *modes* of the fundamental antithesis. The most salient of these we find to be *particular and universal, being and appearance, infinite and finite,* and *chance and law.* We have found that life, reality, as such, always bases itself on the alogical, but that thought, with its logical forms, while necessary to the completed synthesis of reality, can never finally comprehend or explain the ultimate terms of which it is the relation. We have traced this in the salient modes of the antithesis ; we have seen that the universal of thought can never completely grasp or absorb the particular of sense. We have seen that the appearance or phenomenon can never exhaust the being, the infinite possibility, of the object. We have seen that the limiting thought-form, the principle of finitude, can never cover the *in*-finitude that constitutes its material. Further, in the case of chance and law, we have seen that reality, as process in time, always involves an irreducible chance-element which the category of cause in vain endeavours to bring into subjection. We have also seen that the attempts of the logical to absorb or overcome the alogical inevitably land us in alternate impossibilities of thought or antinomies. We have last of all considered the question in what sense reflective thought, as logical, can even indicate the alogical at all under the form of the concept. That it does so, however imperfectly, is clear, since otherwise we could not speak or think of the alogical in any of its modes. We have discovered, however, that these concepts are merely symbols, and that the possibility of their standing for that

which is *per se* antithetic to themselves rests on their common ground as factors in the one ultimate synthesis that we call experience or consciousness-in-general.

Note on the Infinite

Attempts have recently been made to justify the assumption of an actual infinite under the name of "self-representative system." A distinction is drawn between the arithmetical infinite, the infinite regress, and the infinite of immanent self-containedness, as we may term it. Hegel, of course, adumbrated a similar point of view in his distinction between the infinite proper and the false infinite (*das schlechte Unendliche*). It is contended that the essential nature of the infinite is self-containedness. An infinite system in the true sense, it is said, must contain within itself its own principle and its own end and completion. Its perfection is not external to itself, but immanent within itself. It is further contended that the numerical infinite, the infinite regress, as it is termed, is unessential to infinity as such. This point has been elaborated at great length by Professor Royce in his *The World and the Individual* (of which it forms one of the salient positions), following upon the mathematician Dedekind and others. The true infinite, on this view, implies at once "a single system and also an endless *Kette*." This is termed by Mr Royce a "self-representative" or "self-imaged" system. It is illustrated by the idea of a self-reflecting mirror or of an ideally "perfect map of England within England." In either case, the self-representation must be postulated as running into infinity and yet as never transcending itself. Mr Royce bases his thesis also upon the mathematical theory of prime numbers. In this theory, unlike certain of his colleagues, he is prepared to admit the infinite as infinite series or indefinite regress, which, however, he regards not only as not fatal to his notion of positive and actual infinity, but as an integral part of it. Professor A. E. Taylor, in his *Elements of Metaphysics* (pp. 150-155), seems to dispose of Mr Royce's version of the theory. He points out that the fundamental defect in the Royce reasoning lies "in the tacit transition from the notion of an infinite *series*

to that of an infinite completed *sum*." For the criticism itself the reader is referred to Professor Taylor's work.

But, apart from the special turn given to the theory by Professor Royce and the mathematicians on whom he bases his doctrine, and reverting to the wider issues, it may fairly be doubted whether by the usage of language or even in itself there is justification for employing the term " infinite " to any self-contained system of immanent determinations such as that supposed. We shall come back to this more fully in a subsequent part of the present work. Meanwhile we must content ourselves here with a few further observations.

Firstly, as regards language, it can hardly be denied that, except in certain treatises expository of philosophic Idealism, the term " infinite " always refers, directly or indirectly, to the endless possibility of repetition in time and space. In other words, the indefinite regress always lies at the foundation of the popular notion of the infinite and, up to a certain point, of the philosophical notion of it. Thus the Supreme Being of ordinary theology is said to be infinite, by which is certainly meant, not that he is regarded, in the sense of modern philosophic Idealism, as an all-embracing consciousness, self-determined from within, but simply that he is a being whose knowledge and power are not limited by time or space—not that he is " irrespective of time and space," but that he apprehends and acts through endless time and space. This notion may be, of course, absolutely self-contradictory, and hence inconceivable, when brought to book, but it is undoubtedly the notion floating before the minds of all theists who are not metaphysicians in the technical sense. Infinity, as an attribute of the self-complete Absolute of Professor Royce, Professor Taylor, and other modern idealists, including even Mr Bradley, certainly has not warranty in usage, either in popular thought, in science, or, except partially, even in philosophy. Again, looking at the word purely from its philological side, this " being infinite or without limits " clearly has a time-space reference, as implying the possibility of continuation beyond any given number or any given point. The concept or category, which may be viewed as in itself without reference to time and space—as, so to say, outside time and space—is in its intrinsic

essence nothing if not *de*-finite. It can only be spoken of as *in*-finite in the sense of covering an endless possibility of sense-particulars. In other words, infinity can only be predicated of the concept with reference to its complementary factor in the synthesis of real experience, and not in itself. It is only as the relation of alogical terms in time and space, and even then only by a violence done to language, that the logical concept can be spoken of as infinite.

On the above grounds, I have no hesitation in employing the word "infinite" in the sense sanctioned by most frequent usage. The term "infinite" is in the present work exclusively taken as an attribute of the alogical aspect of experience, of the sensible and volitional terms constituting its material, of which time and space are the media. In the fact that time and space are, as such, forms of the alogical, and hence cannot find adequate expression in the terms of reflective thought, we have, I believe, the key to the puzzles constantly recurring in all departments of mathematical science. Problems of space and time as such, and of the sensible content of space and time, inevitably give rise to antinomies whenever it is attempted to express them in the logical formulæ of the reflective consciousness. It is in vain that we try to solve these problems under the relational form of thought. The ravelled edges of the alogical project awkwardly, and refuse to be fitted into the scheme of our formulations.

CHAPTER IV

THE INDIVIDUAL CONSCIOUSNESS

We must always bear in mind, as regards investigations into pure philosophy, that although we may, for the sake of convenience, divide our subject up into sections, yet there is, strictly speaking, no break in the conscious process. It is always one, indivisible, and continuous. From its ultimate metaphysical elements to the concrete personal consciousness, here and now, the process is unbroken—there is no *hiatus*. The same elements, constituting the lowest terms to which we can reduce the process by reflective thought—namely, pure subject-object and inter-relating activity—reappear in a transformed guise at every more concrete stage of the process. At every stage of reality we find *alogical* terms synthesised by a relational activity that we term *logical*. There is no tendency at any stage, however, as Pallogism assumes, for the synthesising relation, in any of its forms, to absorb the terms related; or, at least, even if we assume such tendency to exist, as tendency, it certainly never realises itself. The alogical, notwithstanding the efforts of the logical to absorb it, always remains stubbornly outside. With Marcellus we may say it is, "as the air, invulnerable," and the logical's "vain blows" are "malicious mockery." The above does not apply merely to the activity of thought as the synthetising force of the concrete world in general. Were the alogical, as Hegel contends, a mere *sich-selbstaufhebendes Moment* of the logical, it must ultimately be absorbed completely, without remainder left over, in the logical. But this, most assuredly, is not the case.

As we have just said, there is no break in the process of concrete consciousness (the "transcendental process," as the classical philosophy of Germany termed it). We may divide our point of view into metaphysic, theory of knowledge (epistemology), and psychology; but what we have before us

is really one subject of investigation. It is, in fact, impossible to keep these several points of view, in the long run, distinct. It is impossible to discuss the ultimate elements presupposed in all conscious experience, or the modes in which these elements appear in the more concrete stages of the process, without using psychological terminology, since there is no sharp line of demarcation between psychology and epistemology, or between either and metaphysic, as the word is understood by Modern Idealism. Let us take, for instance, the ordinary common-sense perception of a so-called external world in space. The construction of this world, as it appears complete and fully matured to common-sense consciousness, constituting, as it does, the reality *par excellence* of the ordinary "man-in-the-street," is an epistemological problem. Common-sense consciousness finds it already there, to all appearance complete. All the changed aspects it assumes above the level of the bare common-sense consciousness are regarded as accruing to the individual mind that apprehends it, and as not, like the world as presented to this common-sense consciousness, pertaining to the external object itself. Hence the said aspects are relegated to the domain of psychology. But this distinction, though valid enough from the common-sense standpoint, has no meaning from that of philosophy. Both alike represent articulations or phases in the at once continuous and timeless process of consciousness.

Let us illustrate this by the case of entering a town for the first time. We perceive its houses, streets, and relative localisations from the point of view of bare, hard common-sense consciousness—of ordinary objective experience, we should say. We live in that town it may be for a year, it may be for twenty years, passing through the more or less extended series of personal experiences that time brings with it. Meanwhile the hard objectivity, of which our common-sense perception of the town consists, has absorbed into itself all the moods and psychological experiences of our life in it. Now, if we examine and compare our perception of it, the way the town looks to us after a year (let us say), as compared with the way it looked to us on first entering it, we shall find a difference. What that difference is it is difficult to define in words. There

is nothing in our perception of it after the lapse of time which precisely or definably contradicts or is definably incompatible with our original perception of it—the solid substratum of common-sense Consciousness is there, but it has undergone a change, an indefinable transformation. The growing familiarity, accompanied by a continuous series of inward psychological states, has reacted on the objective perception itself and modified it. But the modification is purely *alogical*. I cannot define it or describe it in words, since language in this connection has as its standing-ground precisely that very common-sense Consciousness, the objective experience common to all, which will not help me in the present instance. The lie of the streets, the aspect of the topography generally has undergone a change, but it is a change which is immediately felt and cannot be directly communicated to others. It is conceivable that it might be possible to indicate by art, were the requisite genius present, in the atmosphere of a picture, or in a poem, or a musical composition, but in any case, in the language of common life or of scientific definition this is impossible.

The above is one illustration of how the timeless process of combination and distinction, of the enrichment of content, characterising the dialectical movement of the elements of consciousness, does not cease with the plane of our ordinary common-sense perception but continues on into the region of the individual consciousness as conditioned by time, and even, as in this case, into the perceptive consciousness of the individual.

The distinction between what is conventionally termed Realism and Idealism in Philosophy may be briefly explained as follows :—

The world of objects, and the sensations we regard as referable to it, presents itself as something *toto genere* distinct and apart from our personal or empirical ego. Of this we have no doubt whatever. It presents itself as a somewhat common to all. You and I and the rest of us, provided, of course, our organs of sense are in fairly normal condition, perceive the same objects, see the same colour, hear the same sound, smell the same smell if it is really "there," as the expression is. Now, whence comes this identity—this conviction of our personal and practical egos that the sensated and perceived object justifies

us in expecting our fellow-humans and maybe our fellow-animals to be conscious of the same perceptions and sensations as ourselves, providing the latter are really " there " and not due to some abnormal condition of our particular and personal organs of sense—in other words, are not " hallucinations " ?

The philosophic Realist, so far as this point goes, postulates his perceptions and sensations, in so far as they are not personal hallucination, to be referable to a world of external objects as their ground.

The Idealist, on the other hand, does not admit the validity of the assumption of a world of objects obtaining *per se*—*i.e.* independently of consciousness altogether—but would refer the sameness, the identity, behind the given or actual perception of yours or of mine by virtue of which the consciousness of our respective personal egos unites in the object-world, as identically the *same* object-world, though perceived by numerically distinct sense-organs and minds, to a common basis of consciousness behind the actual consciousness accruing to the indefinite series of particular percipients. Respecting this common basis or potentiality of all consciousness we know nothing, and can assert nothing, save that it is of the nature of a subject or ground of consciousness in some sense radically identical with, but yet infinitely more than, any or all of its particular manifestations.

It is true that some philosophical idealists have, starting from this postulate of the ultimateness of the principle of subjectivity, ventured to erect thereupon a quasi-philosophical superstructure and to convert a metaphysical postulate into a pseudo-personality to which they can give the appellation—" God." They do not see, however, that in the process of doing this they deprive the postulate in question of its meaning as the ultimate ground or element of all conscious reality. As I have elsewhere shown, the moment you convert this mere principle of subjectivity into a personality, the moment you endow it with the attributes of personality, you have merely got one more personal consciousness over against others which in its turn would presuppose the same postulate, and so on to infinity.

The main position of the " New Realism," as it is called, is

that the object is independent of the conscious act. But what is the object? Either it is the content of consciousness itself or else it is the old Kantian "thing-in-itself" behind this content. But the object that interests us is simply and solely the content of our consciousness. To assert baldly, as proof of the object's independence of consciousness, that "it proclaims itself as such," as is done by some Realists, is to beg the question and at the same time to perpetrate an *ignoratio elenchi*. For no one denies the fact of objectivity as distinct from its opposite. What Idealism refuses to admit is that the object obtains apart from consciousness, or, for that matter, that anything whatever is outside the universe of consciousness. To maintain that the object, the constituent elements of which are sense impressions knit together by thought-categories, subsists independently of all consciousness is palpably absurd. The object as apprehended is clearly but a determination of actual and potential consciousness, and naught else. The only refuge of this naïve Realism remains, as above pointed out, the old "thing-in-itself" which it was generally thought had been sufficiently disposed of by the criticism of the post-Kantian movement.

For the rest the so-called New Realism, where not transparent *contradictio in adjecto*, is nothing but the old "common-sense" philosophy of the eighteenth-century Thomas Reid. In recently comparing the writings of Reid with those of the New Realists I have been struck with the similarity, and in some cases identity, of Reid's argumentation with that of his modern disciples and adapters. It is philosophical *crambe repetita*—the old *crambe* being garnished with a new dressing of modern philosophical terminology. Yet the men who dish up this *au fond* stale cabbage, being university professors for the most part, are "buttered up" even by those who avowedly disagree with them, as though they had discovered some point of vantage which necessitated a thorough overhauling of our intellectual outfit.

There is a side of psychology, of course, that is definitely separated from either metaphysic or epistemology—namely, that which is concerned with the problems raised by psycho-

physical parallelism—the tracing of the connection of mental states as the correlative of physiological changes. This department of psychology is, strictly speaking, outside philosophy altogether. Its method is that of the physical sciences. But, apart from this, there are many psychological problems that undoubtedly overlap the ground assigned to "theory of knowledge." It is often very difficult to say where one ends and the other begins. There is, perhaps, scarcely a philosophical problem that cannot, if we will, be stated, and its solution formulated in the terms of psychology.

Where can the individual consciousness be said to begin? What is its specific mark? The individual consciousness (self-consciousness) implies, I take it, the recognition of a definite thread of memory knitting together the reflective side of an indefinite series of moments of consciousness into one whole or "mental object." With this "mental object" is associated the immediate consciousness of a particular animal (human) body as its instrument. This synthesis of memory is reduced by reflective thought to being itself simply one of the objects of experience, one particular personality as against a world of other particular personalities. It occupies, nevertheless, a unique position as being, so to say, the gate by which every other object of consciousness must enter. The word "I," as used in common language, "myself," "me," are expressions denoting a particular memory-synthesis immediately given in consciousness, as involved with a particular, quasi-external object, my own body. This animal body is postulated by me as external—that is, as existing in space—but it is not given in consciousness as completely external, like other objects in space. Its thisness, that is to say, is not exhausted for me in the fact of its being extended in space; it is thus only quasi-external. My body is hence a middle term between myself as memory-synthesis of feelings, thoughts, and volitions, and the world as given, extended in space. Thus the individual consciousness, or self-consciousness properly so called, may be defined as the determination of the Subject, presupposed in all conscious experience whatever, as *this* memory-synthesis correlated with *this* human body. Our conviction that the world does not arise or perish with ourselves means that we

recognise, over and above this memory-synthesis, correlated with this human body, the root-principle of knowing, or becoming aware, as being *pre*supposed in self-consciousness. We instinctively feel that the *that* in us which distinguishes between the object self (*i.e.* the thoughts, feelings, and volitions embraced in the memory-synthesis) and the object not-self (*i.e.* the outer world or content of space) is, as subject of consciousness-in-general, intrinsically prior to the distinction of self and not-self, since these latter are *its* determinations. This, which to the ordinary man is an instinctive feeling that he interprets falsely as implying an existence for the outer world independent of consciousness altogether, receives its adequate formulation in philosophy.

Notwithstanding the criticism of Mr Bradley (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 83 *sqq.*), I contend that the unbroken continuity of memory (lapses of sleep, swoons, etc., being extruded by the waking consciousness) is all that the personal identity, or self, implied in the individual consciousness, really means. "Memory," says Mr Bradley, "depends on reproduction from a basis that is present—a basis that may be said to consist of self-feeling." So far as this expression means anything to me, it must either refer to the ultimate subject involved in all consciousness—in other words, have a metaphysical reference—or it must refer to the dull background of organic sensation and have a psycho-physiological significance. On the former assumption, memory, of course, would depend on this basis, but that Mr Bradley does not refer to the metaphysical presupposition of all experience is shown by the fact that he talks about his "self-feeling" as remaining the same and changing. As such, I can only assume, since even the dull massiveness of organic sensation could not well be spoken of as changing in this sense, that he must mean the continuity, as series of a given experience, of the *thisness* or immediacy of every conscious moment. But what is it, I ask, but memory that fixes this experience as one and indivisible in time? In spite of his best endeavours, Mr Bradley has not shown that personal identity (or self-sameness as involved in individual consciousness) consists in anything else than the fixation of consciousness-in-general, as a particular content of time, correlated with a

particular human body as its instrument—in a word, by what we call memory. That a definite thread of continuity is requisite for personal identity is admitted by Mr Bradley, who (in so far as he does so) gives up his case for destructive criticism. If I might say so without offence, Mr Bradley seems, in Chapters IX. and X. of *Appearance and Reality*, first to raise a dust-cloud and then to complain that he cannot see. Here, as elsewhere throughout his book, Mr Bradley is on the look-out for contradictions. Now, there is nothing easier than to discover contradictions in every logical formulation. Mr Bradley himself rejects, nominally at least, the pallogistic theory of thought-relations *in vacuo*—that is, without terms to be related. Notwithstanding this, he seems to be surprised that he cannot compress the real into the Spanish boots of the logical. Yet the real, as we have often enough pointed out in the course of these pages, is in the last resort a synthesis of alogical and logical; and the logical as such can never explain, or furnish an adequate formula for, the alogical as such. Whenever you attempt this, the result is that you are landed in self-contradictions or antinomies. But Mr Bradley's whole procedure consists in the endeavour to find an adequate logical formula for the alogical, to make the logical absorb the alogical without leaving a remainder over. His Absolute, in the last resort, means an ultimate reality that yet lacks the conditions of reality. In spite of his protestations to the contrary, it is, I contend, no more satisfactory in this respect than the old Hegelian "*Idee*." Personal identity, then, I submit, means nothing more than the knitting together of a particular or personal experience into a memory-synthesis.

The continuance of the extended object—our body—is the objective clue in space to the continuance of our personal identity in time. (In some cases of dual personality this clue may prove misleading.) The thread once snapped, the synthesis once dissolved, we must regard as gone for ever. The *same* synthesis can hardly be renewed, since its identity consists simply and solely in the *continuity* of its *thisness*. The indivisible moment of actual consciousness, its *thisness*, is, to use a geometrical analogy, the point that produces itself as line in the memory-synthesis of personal identity. The fore-

going may sound paradoxical to those accustomed to think of the human "soul" as a *thing*, an existing substance, capable, it may be, of motion in space, of ascending up to heaven, of descending to the other place, of transmigration into other bodies—in a word, of having an unexplained objectively *real* existence apart from the *thisness* of the memory-synthesis. According to the notion of those who conceive the matter thus, no absurdity would be involved in supposing a person now living to be the same (that is, to possess the same "soul") as Julius Cæsar, Apollonius of Tyana, or Napoleon Bonaparte. If we examine the matter more closely, we shall find that the notion of personal identity is here wholly illusory, and based upon a very crude and primitive analogy. The "soul" or personality is regarded, to wit, as an object in space possessing mental qualities and properties. Just as a skin may hold wine or oil, so the soul is invariably looked upon by the adherents of this order of speculation as in some sense extended in space and *containing* the personal consciousness. This way of conceiving it, a direct legacy from primitive Animism, is expressed by Shakespeare's Claudio in *Measure for Measure* (Act iii., scene 1):

> Ay, but to die, and go we know not where;
> To lie in cold obstruction, and to rot:
> This sensible warm motion to become
> A kneaded clod; and the delighted spirit
> To bathe in fiery floods, or to reside
> In thrilling regions of thick-ribbed ice;
> To be imprisoned in the viewless winds,
> And blown with restless violence round about
> The pendent world.

Compare also the Ancient Mariner in his description of the passing of his colleagues:

> The souls did from their bodies fly,
> They fled to bliss or woe;
> And every soul it passed me by
> Like the whizz of my cross-bow.

We find the theory, in its latest and most finished literary form, in the late Mr Myers' book, *Human Personality and its*

Survival of Bodily Death, where the author seems to postulate the "soul" as a kind of highly refined ether. This is, of course, *au fond* the quasi-material "double" of primitive Animism and of modern Spiritism. It is against so crude a survival of early ideas as this that the Materialism of modern science (compare its recent and most complete working-out in the *Welt-Räthsel* of Häckel) rightly protests in proclaiming that, viewed from the physical standpoint—that is, as objectively real—mentation is nothing but cerebration, that is, matter of some kind in motion. Even if we assume Mr Myers' theory of Animism (as brought up to date and clothed in modern scientific language) to be admissible as a hypothesis, nay even as a probable truth, it would not in the least affect the ultimate problem of reality. The latter is, in the true sense of the word, a metaphysical problem, whereas all such hypotheses as that of Mr Myers do not transcend the realm of space, matter, and motion. Häckel postulated the ordinary "ether" of modern science as the ultimate source of brain and nerve changes, as of other physical phenomena. Mr Myers postulates a still more refined special ether of his own as the physical explanation of certain psychical phenomena, real or alleged. Hence Mr Myers is, *au fond*, as much a materialist as the late Professor Häckel, though not, perhaps, so scientific a one. (*Cf.* Haldane's *Pathway of Reality*, vol. ii., pp. 258-269.)

That the individual consciousness is not immortal necessarily follows, I think, from the fact of its having arisen in time, and of its hence partaking of the nature of a chance-product. All that arises in time (*i.e.* the particular) must perish in time, since the fact of its having arisen when before it was not, shows its existence to have no inherent necessity attaching to it. It must, therefore, be contingent upon the infinity of particulars in time, and in the ceaseless change proper to this time-content it is uninterruptedly exposed to the possibility of a collocation of these particulars causally incompatible with its continued existence. Whether the dissolution of the animal body by death constitutes in itself such a collocation is simply a question for science. The tendency of science, up to date, it must be admitted, has been towards answering this question in the affirmative.

Consciousness assumes the form of the particular, in contradistinction to the universal, in the memory-synthesis, or individual mind. Consciousness here becomes self-object—what Kant termed the "object of the internal sense." As such it becomes a particular among a possible infinity of other particulars of the same universal class or kind. It becomes a numerical *one* over against a *many*. But it is only indirectly, or through reflection, that the individual consciousness, with its continuum of *thisness*—self-identity—is presented as numerical. That there are other "myselves" or memory-syntheses besides this one (mine) may be a primary inference of reflective thought, but it is, in the last resort, only an inference, and not, like the manifold of particular objects in space, immediately given. It is, if you will, a "practical postulate" —to use Mr Schiller's favourite expression—but in any case it is based on an inference arising through reflection. The above is curiously indicated in the earlier stages of empirical reflection—to wit, with primitive man. In this case the instinctive inference, this necessary "practical postulate," has a tendency to overreach itself, and is applied indifferently, in primitive Animism or Fetichism, to all external objects whatsoever. Primitive man, that is, not merely postulated in all external objects, whether animate or inanimate, the "principle of subjectivity" referred to above (pp. 76-77) as the basis of our attribution of being or self-subsistence to them, but in addition he postulated a self-conscious personality as attaching to them, similar in kind to the self-conscious personality he postulated in his fellow-men as attaching to the form of the human body. It is only at a later stage that the inference becomes narrowed to the human, or at least animal, form. The human body presents itself as one of a possible infinity of instances of its own type in space and time. We are partially conscious of our own body as a phenomenon in space like other phenomena in space. We know that our own body involves a conscious myself as *this* memory-synthesis. From this conviction the inference is directly made to a plurality of persons, minds, or memory-syntheses like ourself as attaching to objects in space—first, to all objects pretty much indifferently (Animism) and later only to objects possessing human or animal

form. Yet though we conceive of the conscious personalities inferred in other living human bodies as separate from ourself, the separation is in one sense not so complete as that obtaining between other objects in space. Particular objects in space are absolutely and mutually exclusive; the particularity or individuation of these objects cannot be transcended or reduced to unity except in the logical concept, where their *thisness*, and their whole alogical presentative aspect, is lost. But the vague conviction that the individuation of intelligences is not so ultimate as that of bodies in space, is borne in upon us in various ways—by the function of language, by the phenomena of sympathy, by the associative principle at the foundation of human society with its "super-organic" forms. (See below, pp. 110-14.)

The individual consciousness, or, in other words, the conscious personality, as deduced by philosophy, we must never forget, is, like everything else in reflective thought, of which philosophy is the highest outcome, no more than a universal and abstract formula. For though the individual consciousness represents the fullest or most concrete generalisation of philosophy, yet, none the less, it is not fully concrete, not real. It lacks the *thisness*, the alogical immediacy, that can alone give it flesh and blood—in a word, life. The individual consciousness, the object, properly speaking, of psychology, is in itself no more than a general type involving the universal conditions, as presented in reflection, of any and all individual intelligences. Hence we, as individual minds, may be viewed from a double standpoint. I myself, now writing, no less than Smith, Brown, or Jones, am outside the scope of philosophy, as, for that matter, of psychology. In this respect I, no less than my friends, am an extra-philosophic, evanescent particular; but we, each and all, on the other hand, presuppose those universal conditions of the individual consciousness, which is the farthest point philosophy with its abstract formulæ can reach. This "universal individual," which philosophy deduces as its last word, is the abiding factor in each particular individual mind, but, as already said, it lacks the *thisness* of a memory-synthesis, which alone can make it real. It is a mere rereading, in reflection, of what is involved in self-consciousness previous to

the moment of reflection. In this moment reality is given *for* self-consciousness.

Here may be the place, perhaps, to return once more to the common form of objection raised by the ordinary man to the irrefutable philosophical truth, that in the last resort we are forced to interpret Reality as a system of determinations of consciousness, possible or actual. Consciousness *per se* is here invariably confounded by the man of "common-sense" with a particular memory-synthesis. Thus he will tell you that he can conceive of all sorts of things existing or happening without anyone being present to see or know of them. He then instances the nebulous period of the solar system, the pre-glacial epoch, the Antarctic seas with their *Erebus* and *Terror*, the other side of the moon, etc., as cases in point. He might just as well confine himself to instancing the nearest room that is empty, as regards human or animal occupants, at the moment of speaking, for this homely and commonplace instance is on precisely the same footing as the sensational ones above mentioned. The individual mind, as memory-synthesis, presupposes the general synthesis of consciousness. Its self-consciousness is superimposed upon this groundwork. The man-in-the-street, of robust common-sense, who puts the above "posers" to the philosopher, is really making unwittingly the distinction that the philosopher formulates. Says the man-in-the-street: "Uninhabited islands exist, rocks are falling, waves are dashing up against the beach." He forgets all the time that these things that he is talking about imply the primary and secondary qualities of matter, spacial extension, hardness, impenetrability, figure, colour, etc., all of which qualities he will see, if he thinks for a moment, to be nothing but *sensations* and *thought-forms*—the *sensations* being reciprocally connected in a systematic order by thought. But *sensation* (feltness) and *thought* presuppose—what? A subject, of course, feeling and thinking. The man-in-the-street, try as he may, cannot get outside the closed circle of consciousness, possible and actual. When he thinks to have shaken it off, he is only the more deeply immeshed therein. All he gets rid of by the process of abstraction is the quantitative particularity of the individual memory-synthesis, as one among many. But this is philo-

sophically quite unessential. To any given plane of consciousness the other momenta that it presupposes, but which it has superseded, always appear as something outside and over against itself. Hence comes the illusion of the ordinary man that the object of consciousness—the object of external perception—is something radically distinct from consciousness. He finds that the content of his memory-synthesis, his immediate awareness, presupposes conditions other than itself. In a word, he finds that reality is never exhausted in the appearance, in the immediate perception. The content of actuality, of the *thisness* of presentment, is given as the sign of an indefinite potentiality other than itself. The man-in-the-street is implying this when he asks you whether the other side of the moon does not exist merely because no one sees it. He finds that the content of his memory-synthesis presupposes conditions other than itself; but he has not reached the point of recognising that there is no break in the continuity of these conditions, that the world-process is through and through a conscious process, and that the true distinction between the individual consciousness, encased in its memory-synthesis, and the universal synthesis of consciousness it presupposes, is not the distinction between consciousness and something that is not consciousness, but between consciousness as actual and consciousness as potential.

But it may be asked: Can reality, can self-subsistence, be predicated of the universal, but for us potential, synthesis of conditions which we see to be involved in every moment of our individual consciousness? Is the Subject which knows, which becomes aware, *realised*? Is it object to itself—in a word, is it self-conscious—apart from, and independent of, the infinity of particular memory-syntheses arising and perishing in time, which are called finite "minds" or "personalities"? This question has already been discussed in Chapter II. as that of philosophical Theism, as it is termed, in contradistinction to the theism of the man-in-the-street and of the ordinary theologian. We here offer some further remarks on the subject.

The question resolves itself into this: Is the ultimate subject or potentiality of knowledge, which analysis discloses to us, in itself a mere abstraction, or is it the one self-subsistent reality?

Is it solely realised in the personal mind from which our analysis starts, or rather in the infinite possibility of such minds, which we assume our own mind, our own personal consciousness, here and now, to connote? Or is it realised as concrete self-consciousness in some mysterious manner, apart from the particular minds known or conceivable to us? This is a question to which philosophical analysis as such can return no answer. The philosopher, as philosopher, in dealing with it, is compelled to fall back upon the agnostic attitude. The results of his investigation into the conditions of the possibility of knowledge do not afford him any light on this point. The philosopher of theological proclivities will doubtless be tempted to postulate the second of the above alternatives, and he will seek to support his assumption with philosophical arguments. The pallogistic doctrine, already criticised in these pages, is much affected by him. If he draws his inspiration from the old right wing of the Hegelian school, he conceives his "God" as the quintessence of the categories, pure thought or reason, in which sensation, feeling, and will are absorbed and abolished. In this sense "God" is conceived as the Absolute, a "wound-up" and eternally complete form of forms, in which the shadow of matter is not. The possibility of change, of movement towards aught, such as towards fuller perfection, is excluded. The absolute in this pallogistic sense must always be the "*durchsichtige Ruhe*" of Hegel. But, as already pointed out in another connection, Pallogism necessarily issues in an abstraction. It lacks, in this as in other cases, the conditions of reality. Even, however, if we abandon the pallogistic position and postulate an absolute consciousness based on the alogical element essential to reality as opposed to abstraction, we are still confronted with the difficulty that in conceiving the Absolute as reality independent of its realisation in the type of finite individual mind we know, we are none the less perforce compelled to give it a particularity of its own—we are compelled to regard it as individualised—*i.e.* as a self-conscious personality. Once, however, we do this, we cease to have an Absolute. What we have is at best one more finite mind, inconceivably wider in scope and richer in content than our finite mind, it may be, but still not essentially different. At the same time, we

surrender it as a factor in the philosophical analysis of that concrete consciousness or knowledge we have to explain. It then becomes merely one more intelligence *over against* our own. Now, one more personal will and intelligence over against mine, however wide its range of power and knowledge, cannot possibly, I contend, enter as an element into the explanation of my consciousness here and now. It is, in fact, impossible to formulate the Absolute as personality in any sense without becoming involved in a hopeless tangle of self-contradictions. At the same time, I am fully prepared to admit the difficulties that confront us in what, from a speculative point of view, seems the only alternative—namely, that of regarding the synthesis of consciousness-in-general as in itself a mere abstraction which becomes realised solely in the finite individual mind. Here again I can only repeat that *qua* this problem the agnostic attitude seems the sole resource for philosophy. We can only say that, for strict metaphysical analysis, the ultimate Subject of consciousness our immediate individual consciousness presupposes, is a pure potentiality—in other words, is no more than an abstraction, distinguishable, but not separable in thought from the mind of the thinker. An abstraction, however, we must not forget, does not necessarily mean a fiction. For philosophy, therefore, "God" is always a gratuitous hypothesis foisted on to the analysis. The problem is the crux of metaphysic, but more concerning it we cannot say. Philosophy, indeed, formulates the problem, but leaves it without any adequate solution. It would, as I conceive it, save much confusion of thought and vague speculation if thinkers would place clearly before themselves the issues here stated. For the rest the theistic problem is mainly ethical, and from this point of view we shall return to it later on.

By way of metaphysic then, we are unable to arrive at any data affording us a positive clue to the realisation of the basal conditions of consciousness as personality in any other form than that of the individual finite mind that forms the starting-point of our analysis. Let us see if we can do so analogically by way of the physico-psychical series presented by the order of evolution in time and space. Here it is true that we are also in the region of unverifiable conjecture, but it is a region where,

I think, we have at least some data sufficient to give colour to a suggestion. The suggestion may be put in the following form: From the earliest beginnings of organic life up to that highest realisation of the animal body, the human form, I think it will be generally admitted that we observe, or, to be strictly accurate, we infer, a progressive unfolding of consciousness from the mere sentiency we attribute to the cell and to those animals that are little more than aggregates of cells, towards intelligence—*i.e.* towards thought-determination, culminating in the self-consciousness of the human personality. This we assume to be the final goal of physico-psychical life. Now, is not this last assumption somewhat arbitrary? By what right do we regard the psychical evolutionary process that has hitherto advanced *pari passu* with the physical to stop at this point, while the physical goes on? But if it does not stop here, what reason is there for not assuming it to follow the steps of the physical evolution? If there be no reason, we may surely infer by an obvious analogy that the next higher physical type that succeeds that of the animal or human body shall connote a new psychical type corresponding to it. To make my meaning clearer, we will enumerate the chief types involved in physical evolution up to the present. We have the atom (not to go farther back, and not to discuss rival theories concerning it), and this we may take as the physical basis. Next we have, based upon it, the molecule. The atom enters into the molecule as typal *element* merely. Next after the molecule we have the organic cell. Just as the molecule is based upon the atom as its elementary constituent, so is the cell, the typal element of organic life, based upon the molecule, the typal element of inorganic life. The next great type in the order of evolution, attained through many intermediate stages, is the animal body which is based upon the cell as its typal element, just as the cell is based upon the molecule, and the molecule upon the postulated atom. The animal body reaches its highest perfection in man, and we have no special reason to assume an essentially higher kind of animal body as likely to be evolved in the future than that which, in the highest developed races up to date, exists at present. But there is yet another evolutionary type that has been in process of development from the earliest ages

of man's appearance on this planet up to the present time, and it is even now no more than embryonic. I refer to human society. This, which, as evolutionary type, is commonly designated the *super-organic*, would more correctly be termed the *super-animal*, seeing that its typal-constituent is directly the animal body as represented by its highest form, the human being. It is clear, and generally recognised in the present day, that in human society we have a new evolutionary type in process of development towards the highest perfection it is capable of attaining as a type. The late Herbert Spencer, indeed, made this a cardinal position of his system, and did more than any other thinker to enforce and illustrate it.

So much for the physical side. Now, Häckel and most modern materialists insist on postulating a rudimentary psychic side, even to the molecule and the atom. They are driven to this by the difficulty they find involved in assuming an absolute beginning to psychic life at any point in the course of the process of evolution itself. Whether this be correct or not, all admit the psychical side to be correlated with the physical from the dawn of life, as manifested in the simple organism of the cell onward. Here, indeed, we can inferentially trace the evolution of the psychical side from the bare sentiency of the lowest forms of organic life to the intellectual master-mind correlated with the highest development of the animal body—*i.e.* the human form. But for those who admit that there is another evolutionary type in process of realising itself, based upon the human personality as individual—in other words, based upon the *personal units* constituted by individual human beings, just as the human being, as animal body, is based upon organic matter with its *cellular units*, and just as organic matter is based upon inorganic matter with its *molecular units*—for those who accept this view on the physical side there seems to me no logical halting-ground that stops them from admitting a corresponding process of evolution on the psychical side. And if this be so, where are we driven to ? Clearly to a recognition of the psychical side as accruing to the super-organic (super-animal) evolutionary type—human society in its corporate capacity. We cannot get over the obvious impossibility

that we animal-human personalities shut up in our respective memory-syntheses, find in conceiving (*i.e.* representing to ourselves) a social-human personality, with its own self-consciousness, as much wider in scope and richer in content than the former as the human-animal's is wider and richer than the sentiency of the lower nerve centres that build up his body. But the lower nerve centre is equally unable to throw itself forward into the position of grasping the perfected psychical side, to which it contributes its quota, of the fully fledged human being. The synthetic intensity (the *thisness*) of the social consciousness must overpower that of the individual conscious *foci*, which together constitute its medium, for the former to arise. Just as the individual consciousness must attain a degree of intensity which overpowers the mere sentiency or sub-consciousness of the cellular units which collectively constitute its medium, so the super-consciousness, as we may term it (speaking from our animal-individualistic point of view) of the social individual must reach a stage of intensity at which it overpowers and cancels the separateness of the individual conscious *foci*, by the coalescence of which it is conditioned, before it can, properly speaking, be said to obtain. At the present stage of human social life we have only the forecast, the *penumbra* (so to say), of the social consciousness just as in the sentiency of the invertebrate animal forms we may assume to be represented the *penumbra* of the later individual and personal consciousness associated with the higher animal and human organisms respectively.

We now know in part as individual conscious *foci*. This knowledge will attain *ex-hypothesi* a, to us, inconceivably higher plane as social consciousness which we may well assume will intuite or apprehend concretely what our personal consciousness as individuals at most comprehends imperfectly through the symbolising processes of reflective thought in the form of abstract notions.

The far-reaching issues opened up by this speculation, should it be provisionally accepted as a working hypothesis, are sufficiently obvious for the reader to work out for himself. For one thing, should the foregoing be true, it may be that we shall have to seek our "God," if he is to be a practical ideal,

not so much in the realm of metaphysical analysis as in that of speculative sociological research, or, as we may term it, in *transcendental sociology*.

Has the foregoing hypothetical suggestion, based as it is upon an analogy furnished by the whole course of the evolutionary process, any positive corroboration from the known facts of sociology? I think it has. What is at the root of the whole ethical consciousness but the conviction that the *telos* of the individual personality lies outside itself as individual? Hence arises the introspective form of the religious consciousness which requires a transcendent divinity as a complement to the individual soul, with its yearnings for a completion and perfection that is not itself. What is your "categorical imperative," your "ought" of consciousness, but the recognition of the fact that the animal-human personality is ultimately not an end to itself but only a means to an end? Of course we may adopt a theological or abstract-metaphysical explanation of these things, but for those who cannot see their way to do this, their explanation on scientific grounds, by means of some such hypothesis as that suggested, seems natural and almost inevitable. For such, many things that were before a mystery receive an explanation falling naturally into its place in the general scheme of evolution as understood by science. The true significance of ethics, of introspective religious aspiration, etc., is seen to have its ground of explanation in the fact that the animal-human personality is tending towards absorption in a higher evolutionary type, based upon itself indeed, but in the same way as the human body is based upon cellular tissue with its low order of sentiency. This fact receives its psychic expression in the sense of the inadequacy of the animal-human personality as end to itself. The good man's sense of moral obligation, the mystic's craving for union with some divine consciousness, etc., are seen again to be the distorted expression of a truth to which the Materialism of modern science has been long leading up. This truth, if we are right, is to be found in the view above given of the destined supersession of the animal-human personality—*i.e.* the individual mind as correlated with an animal body which we know to-day as the last word of Mind altogether, by a social-human person-

ality—*i.e.* by a self-consciousness transcending that of the animal-human personality, albeit based upon it. The perennial ethical contradiction, the self that can only fulfil its own higher destiny by the denial of itself, here finds its explanation in the truth that the death no less than the birth of the *animal-human* personality is as necessary a part of the process by which the life of the *social-human* personality will become realised as the disintegration of the organic unit of the animal body, the cell, is necessary to the development of the life of the animal body itself—the disintegration of the organic cell being as necessary to the life-process of the animal system as is the continuous production and reproduction of such cells. In this way the yearning for the ideal self, the self which throughout history earnest men have sought to realise in the negation of self, acquires a new meaning. On this hypothesis the higher ideal self is identifiable no longer with a transcendent divinity but with an immanent fact of evolution. The moral impulse, the unsatisfied religious longings above referred to, would disclose themselves as, at basis, only the higher expression of that fact which in the world of the primal cellular life of organic nature is termed "organic irritability." For this also is nothing else than the *trieb*, the inherent tendency towards realisation on a higher level of development. These unsatisfied longings of the human heart, of which we hear so much, would, on our hypothesis, simply mean the vague and instinctive conviction that, self-conscious though he be, the self-consciousness of the animal-human being is yet not the last word of self-consciousness in the order of evolution, but is in its nature subordinate to a higher self-consciousness, its relation to which the individual human mind may dimly feel, but cannot formulate in terms of its own thought.

Let us take another fact from the field of sociology—the great fact that seems at once cause and consequence, the fact of language. It has often enough been pointed out how the power of abstract thought, presumably peculiar to the human animal as against other mammalia, is determined by language, the means of intellectual intercommunication. It is difficult, indeed, to realise how completely dependent—speaking, of course from the empirical point of view and considering it as a

product of evolution in time—is the perfect emergence of the self-conscious personality upon the fact of language. Without language, feeling or sensation would remain isolated. If we can interpret the alogical *per se* in terms of the logical, it would seem we have to thank language for it. Sensible quality, for example, which is in itself alogical, is brought under the logical universal by means of language, and is thus rendered capable of treatment by abstract thought. Thus colour, a logically undetermined feeling or sensation, is helped by language into the logical form of the universal, and becomes a fact common to all, and not circumscribed by the memory-synthesis of the impression-receiving individual consciousness. But language is through and through social. Its inception is social, and its aim is social. It is, indeed, a means to the full perfecting of the self-conscious human personality regarded as a time-product. But in its power of throwing the aforesaid animal-human mind outside itself and connecting it with a world of minds outside its own individual personality, may we not see an indication that while it has helped to bring that personality to perfection it is also one of the signs of the ultimate submergence of the self-consciousness of the *animal*-human personality in the self-consciousness of a *social*-human personality, as highly differentiated from it as it is from the sentiency of its own cellular tissues? A similar line of argument might be adopted as regards æsthetics and the indications to the same effect afforded by the inner meaning of our art-consciousness.

Again, take the power of collective suggestion, as shown in the behaviour of nations and other communities, armies, crowds, mass-meetings, etc. Here we find that combined conduct assumes a form indicating a collective mentation distinct from and inconsistent with that of the units, considered as units, of which the mass is composed. In this phenomenon of collective suggestion we have as yet no actual trace of a *self-conscious* social-human personality, but in the mental element referred to, as obtaining over and above anything in the individual minds composing the social-human mass in question, may we not perhaps detect the *penumbra* of this new type of consciousness, destined to realise itself in the fulness of time? Examples of the fact referred to will readily occur

to the reader. We all know the wild rush of a battalion into a breach, regardless of death and wounds, accomplished by men, many of whom in private life would doubtless be found wanting in courage to meet infinitely smaller emergencies ; the conduct of masses of men collectively which gives rise to such phrases as the " cowardice of mobs " ; or, again, the contagious enthusiasm of the mass-meeting, the self-sacrifice of the revolutionary band, even the *esprit de corps* of a football team. The influence of collective suggestion is well illustrated by the fanatical devotion of the " blues " and " greens " to their side in the Roman and Byzantine circus ; in other words, to what was in itself a meaningless badge. Last, but not least, the results of anthropology and the beginnings of history show us primitive society as essentially based on collective impulse or suggestion, as exemplified in the social group, the clan, tribe, or people. The fact that man, as an individual, acts and feels differently from man as a collectivity, that an organised community of human beings is a corporate entity having distinct characteristics from the sum of those of the individuals composing it, meets us in every aspect of human affairs. It furnishes us, I think, with yet another corroboration of the general thesis put forward in these pages.

We have not gone into the question of hypnotism, telepathy and allied phenomena in this connection, though it is clear that, in so far as we are disposed to accept them, they constitute a more powerful illustration than even those already given of the extra-individual possibilities inherent in the animal-human personality. This is, I think, clear, and there is no need to elaborate it further in this place.[1]

The above speculation is a digression that has interrupted

[1] If we reflect on the issues opened up by the foregoing hypothesis, some curious speculations present themselves. One, already briefly referred to, is that—as the consciousness of simple organic life is postulated as mere sensation, as that of the animal personality apperceives the world under the categories of common-sense reality, so in the highest development of the animal personality (namely, the human) reflective intelligence appears and metamorphoses the world of common-sense reality into the world of science, or into that of speculative thought—we may still further assume that a form of consciousness empirically based on higher and more complex conditions might apperceive *immediately* the world as it now appears mediately in the reflective intelligence of the man of science.

the main task we set ourselves in the present chapter—namely, that of the metaphysical analysis of the conditions presupposed in the self-conscious personality. We are here confronted with the problem of the identification of the Absolute Subject, that which throughout all time becomes conscious, the "*moi premier et éternel*," as Jaurès termed it, with *my* memory-synthesis here and now—the identification of that power of consciousness which creates the world *in* and *for* me, the individual, with this very *me* which is its latest product, as representing the final term of that metaphysical process on which all processes in time depend as their prototype. The terminus *a quo* is the subject presupposed in all possible experience; the terminus *ad quem* is the relative, finite, and individual, subject-object. Between the two lies the region of the object-world—to wit, the region of the determination of consciousness as the content of space and time, irrespective of its determination as self-consciousness.

The impotence of the mere categories of reason, to deal with the purely alogical, is once more crucially illustrated in this question of the self-conscious personality. The category of cause utterly breaks down here when it is attempted to apply it. All events in the time-series are in some measure or other amenable to the category of cause. The why of them can be asked and answered from the same point of view as that from which it is asked. But if I ask the question why—that is, by what cause—do *I*, considered as this particular diremption of consciousness here and now, exist at the present rather than at a former or a later period of the world's history, it is seen that the question has no meaning, that the category of cause and effect glances off from it. Let us analyse the question for a moment. It may be paraphrased as follows:—Why does my individual consciousness reflect a content taken from that section of filled time called the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, rather than from that of the thirteenth or the twenty-fifth? That my psychological personality, that my mind or character, is built up out of material derived from the particular period of history into which I have been born, is a fact for which obvious causes can be assigned. The question here is not, however, one of concrete personality, but of the mere diremption of consciousness as

this particular selfhood, of the *thisness* of my memory-synthesis *per se* and quite apart from its content. A similar line of argument, of course, applies to space. Why did the particular *thisness* of my memory-synthesis originate in London, Rome, or Paris, rather than in Timbuctoo, Teheran, or Tokio? The why, I submit, is in both cases meaningless. The *thisness* of self-consciousness on which the memory-synthesis is based is outside the time-series, and *a fortiori* outside the sphere of influence of the thought-categories of which time is the sense-medium. The foregoing query may be variously propounded in the form of curious and even grotesque puzzles, as, for example, the question whether a man would be himself if his father had married another woman, or why he is not his brother.

These questions are seen to be absurd, but their absurdity does not lie where it might be expected. Scientific reflection can very well answer the question in one sense, as we have above indicated. It is quite obvious that the substitution, for example, for one of the parents for someone else, must give a different offspring. Similarly we may assume that science is capable, were the leading conditions known, of affording a satisfactory explanation, on its own lines, of the obvious fact that one brother, as concrete personality, is different from another. But here again the real gist of the question would be missed. It really means—why is the *thisness* of my self-consciousness, as constituting an apparent *continuum* in time (what we have termed the memory-synthesis of personal identity), although itself outside the content of the time-series, attached to this particular body rather than to another, or to this actual disposition of character, or particular mental constitution, rather than to another? To ask the why of this matter may be absurd, but its absurdity is to be looked for in the fact that it is a strikingly flagrant instance of the attempt to reduce the alogical to the logical. In this case of the diremption of the personal consciousness we have a unique instance to the point—namely, an immediate determination of consciousness, generically outside time-content and any form of the logical category. Hence it is that any question that assumes its reduction to cause, substance, or any other category proclaims itself straightway as meaningless.

The primary Subject, which the self-consistency of consciousness posits as an immediate postulate, as that underlying my *thisness* having its root-principle in all time, becomes particularised as *this* memory-synthesis. This is all that self-identity or individual consciousness means *per se*. By personality we imply, of course, more than this—namely, a definite content, a particular system of thoughts, feelings, and volitions, in addition. This system, like any other particular combination in time, constitutes an object which arises and perishes, but which is knit together by the particular memory-synthesis in question. The lapse of this particular actualisation of consciousness necessarily carries with it the destruction of the personality as a whole. Needless to say, this destruction in time does not touch the time-less Subject for which time itself is, which, although presupposed in every individual consciousness, is *quoad* such consciousness a mere potentiality. Psychological personality is the resultant of an infinitely complex and unstable series (or converging network of series) of real psycho-physical particulars in time and space. Physically, it is coincident with a particular organic system or animal body; psychically, with the content of a particular memory-synthesis. This content itself, therefore, the subject-matter of psychological inquiry, falls, no less than the subject-matter of physiological inquiry, within the category of cause and effect. It has been calculated that if we trace any given case of this said object, any given personality, back for two centuries, we shall find it to be the outcome of some 16,000 more or less direct ancestors—that is, psycho-physical objects of the same kind as itself. Now, the dissolution of these psycho-physical objects, together with the self-identifying memory-syntheses they imply, does not affect the principle at their basis. Yet, on the other hand, if the foregoing be admitted, we can hardly view the definite lapse of the self-identifying memory-synthesis, and *a fortiori* the dissolution of its content, whenever such takes place, as otherwise than complete and final.

In psychology, which deals with the content of the memory-synthesis, the antithesis between the alogical and the logical is shown in the opposition between feeling and thought, between will (viewed as mere impulse) and action following on reflection,

between instinct and reason. The first and last word in psychology, as in metaphysic, is an indication of the alogical. The thought-out end presupposes the desire as mere blind impulse. The action as directed by reason has for its background the mere *nisus* of instinct. The *feeling* of psychology, hedonistic feeling—feeling, that is, which involves a pleasure-pain reference—is the Alpha and Omega of psychology. Thought, reason, is the middle term only, always appearing as the handmaid of feeling in this sense. All human endeavour refers to practical postulates. The first term of all our activity is the *nisus* following on want, the last is the satisfaction of the want. As middle term we have, of course, the end defined by reason, and the means chosen by reason. Will itself, in psychology, we may regard as a mode merely of the self-identifying memory-synthesis, or, going farther back, we may conceive it from a metaphysical standpoint as identical with the eternal Subject of consciousness itself. But, in any case, whether as psychological or metaphysical element, will falls to the alogical. It is the same with feeling. The material of thought, whether in a psychological or metaphysical sense, is feeling. It is a pleasure-pain feeling from which all our actions spring and out of which our active impulses grow. The present work is not a treatise on psychology, and hence we do not propose to pursue in detail the suggestions here indicated. The fundamental problem of ethics, which might conceivably have found a place in this chapter, will be more appropriately dealt with at a subsequent stage.

CHAPTER V

REALITY AND TRUTH

In the foregoing pages we have had much to say on the antithesis of the alogical and the logical as the most salient antithesis within the sphere of reality. In Chapter III. we traced the most important modes in which this antithesis manifests itself. We also there dealt with two other antitheses that have played perhaps a more prominent part than any others in philosophy from Aristotle downwards. We refer to the antithesis of matter and form and that closely allied antithesis of potentiality and actuality. Conscious reality is also analysable into these pairs of opposites, and we make no excuse for recurring to the subject here, and amplifying what was there said, before passing on to the main object of this chapter, which is the distinction of reality itself from truth.

The above antithesis (or pair of antitheses) is nearly covered by that between alogical and logical. Matter and the potential are usually referable to the alogical; form and the actual usually to the logical. But there are one or two points where the coincidence is not exact, or at least where the usage of philosophic writers would make it undesirable to insist upon a too strict fixation of the terms in this sense. For example, I believe that the logical universal itself has been spoken of by some thinkers as the potentiality of the particulars coming under it. The point of view from which this is said is not difficult to understand, although I cannot myself regard it as justifiable. And this for the simple reason that the logical universal has no *potency* in it; it is, as such, a mere *form*. The potency here lies in the at-once differentiating and unifying subject of consciousness itself, of which the alogical and the logical elements in the object are alike functions, but which nevertheless, in its immediacy, invariably falls to the side of the alogical. Matter and form (and the same may be said of

potential and actual), as applied to the object of consciousness, constitute a purely relative pair of opposites that slide up and down the scale of real existence. The antithesis is not fixed throughout consciousness as is that between alogical and logical. The *in*formed matter of one stage becomes the matter *per se* of the next, in which it acquires a new and higher form. Aristotle's πρώτη ὕλη (pure matter), as such, undetermined to anything, is as much outside the synthesis of the real as is pure form, such, for instance, as the Platonic ideas. The nearest approach we have to this Aristotelian "First matter" is in the "I" or subject that analysis discloses as presupposed in all experience. Even this elementary factor of knowledge, however, is at least so far formally determined, that we can say of it that it constitutes the *possibility of consciousness*.[1] The *caput mortuum* of absolutely undetermined matter does not enter the purview of philosophy at all.

The actual of sense, the sense impression as immediately

[1] When most people hear the word "consciousness," they understand thereby consciousness as actual. They are fond of making it antithetical to the unconscious. From Leibnitz downwards we have heard much of the "unconscious perception," etc., but this antithesis of consciousness and unconsciousness is, I take it, a spurious one—or at least, as regards terminology, a clumsy one. What is meant by conscious and unconscious is the distinction between consciousness in its moment of actuality and consciousness as potential merely. The "unconscious perception" is no less within the sphere of consciousness-in-general than is the conscious perception. The subject or Ego *for* which the unconscious perception *is*, has as its sole attribute that of being the potentiality of consciousness; its *what-ness* consists in that it is realisable as a conscious synthesis. Perceptibility itself is nothing but a possible mode of consciousness. Save as a mode of consciousness, the words "perceiving" or "perceived" have no meaning. The point of view we have spoken of as Pallogism invariably has a tendency to hypostatise form at the expense of matter, the actual at the expense of the potential, and *à fortiori* the logical at the expense of the alogical. Even Mr Bradley, who is not a pallogist *pur sang*, falls at times into the serious error—as it seems to me—of failing to recognise the true philosophic value of the potential as an element of reality. This tendency comes out as much in dealing with the sphere of phenomenality—that is, of the world of science—as it does with that of metaphysics. For example, in Mr Bradley's case he speaks (*Appearance and Reality*, pp. 332-333, footnote) of the absolutely correct phrase in physics, "potential energy," as being, "strictly speaking, nonsense." This is undoubtedly the commonplace philosophic attitude towards the notion of potentiality. (*Cf.* Chapter III., pp. 67 *sqq.*).

given, is *per se* the vanishing moment of consciousness. In the completed percept of common-sense experience which already contains a logical element, the sense impressions at its basis being already synthesised, thereby constituting it an object, related more or less distinctly to other objects as classes, the original vanishing moment of the actual is, so to say, held in suspension, or, as we may express it metaphorically, partially frozen. This freezing process is completed in the pure abstract concept *per se*—that is, as detached from the alogical impression of the sense-consciousness. The logical universal as such, in its complete abstraction from sense-particulars, may well be described as the frozen actual. While not itself embodying or expressing any actual sense-particular or any definite number of such particulars, it yet contains within itself the promise of all sense-particulars irrespective of time, which is the special condition of the sense-actual. Sense-consciousness, though it is the basal element and presupposition of thought-consciousness but yet *per se* distinct from thought-consciousness, is nevertheless held in solution, as it were, in thought-consciousness, as the universal of logic.

The distinction between the alogical and the logical, between Sense and Thought, is not absolute. There is no question here of a separation. The distinction is one of elements merely, of elements which, considered *per se*, are abstract, but which in their synthetic union constitute that consciousness wherein we not merely "live and move and have our being," but of which we are ourselves simply the determinations. The problems of metaphysic concern the genetic or, as we may term it, presuppositional priority of elements within the given whole which is the subject of our investigation. In the last resort all problems of metaphysic may be said to resolve themselves into questions of value—I do not mean of practical value, in the sense in which the Pragmatists might use the word, but of value in the sense of the relative position and importance of each element in the complete system of consciousness.

There is no department of our experience that is either exclusively alogical or exclusively logical. But the fact remains that there are some departments which are predominantly alogical and others which are predominantly logical. There are

some in which potentiality and others in which actuality is the leading element. Speaking generally, we may say that in Reality as apprehended immediately—*i.e.* as experience "given," the alogical element by far outbalances the logical. In all that concerns life—organic, animal, or social—it is the Alogical, in the sense of the Potential, which is of chief importance, the Actual being quite subordinate. This point has been abundantly emphasised in other terms in the philosophy of Henri Bergson. In fact, while in all first-hand reality the Alogical is in some sense dominant, in life as life the Alogical, in the sense of the Potential, is so *par excellence*. It is not any actual moment in life, but it is its ceaseless becoming, with the inexhaustible content of this becoming—in a word, its infinite Potentiality—which is its essential point and which gives to it its character and value.

On the other hand, in all knowledge as knowledge it is the logical with which we are all but exclusively concerned. Knowledge deals almost entirely with what we have termed "frozen" actuality, in contradistinction to the fluid actuality of first-hand experience. It is comprehension, not apprehension. The aim and end of knowledge as knowledge is not reality, with its ceaseless inexhaustible becoming and hence its eternal incompleteness, but logical completeness and coherence. Its material is not Sensibility, Will, or Feeling—in a word, the Alogical—but thought-forms and their relative articulation. Knowledge proper—*i.e.* knowledge which is not directly apprehensible or perceptual, which is at best the lowest form of knowledge, but knowledge in the narrower sense in which the word is generally used, as the function of reflective thought—is never identifiable with the reality of immediate experience. Reflective thought interprets reality in its own medium, and in so doing transforms it into something other than itself. In itself Reality is, as we have seen, predominantly alogical. As transformed by reflective thought into knowledge, it has become predominantly logical.

It will be evident, I think, that the time-honoured antithesis of matter and form, as above said, at least roughly corresponds with our own antithesis, as formulated in this volume, of alogical and logical. Here also, throughout the history of

philosophy, we may notice the working of the pallogistic fallacy —to wit, the disinclination, where not the direct refusal, to give a positive value to the presuppositional element, as I might term it, of the synthesis of the real—namely, the *material* as opposed to the *formal*. For the majority of constructive thinkers positive significance alone attaches to the thought, or relational, element, as opposed to its alogical terms; it is the formal element, as opposed to its material basis; it is the actual, in contradistinction to its potential implications, which, for the majority of the aforesaid thinkers, has alone had any positive significance. We find commonly the attempt to argue away the one side of the antithesis. In this attempt more than one system has made shipwreck. For the fact remains that, in reality, not only is the one element of the antithesis as essential as the other, but the material, the potential, no less than the alogical, elements have, metaphysically, the primary value. The thought-relation presupposes relatable terms. Form presupposes matter to be *in*formed. The content of the actual moment only acquires its meaning through the potentiality of which it is the outcome. The purely negative value philosophers have been wont to ascribe to this side of experience is explained by the fact of its priority in value, within the conscious synthesis, as well to the thought, or formal element, as to that of immediacy or actuality; whence it follows that for reflective thought it is only expressible by negatives. The logical can only indicate the relation between the *that-ness* or the *what-ness* of its terms, but can never touch either the *that-ness* or the *what-ness*, in itself. To take our old illustration, feeling, whether as mere sensation or as the pleasure-pain consciousness, can never be interpreted in terms of thought, and hence of language. It is merely by means of its relational activity, its categorising function, that thought can express—or rather indicate—feeling, or the modes in which it manifests itself. The *feeling itself*, in its own immediate inwardness, remains outside thought, and hence outside language. Reflective thought glances off feeling, it falls away, like the proverbial water off the duck's back. Hence, to reflective thought—the dominant element of our intellectual life proper—feeling obtains merely as a negative *other-ness*. Thence arises the

plausibility of the pallogistic and formalistic tendencies hitherto prevalent in philosophic thought. These remarks lead up naturally to the special subject of our present chapter—namely, truth and reality.[1]

The word "reality," as implying the objective[2] synthesis of experience, actual and possible, is one of the most constantly recurring expressions in modern philosophical writings. It has the misfortune, however, which it shares in common with most words in use in philosophy, to have been employed loosely and in various senses by different thinkers. As we all know, for Kant, reality meant mere intensity of sensible quality—the more intense the qualitative sensation the greater the reality, and *vice versa*. This is a sense, however, in which the word is, so far as I am aware, not used by any recent philosophic writer. But there are two distinct senses current at the present day which it is important to keep distinguished. The first sense referred to is that which I have in the present work in general termed common-sense reality—that is, reality as ordinary perception of external things. This is emphatically the popular sense of the word "reality." To the man-in-the-street that is *real* which exists in time and space as perceived or perceivable, apart from the particularity of his own personal consciousness. Hence for him the typal form of reality is the world of common-sense, the world of perceived and perceivable objects in space, into which he enters as one individual among many. As we

[1] It should perhaps once more be premised here that reality, *as opposed to abstraction*, is always identical with concreteness— that is, it implies a synthesis. It involves at least two elements. The synthesis cannot be reduced to less than the union of matter and form, of potentiality and actuality; or to that of the cardinal antithetics—namely, the alogical and the logical—which to me seem more comprehensive than either of the two former pairs. Reality, then, viewed in this connection, means nothing but the inseparable correlation of at least two ultimate terms as factors. We can distinguish those two elements in reflection, but they cannot be presented in consciousness as separate. Each is *by itself* an abstraction. As Ferrier of the *Institutes of Metaphysics* would have put it, something more than 0 but less than 1. In their synthesis they constitute the real as such, in its barest and simplest expression.

[2] I here use the word "objective," not in the psychological sense as meaning exclusively something outside the individual mind in space, but in the more properly philosophical sense, as meaning all that is distinguishable from the perceiving subject. In this sense, of course, an idea or a feeling, recognised as such, is objective.

pointed out in a former chapter, the man-in-the-street is very careful to limit the reality of the sensible world to the horizon of common perception. Any purely psychological or personal element that this common-sense reality may acquire in the course of familiarity with it on the part of the individual mind is excluded from reality as not answering to the test of being common to all percipients.[1] This, the reality *sans phrase* of the ordinary man, is a perfectly legitimate use of the word also in a philosophical discussion.[2]

[1] There is, of course, a difficulty in deciding between the view taken by different individuals, or even by the same individual at different times, or under different circumstances, as to what is predicable of reality. This does not really affect our main argument, but is perhaps worth calling attention to at the present juncture. What, for instance, is the reality of a historical period—say, the Middle Ages—as seen through the psychological lens of contemporaries, or of the scholar of a later time? And of contemporaries, does it appear the same to the feudal villain, to his lord, to the cleric, and to the burgher? We have psychological refraction in all these cases; each sees the period from a different point of view, but which are we to assume as the nearest to reality? To the mind of a scholar of a later age, again, the period presents itself in a light in which it could never have appeared to any contemporaries; and, assuming the scholar to be a man of powerful imagination (a Scott or a Flaubert), are we to regard his reconstruction as in any way nearer the reality than the conception of an ignorant contemporary whose outlook was limited? Is that conception of the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century which is the product of the memory-synthesis of a London costermonger *more* real or *less* real than that of an Oxford graduate, or are they, either of them, more or less real than that of a scholar of a subsequent century will be, who sees our age in the light of the later evolution of events, and whose perspective is naturally modified accordingly? This problem is after all essentially of the same character as the puzzle of one's childhood—what was the real size of any object. Was the real table the table one saw when one's face was pressed against it, or was it the table one looked at twelve inches away, or the table as it appeared from the other end of the hall, or looking down the well of the staircase? It would be interesting, by the way, to know which of these hypotheses the partisans of the theory of an external world, independent of consciousness, would adopt. To the idealist metaphysician the problem offers no special difficulties. For to him reality is something fluid, not fixed; it contains within it an infinite potentiality, and hence can never become finally definite.

[2] It has recently become the fashion amongst certain English thinkers to distinguish in the problem of External Perception between the individually subjective Feeling or Sensation and what are termed the Sense-datum, which I have in this book called Feltness, and the hypothetical objective cause of the sensation and its datum—*i.e.* the "thing in itself," dear to the heart of the Realist. This division of the elements of objective consciousness may be in itself legitimate enough, but I prefer the terms here used for the actual

There is, however, a special philosophical sense of the word Reality, which Mr Bradley uses in his *Appearance and Reality*, although not peculiar to him, which is exceedingly important. This philosophical sense is connected with the popular interpretation of the term reality that we have already mentioned, but is much wider in scope—in fact, may be said to include the latter. According to the philosophical usage here spoken of reality means perfection or completeness, relative or absolute; the reality of any object in time implies that object at its fullest development. The reality of the individual man is that man in the prime of life and health, neither in childhood, nor in adolescence, nor in senility, nor in illness—the man at the zenith of his powers. Similarly the reality of the flower is not the seed, the shoot, or the bud, nor yet the flower when dropping its petals in decay, but the flower in full bloom. In fact, reality in this sense coincides as nearly as possible with the thing in its ideal perfection. Hence, in metaphysics, the ultimate reality is equivalent to the Absolute, the assumed totality in which all terms and all relations are thought as absorbed, outside which nothing is or can be. But it is obvious that in

perceptive Consciousness itself—namely, Feeling and Feltness—to the terms Sensing or Sensation and Sense-datum. Apart from the purely literary point that the words Feeling and Feltness are good Anglo-Saxon while the others are Latin in origin, on which I do not myself lay much stress, the term Sense-datum, at least, seems to me—in spite of the distinction sought to be drawn between it and the hypothetical object in itself of the realist's theory, as the cause of the perception—to be a question-begging appellative in favour of Realism. If the Feltness constituting the basis of the perceptive synthesis is something given (*datum*) then Realism—viz. the assumed cause outside the actual phenomena present in Consciousness—is plainly suggested, whereas, what is really meant by the term Sense-datum is, I take it, the deposit left, abstraction being made from the individual subjective side of the conscious act itself called Perception, and this, it seems to me, is better expressed by the term Feltness. The word Feeling is generally used to signify a somewhat purely subjective in the sense of individual psychology. Hence its special employment in connection with the affective side of the psychological subject—namely, the individual consciousness of pleasure and pain. But from the purely objective element in Perception, the Feltness, or so-called Sense-datum, all the affective element belonging exclusively to individual psychology is eliminated, or, so to say, shut off. This becomes the objective reality, and the only objective reality of the Idealist, who will have naught to do with the hypothetical *cause* of the perception, of the realist—namely; the "thing in itself" outside of, and apart from, the conscious synthesis.

reality taken in this sense there are degrees, and in this question of degrees the connection between the ordinary common-sense view of reality and the philosophical view comes in. From the point of view of theory-of-knowledge (epistemology) the outer world of ordinary consciousness is merely a definite *stadium* in the genetic synthesis of consciousness-in-general, while for practical needs it is the *only* type or norm of reality possible. Below it in the genetic order of the conscious synthesis you have inchoate elements merely, which only attain completion in the world as perceived—that is, in common experience. On the other hand, any synthesis richer in content than that of our common experience falls from the point of view of the latter to the side of the ideal, as a construction of the individual mind. Philosophy indeed destroys the complacent confidence of the man-in-the-street in the exclusive claim of this common-sense world to the title of reality ; and, in fact, from both sides it can show that the common-sense world itself is but a synthesis of sensible and logical elements. On the other hand, it can also show that this so solid-seeming world that forms the content of everyday experience only requires to be closely analysed to disclose itself as a mass of contradictions—a piece of rubble masonry, in fact. When viewed in this light its reality ceases to be so imposing as it is to the man-in-the-street, notwithstanding that its serviceability as " practical postulate " for ordinary human purposes remains unimpaired. From the same point of view it is very easy to show, as many thinkers have done, that, being neither consistent, complete, independent, nor an end in itself, it forces us forward to the assumption that it is not ultimate, but simply an imperfect phase of a larger and higher unity than itself. The term reality, in the sense we are discussing, emphasises the fact of the impermanence, as such, of every phase it may assume, and this applies as much to any sensible reality in space as to reality viewed from a metaphysical standpoint. The formed matter, the synthesis of one phase, becomes the unformed matter to be carried up into a new synthesis in the next, and here comes in the Hegelian trichotomy, which is essentially the Aristotelian process of matter, form, and their reciprocal synthesis, or (as we may translate it into the at-once more definite and more comprehensive terms

suggested in this book) into the alogical and the logical, the unity of which constitutes reality in its most general sense.

It is easy to see the temptation to Pallogism that lurks in this trichotomy, whether it take the form of the Hegelian logic or of the Aristotelian metaphysic. The progression of the apperceptive syntheses, in each of which these two factors are discoverable, leads to the illusion that the alogical can be finally absorbed and abolished in the logical; that matter must, in the ultimate reality, be eliminated by being transcended in an ideal-formal synthesis; that the potential loses its independence and disappears in the actual; that feeling and will exhaust themselves in an ineffable consciousness of pure intelligibles—in a word, of pure knowledge and final satisfaction. (Compare the ideals of various religious systems, the *Ewige Glanze*, the Beatific Vision, the "ecstasy" of the mystic, etc.) An analysis of reality, whether as a whole or in any one of its infinite partial manifestations, never discloses any approach to the transcendence of the alogical by the logical, of the matter by the form. What those who, under whatever disguise, adopt the pallogistic attitude fail to see, is that the moment they have transcended—in a word, got rid of—one of the elements of reality, they have got rid of reality itself, seeing that, as used, alike in common-sense and in philosophy, the term reality implies a conscious synthesis, and hence necessarily involves at least two elements. Reduced to its simplest expression, we have found these elements in the general synthesis of reality, viewed alike *per se* or in any of its special phenomenal manifestations, to disclose themselves as the antithesis of alogical and logical, an antithesis that is in the main covered by the Aristotelian antitheses of matter and form, potentiality and actuality. The moment you dissolve the synthesis by separating these antithetic aspects, the moment you sacrifice one of them, you have the *caput mortuum* of an abstraction left. The reality, the synthesis, has disappeared, and this hypostatised abstraction has taken its place. This is the case, though often concealed under plausible guises, with all systems of a pallogistic tendency. Such a hypostatised abstraction, for instance, was the *νοῦς ποιητικός* of Aristotle, perhaps the *unica substantia* of Spinoza,

and certainly the *Idee* of Hegel, in addition to the classical instance in the history of philosophy, the Platonic Ideas, *universalia ante rem.*

But although the polarity of the basal antithesis is essential to every real, and no less so to ultimate reality itself, if we admit such, yet it may be possible to predicate a certain priority of significance for one pole of this antithesis as against the other. By this priority of significance I mean the *stress* of presupposition, and here, I contend, from the metaphysical elements of all experience, down or up (as we may choose to term the process) to the most concrete of apperceived contents, the logical-formal element invariably presupposes the alogical-material element, in a manner in which the converse does not hold good. To take an illustration from the root of all things. The object—the side of the primary conscious synthesis to which logical determination falls—presupposes that mere alogical power of consciousness which we distinguish as the subject *per se*, in a more thorough and unconditional manner than the subject presupposes the object. A bare subject without object may be unimaginable, but it is not in the same way impossible and absurd as is the bare object cut off from the subject. In other words, a system of felt, thought, and willed determinations without a feeler, thinker, or willer, is a sheer contradiction in terms. The object itself is, in the last resort, metaphysically deducible from the subject. The *thought-feltness*, which we term object, clearly has its *raison d'être* in the feeling and thinking agency or subject. Hence the alogical (here the primordial subject) has clearly a pre-suppositional value, from the metaphysical point of view, superior to that of the logically-determined object.

To take an illustration from the physical world, life or organisation presupposes inorganic physical substance as its basis. The living thing does not exist apart from the *form* of life itself—apart, that is, from the laws or logical categories determining organisation—but life, apart from living matter, is an impossible absurdity. Life, in short, is an objective fact, having for its presupposition physical matter *sans phrase* (inorganic matter). Now, *quoad* the special category involved in living matter, the mere physical substance at its basis is

alogical. The difference, of course, between our metaphysical and the above physical illustration lies in the fact that in the latter the alogicality is only relative. The physical substance constituting the ultimate matter of the living organism can be itself reduced as an objective reality under the categories of inorganic matter. You can destroy an animal body and chemically resolve it into its inorganic elements—which elements, nevertheless, have a real existence. When we are dealing with metaphysical principles, the case is otherwise. The ultimate alogical subject at the root of the primary synthesis of consciousness has meaning and value only as element of the synthesis itself. For us it can never become invested with reality *per se*. Our point ought now to be sufficiently clear—namely, that the alogical in any real synthesis has always an implicatory priority of value over the logical form that converts it into reality, whether ultimate, as in the case of metaphysical principles, or derivative, as in the case of physical products.

But it is not merely when considered as elementary factor of reality that this presuppositional priority of value attaches to the alogical. Analysing reality by the method known as that of the Hegelian trichotomy, we view it as position, negative apposition, and synthetic unity of these two terms, this process obtaining alike in every special case of reality and in reality considered in its widest and simplest aspect as determination of experience in general. In the synthesis itself, viewed as completed whole, we find the alogical again the dominant factor. This is especially noticeable from the point of view of psychology. The focus, so to say, of the reality of the thing, rests in its alogical, its *felt* but inexpressible, particularity. In will, the touchstone of motive is always feeling, and the desire or realised end is always feeling. Reason, the logical determination of the value of motive and end, is the handmaid merely of feeling. We cannot reason feeling into existence or out of existence. No logical process can exorcise the given immediacy of feeling, any more than the given particularity of the felt object; although, of course, this given particularity may evoke the logical process. This side of the question, however, will fall to be fully dealt with in discussing the ethical and æsthetic

consciousness, when the questions of motives, ends, and ideals can suitably be treated in greater detail.

We have thus far, throughout the present chapter, discussed the question of reality from certain points of view touched upon, either not at all, or only casually, in the previous portions of this work. In the remainder of this chapter we shall have to consider the notion of truth, as to its distinction from reality, as to its inner significance, and as to its test.

The main distinction between truth and reality is that, whereas in reality we are concerned with the alogical as well as with the logical, in truth we are dealing, at least primarily, with the logical alone. Furthermore, while in reality we have the logical in its first intention—to use the scholastic phrase, —in truth we have the logical in its second intention, as reflected in the mind. Hence truth can never be identical with reality. Truth is always *abstract* as being concerned essentially with logical notions, whereas reality is *concrete*; it represents the synthetic union of the alogical and the logical. In truth, therefore, reality is always transformed. The alogical of the real object disappears, and is replaced by a thought-form—a more or less arbitrary symbol of itself. This symbol works all very well up to a certain point for practical purposes, but beyond that point it breaks down, and we get into the well-known antinomies, insoluble contradictions, or impossibilities of thought, as we may choose to term them.

In this connection we may observe that the time-honoured philosophical theory of "things-in-themselves," outside all consciousness, may be traced back to the inability of reflective thought to deal adequately with the alogical. All that has to do with relations between alogical terms it can fully master, but, being pure thought, it cannot get inside the alogical terms themselves. It can compass the relation between subject and object, from its most general metaphysical expression up to its most complex form as relation between individual mind and outer world. It can also compass the manifold and complex relations between objects themselves. But it cannot penetrate the alogical. It cannot interpret, but can only symbolise, in its own language feeling or feltness (sensation) itself. It

cannot penetrate the particular individual *as such*. It cannot comprehend that infinity of particulars which its own universals presuppose. Hence these things, the alogical *per se*, are to reflective thought, of which philosophy is the highest expression, necessarily a *caput mortuum*, outside its own range, and which it can, for the most part, only indicate by negative definitions. Here, I think, we have the fount and origin of the thing-in-itself, the *noumenon*, the unknowable, etc. These and similar expressions represent simply endeavours to indicate and seize, in thought, the alogical in its inwardness and apart from its connection with thought, as complementary element in the synthetic unity we call the real.

Just as the word reality is used in different senses, so is truth. To the ordinary man truth means the correspondence between the reproduction in imagination, or the statement in words, of a thing or event and the thing or event itself. Truth is, for him, usually of the nature of a "practical postulate," and his chief concern is that the correspondence shall be such as shall satisfy his practical needs. This at one end of the scale. For science, the standard of truth is, that the formulæ of reflective thought that it employs shall be capable of re-translation into terms of reality, and *vice versa*, in any given case, on demand. This, at least, is the theoretical postulate of scientific thought. Philosophy demands more of truth than this. Like science, it expresses truth in the abstract terms of reflective thought, only more so. It aims at an adequate interpretation of universal reality by reflective thought in its own terms, but one that shall correspond to that reality in a manner to satisfy the individual mind. There is one thing common to all senses of the word truth, and that is, that ultimate test of truth spoken of in the Introduction (see pp. 26-8), the self-consistency of consciousness. Where, in everyday life, a report does not tally with the fact reported, the self-consistency of consciousness is violated. Where a scientific formula is contradicted at any point by the reality it is supposed to represent, there the self-consistency of consciousness is also violated. By the self-consistency of consciousness is meant the consistency of consciousness, considered as a whole, with itself, wherever and whenever the test is applied. This does

not invalidate the fact that in every process of consciousness a contradiction lies embedded, based on the antithetic character of its two ultimate elements, the mark of which we have found to consist respectively in alogicality and logicality. This contradiction, as Hegel in his own way has pointed out, belongs to the life and movement of reality considered as process, or as incomplete. But the contradiction *qua* contradiction nevertheless disappears in every completed synthesis as such, whether of consciousness *per se* or of any special organic phase of consciousness, for the very essence of such is consistency or coherence within itself.

It is important in this connection to distinguish between the alogical and illogicality. Where you have what is commonly termed a *contradictio in adjecto*, or a " contradiction in terms," *within* a logical process itself, you have illogicality. The contradiction of the Hegelian dialectic is of quite a different character to this. It is not, like the latter, a contradiction immanent in one side of the real synthesis, but a contradiction arising from the intrinsic disparity between the two sides or elements of the synthesis. This disparity can only be envisaged by reflective thought, working, as it necessarily does, through categories, as a continuous process of the surging up and resolution of contradictions.

We have defined the test of truth as the self-consistency of consciousness. But neither truth nor its test is something fixed once and for all. Truth, as the representative of reality in the sphere of reflective thought, has gradations like reality itself, and corresponding to it. The highest truth stands for the most complete expression of those determinations of consciousness we term reality. Truth means, then, the expression in the forms of reflective thought, of the highest realisation of a given synthesis, the most perfect expression of the reality of a given plane of consciousness. It is the alogical in every real synthesis that forces forward to a new reality, and thus is perpetually falsifying truth. There is no conceivable formulation of the nature of things that cannot be transcended by a more adequate formulation. Hence a " truth " is only absolute for its own plane and for those below it. Otherwise, by its very nature it *becomes*—that is, it evolves from within itself

—a higher truth, in respect of which it loses its character of truth.

The "highest" truth, then, if we are dealing with the ultimate nature of consciousness, as in philosophy, would be identical with *absolute* truth, but below or within this all-comprehensive aspect we find infinite gradations of *relative* truth. Thus every department of knowledge has its special "truth." The truth of physics is not precisely the truth of chemistry. The truth of chemistry is just as little the truth of physiology. The truth of physiology again differs from the truth of social science. Truth, in this scientific sense, is largely coincident with the system of the laws of a given science. The confusion between these relative truths of science, and their misapplication, have been often recognised as a fruitful source of fallacy.

Meanwhile, let us pass in review more closely the three senses in which the word "truth" is used, but for all of which the self-consistency of consciousness affords the ultimate test. Truth in the first sense is bound up with the concrete mental image of sensible reality, and, as such, it is truth in its lowest meaning, This is truth in the popular sense, the sense in which little boys are told to "speak the truth." Here we have an instance of simple and crude correspondence, usually speaking, between the psychological order of ideas and the perceptive order of things in space. In the example taken, when we demand that the small boy shall speak the truth, we inculcate upon him that he shall not call up in our minds ideas—using the word "idea" here, not in the sense of abstract notion, but of concrete mental image—having no counterpart in the world of spacial perceivedness, while alleging that they have such a counterpart. We mean that he should not call up such a mental image or series of mental images in our mind, coupled with a judgment that these images correspond to a perceptual happening in space. Such is the typical and most common case of truth in this lowest and everyday sense of the term.[1]

[1] In the illustration given we have referred to a happening in space. We need scarcely say that this is not a *sine qua non* of the matter. To pursue our illustration, the mental image called up by the boy might be just as well something concerning the workings of his own mind. He might allege that he had

Truth in the scientific sense does not necessarily postulate the correspondence between a mental image and something else outside itself, as does truth in the above popular sense. The essence of scientific truth is that it transforms common-sense reality in the light of abstract conceptions. Any mental image that is involved is altogether subsidiary. In fact, the mental image is often rather disturbing than otherwise to the apprehension of scientific truth. In mathematics it is admitted that no mental image formed, say, of the geometrical configurations of space can correspond with accuracy to the figures postulated by geometry (points, lines, circles, etc.). Again, we cannot help, when we speak of a molecule, of an atom, or of ether, forming by analogy some sort of mental image of these ultimate factors of the world of physical science. Yet we are perfectly well aware that any mental image arrived at in this way begins and ends with itself, that it corresponds with nothing outside itself. It is true, of course, that in geometry the clumsy attempts of mental imagery to bring these configurations of pure space before the mind may, properly discounted, be of assistance in dealing with the problems peculiar to this science. But, on the other hand, for the apprehension of physical truth the mental image involuntarily formed of molecule, atom, or ether, leads undoubtedly to direct misconceptions, and hence, as above said, is a hindrance rather than otherwise to accuracy of comprehension. Scientific truth reduces the world of sensible reality to a system of abstract categories. The mere pseudo-picture it makes of a transformed sense-world is entirely subsidiary thereto. It is very little more than the tailor's block (so to say) that it uses for the display of its system of categories or laws.

Truth, in the highest sense of the word—that is, the truth of philosophy—means the complete apprehension of the world through the medium of thought-forms. The truth of philosophy is the truth common to all other departments of knowledge, inasmuch as it is the truth involved in the conditions of

forgotten something that he had not forgotten, and *vice versa*. Here he evokes in us the mental image of acts of forgetfulness within our own mental experience, conjoined with the false judgment by which we identify them with the state of his mind at the juncture in question.

knowledge itself. Philosophy aims at a perfect formulation of reality in the abstract terms of reflective thought ; this aim is, however, impossible of attainment. However much we may approximate thereto, we can never attain to and grasp truth in its entirety in this manner. No formulation in terms of the abstractions of reflection can ever correspond exactly to the requirements of the complete self-consistency of consciousness. The ground of this lies in the fact that the alogical element, which is the basis of reality, and which interpenetrates reality, cannot be expressed, but can only be indicated—that is, symbolised—by the forms of abstract thought. It is this alogical element at the basis of reality, this " power behind the throne," of the transformed world in which philosophic truth consists, that prevents the formulation from ever becoming perfect, and, so to say, rounded off. The reality of things and of mental processes, their evolution in time, continually forces us on to a readjustment, a re-formulation, of the world-problem and its solution. In a word, philosophic truth must always be *relative*. In philosophic truth, as in other aspects of truth, the correspondence of truth with reality never amounts to more than an approximation. But what in philosophy, as in science, we mean by truth is the formula expressing the nearest approximation up to date to the self-consistency of consciousness. Hence no system of philosophy, no formulation nor solution of the world-problem, can be final. Absolute truth in the philosophic sense—that is, a formulation adequately expressing, under the notions of reflective thought, reality throughout its complete range, for all time, is an impossible and absurd chimera. A system of philosophy, in the last resort, like a work of art, is the handmaid of feeling. For, indeed, every metaphysical formulation has as its end the satisfaction of personal feeling. It may wear the guise of a purely logical construction, but its final *telos* is, no less than that of a work of art, the satisfaction of a certain complex feeling or emotion. It is a customary convention to term the ideal of philosophy truth, the ideal of art beauty, and the ideal of conduct goodness ; but, in the broadest sense, these are only parts of one ideal, the ultimate harmony or self-consistency of consciousness with itself, of the form

with the content, of the alogical with the logical, of the potential with the actual.

Here again the fallacy of Pallogism comes into view. Nothing is more common in philosophy than what is sometimes termed Intellectualism, by which I understand the attribution to reason, as such, of an æsthetic or ethical value. In Plato we find it expressed in its baldest form, but the tendency runs through most synthetic thinkers up to modern times. With Spinoza, for example, the constitution of reason, of pure intellect, as the final goal of all things, is very conspicuous. His phrase in this connection, the " intellectual love of God " (*Amor intellectualis Dei*), is well known. For Spinoza, the goal of ethics is the raising of the individual consciousness to the standpoint of pure, passionless, intellectual insight. In and through this, the individual, in proportion as he attains it, achieves one-ness with the Absolute. Yet one would think it was easy to see that this point of view is abstract and one-sided—that, after all, the intellectual insight that leads to a supersession of passion in the lower and more partial sense, is itself only the handmaid of passion or emotion in the higher and fuller sense, a passion that may also receive its satisfaction through other means than the relational activity of pure intellect.

The æsthetic consciousness with its ideal of beauty, the ethical consciousness with its ideal of goodness, love, or whatever we may choose to call it, have also their parts to play in this connection no less than the reflective consciousness with its ideal of truth. To talk of " intellectual love," as Spinoza does, is a misuse of language. One might almost as correctly talk of " long depth " or " broad height." Intellectual insight, conceived at its highest, as the complete comprehension of all possible relations in a systematic logical unity, could never give us, intrinsically, anything beyond itself. The emotional satisfaction derived from a completeness of knowledge in this sense has an exclusively intellectual content. If we put aside the sense of symmetry and harmony which an intellectual construction of the universe brings with it, and which, as we have already pointed out, places it *en rapport* with the æsthetic ideal —thereby giving it, in a sense, an æsthetic value—the content

per se is not a true æsthetic content, while still less does it possess any ethical value. Mere logical truth, although it may be an essential element in the final goal of experience, can never by itself furnish the complete satisfaction that this goal implies.

To sum up, we have found that reality, apart from its barest philosophic significance as involving a synthesis, is used with two chief meanings as opposed to abstraction, the one its ordinary meaning, and the other more specially philosophical. These two meanings, though seemingly divergent, are essentially not so. The ordinary sense of the word reality is that of the outer world of sensible objects in space and time that forms the content of our perceptive consciousness. This is the norm, or standard, of reality, for everyday life. The philosophical use of the word is more comprehensive, and also more elastic. In its more specially technical application, the word means the highest expression of the essence of any given thing or of the world as a whole. In this sense it does not mean *mere* concreteness as opposed to abstractness, but the highest perfection of any given concrete, or of the universe conceived as a totality. The reality of the flower is in this sense that of the flower at the moment of its fullest expansion, the reality of the man being similarly that of the man in the perfection of his powers. In short, that final stage or condition of anything to which all other stages have led up, or to which they are contributing, is its reality. Thus the Absolute, if postulated as the highest expression of reality, must *ex hypothesi* be viewed as an infinite consciousness, as regards which the content of each and every individual consciousness is but a more or less partial aspect. The latter's full significance could only be apprehended from the point of view of this supreme consciousness. Reality in this sense, therefore, means always fulness or perfection, whether relative or absolute. But, as pointed out, this philosophical use of the word reality does not essentially clash with its ordinary use. The man-in-the-street calls the outer world—the content of his waking perceptive consciousness, working through the forms of space and time—reality. In so doing he confines the word to that plane or *stadium* of consciousness that is of most obvious importance (to himself)

for everyday life and its practical concerns. This common-sense reality is also a perfection and completion, the perfection and completion of the inchoate sensations and the bare thought-forms of which it is constructed, and which disclose themselves to metaphysical analysis. It is the most salient *stadium* of consciousness in its self-unfolding, and as such is a *degree* in reality of the first importance. Hence it will be seen that the common usage of the term and its special philosophical sense are not at all at variance.

Truth, we have shown, is distinguished from reality in that in truth, considered as truth, the alogical element, the foundation of life and reality, is absent. Truth has at least three easily distinguishable connotations. It always involves the notion of correspondence between the psychological order and an order that is more than psychological. The ultimate test of truth, as often enough here insisted on, is the consistency of consciousness with itself. We have truth as to matter-of-fact, which presupposes the correspondence of certain mental images with events in space, or with the inner workings of an individual mind. We have the " truths " of science, which in the main coincide (respectively) with the systems of laws or categories peculiar to each department of science. We have also " scientific truth " as a whole, which means the harmonisation of the laws or categories of special departments under certain wider thought-forms that include them.[1] Finally, we have philosophic truth, in the true sense, which aims at embracing in reflective thought, under the most comprehensive formula possible, all conscious experience. In this way it seeks, under the forms of reflection, to arrive at the ultimate meaning of reality itself. The immediate test of truth as to matter-of-fact lies in the correspondence between a mental image and some form of happening, either in the perceptual world of space or in the workings of some individual mind. The immediate test of scientific truth is its correspondence with reality at every point to which it is possible to test it, and whenever we choose to apply it. But the only test of philosophic truth (and in the

[1] Scientific truth as a complete body of doctrine, as distinguished from the respective truths of the different sciences, has been sometimes termed " cosmic philosophy."

last resort the test of truth also in the other senses named) is the self-consistency of consciousness. The aim of philosophy is the supreme and most intimate satisfaction of aspiration towards the unity and harmony of consciousness in all phases from the lowest to the highest. This necessarily involves the inclusion of the *telos* of all consciousness in the theory that is designed to embody this harmony for reflective consciousness.

But reflective thought is not the only aspect of consciousness under which reality, as primarily given, becomes transformed and acquires a higher value. In the art-consciousness this is also the case, and the emotion of aspiration above spoken of seeks satisfaction here immediately under the forms of sensibility and perception. The aim of art, in its highest manifestations, is to express the unity and harmony of experience, together with its final goal, in the world of immediate feeling—in a word, *alogically*. As to any ultimate goal of conduct, this also would seem, in the last resort, to have none but an æsthetic significance. Character, if not viewed as a means to some end other than itself, but merely looked at in itself, has a purely æsthetic value. The measure of "goodness" in character is the degree in which it expresses to our moral consciousness, in the forms of conduct (justice, duty, sympathy, etc.), the same unity and harmony of consciousness with itself —considered as process and as end—which philosophy seeks to embody in the logical values of reflective thought, and art in the alogical values of perceptive feeling.

CHAPTER VI

THE HIGHER CONSCIOUSNESS

The philosophic, the æsthetic, and the ethical consciousness have this much in common, that they are severally concerned with the attempt to merge the many in the one, the quantitative particular in the universal. The success with which this is done is the test of their several "values." The aim of all three is to eliminate quantitative particularity, to raise consciousness above the mere endlessness of repetition, with the differential imperfection attaching to each instance of this repetition—to raise it to a point at which this quantitative particularity, the salient feature in the reality of commonsense, has disappeared, or at least has lost all significance.[1] Their aim is to unite with universality the qualitative side of particularity, its *thisness*, without which there is no life, but only "bloodless categories." Science and *a fortiori* philosophy seek to attain this synthesis in their own medium of the logical relation as transformed by reflective thought. The ultimate goal of philosophy is the perfect and most adequate expression of reality in the terms of reflection. But in this attempt, however successfully universality may be attained, it is so at the expense of the *thisness*, the immediacy, the life constituting, the marrow of the "world and the soul" in their "first intention." The salient point about a logical relation, a thought-form, is that it is purely discursive—that it has no *thisness*. Hence the sense of emotional satisfaction accompanying the contemplation of reality as transformed by reflective thought into scientific, and to a still greater extent philosophic, truth, must be ascribed to the fact that we impart something foreign thereto in our mental attitude—to wit, the feeling of harmony, symmetry, and perfection derived from the æsthetic consciousness with its alogical content of sense. For it is clear, and we

[1] For the general discussion of the antithesis of particular and universal, see Chapter III. on "The Alogical and the Logical."

hardly need labour the point, that emotional satisfaction can only grow out of the soil of *thisness* or immediacy—in a word, out of the soil of life. Mere "bloodless categories," scientific or philosophic, can never be food for emotion of any kind whatever. But every transformation of reality by the mind into the terms of its own reflective consciousness necessarily means its transformation into abstractions—that is, into some form of the logical universal. We have seen that the latter observation applies even to what are, considered *per se*, purely alogical elements of the real synthesis. These also, as indicated in the reflective consciousness, necessarily, so to speak, take on its colour; and are presented, therefore, in the guise of concepts, or, if we prefer to call them so as being more strictly accurate, as *pseudo-concepts*. For example, if we speak of sensation as a whole or of any special modification of sensation, such as colour, hardness, sweetness, we have thereby transformed what, as originally given, is a purely alogical factor in our experience, into a pseudo-concept. All thought and *a fortiori* all language have to be carried on in universals—that is, under thought-forms. Hence, even when dealing with intrinsically non-conceptual, alogical elements, thought cannot choose but indicate them in the terms and under the conditions prescribed by its own relational activity. I say *indicate* them, for in the nature of the case it cannot adequately *express* them as it can express a principle, a relation, a law, a formula, etc. From the foregoing, therefore, the reader will clearly see that a philosophical construction, *as such*, is always concerned with thought-forms —if not with concepts that adequately express real relations, then at least with pseudo-concepts that inadequately indicate the alogical terms of these relations apart from the relations themselves.

Philosophy may be not inaptly defined as the last word of the logical. It cannot, as we have often enough had occasion to insist, get beyond universals or abstractions. Even when it seeks to deduce the individual, it is always concerned with the universalised individual, with the synthesis of those general conditions that the *thisness* of the particular individual presupposes, but is not. The impossibility of the logical, as such, expressing the alogical, remains, but in philosophy the logical is

pushed to its extreme limits, to the point at which it transcends itself. Although philosophy as philosophy cannot touch the alogical, yet it can show us the boundary of the logical—the point of contact, so to say, with the alogical. For the instrument of philosophy is language, and language is the exponent, where not of true concepts, at least of pseudo-concepts. The aim of philosophical terminology is directly to express thought-relations, and not, like the language of poetry, indirectly to evoke feeling by means of suggestion. Yet the analogy between philosophy and poetry, which has often been remarked upon, is undoubted, and rests upon the fact that the last word of philosophy is a hint at conveying that which its proper medium—reflective thought—is incapable, strictly speaking, of expressing. Discursive thought, as we have often said, always glances off from immediate feeling, and hence can never directly express it. The universal can never penetrate the particular. Although it can indicate particularity as a bare principle in conceptual form, yet the element itself eludes it. The problem as regards the future is whether we are destined to attain a mode of knowledge, a consciousness, in which the alogical shall be immediately presented as universal. Meanwhile, this is imperfectly attempted in the fine arts.

The " higher consciousness " is concerned with values rather than with facts or abstract relations. The problem of human culture is, as it has always been, to disengage the quantitative particular, the mere many-ness of the world, from the essence of its reality. This applies alike to human culture in its three great branches, philosophic, æsthetic, and ethical, notwithstanding that the value of each is different. Philosophy strives to accomplish this by reason, by the reduction of the world's many-ness to the unity of abstract thought ; art, by its reduction to the unity of abstract feeling. A similar aim appears in the practical department of human culture—namely, ethics. The goal here is the reduction of the many-ness of particular, independent contradictory human interests to the universal common interest of humanity. Here also, therefore, the problem is the disengaging of the aim of human conduct from the quantitative particularity of countless aims and its reduction to the unity of a common standard. In all cases, the many-ness of particularity

is the enemy with which the intellectual progress of mankind is continually battling. The ordinary man is occupied almost exclusively with this many-ness, with the quantitative particular, with the " sense-manifold," as it is commonly termed. The intellectual man, on the other hand, is occupied with the universal, either of thought or of feeling. He has one of two aims, either to transcend the quantitative particularity of events, things, and persons by translating reality directly into thought-unity, or to effect the same purpose by transmuting it directly into feeling-unity. In the latter case, while the quantitative mode of particularity is abolished, the qualitative mode, the *thisness*, is retained. In the former case, on the contrary, we have, in the first instance at least, to sacrifice both aspects, the qualitative aspect of particularity, its *thisness*, as well as the quantitative, its endless repetition, by reducing reality to a system of logical abstractions, general principles, or laws. In either case, the concrete reality of ordinary consciousness is changed. In one case, the product of the transmutation is termed truth, in the other beauty, employing these terms respectively, of course, in their widest signification. The opposition between particular and universal can never be transcended by the mere reduction of any given reality to logical formulæ *per se*, to laws or universal principles, as is done by science. The æsthetic abstraction, or beauty, in combining the qualitative particular, the *thisness* of feeling, with the universal, which in ordinary empirical consciousness accrues to the logic-relational side of reality, may be said in a sense to transcend the antithesis of particular and universal. The typal form in art is a particular, but with a purely universal content and significance. (*Cf.* Schopenhauer, *Welt als Wille*, iii. *passim*.) This typal form or æsthetic idea represents the attempt of the æsthetic consciousness to disengage reality from the quantitative particular, to pluck it out of the swamp of indefinite numerical repetition, the morass of infinite multiplicity, in which, on the plane of common-sense consciousness, reality is immersed. This attempt is achieved with varying success in all the departments of art. In music, as Schopenhauer has pointed out, the transcendence of the particular is more successful than in the other departments, owing to the

medium employed. Philosophy proper, from one point of view, may be regarded as an *eirenikon* between the opposed modes of reducing the many-ness of particularity to unity and universality. In metaphysic, the process of reducing the real world to the unity of the pure forms of thought is carried out to the fullest extent possible. The generalisations and distinctions of metaphysic are infinitely more comprehensive and subtler than those of physical science, or even of mathematics. Hence the difficulty the man working in the atmosphere of common-sense or science finds in appreciating the significance of the problems of philosophy, let alone in understanding any attempted solution of them. But, notwithstanding its failure to appeal to the ordinary mind, the very completeness with which philosophy does the work of logical generalisation and distinction tends to bring us back again to the immediacy of feeling, but in a higher potency. This being the case, it approaches the art consciousness in its final result. In both, the end is so far the same. They both represent the activity of the subject of consciousness in its effort to be rid of, or at least to reduce the significance of, that mode of the alogical, termed in this book *quantitative particularity*. In the first case, philosophy seeks to abolish the infinite many-ness of the real world by the complementary factor of that many-ness—to wit, logical universality. In the second case, it has striven to effect this by informing the other, or qualitative aspect of the particularity, its *thisness*, with a quasi-universal content. In art, the thisness or immediacy of mere feeling is sought to be made the vehicle of a universality that is itself based on sensation or feeling.

The mode of envisaging the world in which the relational element holds the most undisputed possession of the field is undoubtedly the scientific attitude. In philosophy, the inadequacy of the logical formula becomes apparent, but the scientific mind proper has no vestige of a suspicion that the categories employed by physical science are not ultimate and final. In the infancy of knowledge, man blindly followed his feeling as the interpreter of the world-order for him. At a later age, the results of this interpretation, based on feeling and the attitude of mind to which those results belonged,

became superstition ; the scientific attitude assumed the sway of knowledge. The truth of the universe in this scientific sense appeared very different from its truth before the rise of science. The highest truth for most of us means the reduction of the quantitative particular, of the many-ness of the world, to the categories of science. Until all departments of knowledge are as completely reduced to those categories as their nature admits, the truth of science will still await completion ; hence, until this is the case, the scientific attitude must continue to be supreme. But the question then arises whether, after all, the scientific outlook on the world is ultimate, in the sense that it may not possibly be superseded in its turn by a different one, by one, that is, which, while not *abrogating* the results of the modern scientific world-outlook, will nevertheless present them in such a completely new light that in their present shape they may appear to the man of the future hardly less unsatisfactory than are the naïve unreasoned theories of early man to the man of science of to-day.

The great antithesis of the ethical consciousness is that of freedom and necessity. This, as will be at once apparent to the reader, is only the special form that the cardinal antithesis between the alogical and the logical assumes in the sphere of ethics. The reason, working through the categories, proclaims that every event is necessitated—that is, that it is related indissolubly with previous events according to the category of cause and effect. Feeling in its immediacy proclaims spontaneity of motive and of action on the part of the individual will. In all my action, setting aside, of course, coercion from without, while I *know* that the action is rigorously necessitated by motives, in their turn strictly determined by preceding events, all of which are deducible from certain laws, physical and psychical, constituting special determinations of the great principle of causation—while I *know* all this, I nevertheless *feel* myself to be acting spontaneously or freely. In this antinomy of free will and necessity, therefore, we have the alogical and the logical very obviously presented in crass and apparently irresolvable opposition in the individual consciousness. Reason, in the form of reflective thought, presents our actions to us as through and through necessitated ; immediate

feeling presents them to us as altogether spontaneous. This contradiction cannot be transcended by thought, since it has its ground in those alogical elements that are prior in nature to thought. The activity of thought, in both its forms, whether as constitutive of the objective world or as reflected in the mind, must, by its very nature, reduce the particular under the universal, contingency under necessity, spontaneity under law. Viewed from the standpoint of science, therefore, from the standpoint, namely, that makes abstraction from the alogical conditions of self-consciousness, necessitarianism is a plain and uncontrovertible conclusion. On the other hand, viewed from the standpoint of self-consciousness and its conditions, free-will is an equally irresistible truth. This antinomy can no more be resolved by thought than the infinity of space and time and their quantitative-particular content can be reduced to any thought-formulation. Reason holds a brief to reduce all reality to the category, and it always succeeds in doing so whilst its own point of view is retained in the reflective consciousness, and whilst abstraction is made from the other point of view in which the alogical predominates. For the reflective consciousness, although it always has before it the empirical consciousness, the object-world as given, from which it draws its content, can, we need scarcely say, always by a voluntary act throw one of the elements constitutive of the empirical consciousness into the background, and fix its attention on the other. The individual, therefore, may either view his action as an event in time indissolubly connected with other events under the category of causation, or he may strike at once to the bed-rock of all things, through his own self-consciousness to the subject of all consciousness, and view the action as having its source in that of which time itself is the mere form. In the first case, he ascribes action to motive; he deduces action determinately from character under a hierarchy of laws, the foundation of which is the principle that action follows the strongest motive. But, as Schopenhauer has pointed out, he ignores the fact that this character itself, and the relative power of the motives influencing it, emanate from that which is not itself *per se*, but which is the presupposition, not of it alone, but of the whole world-process of consciousness whence it takes its

origin. The spontaneity immediately given in the act of will or choice is, in short, not an individual fact, although the act itself may be, but proceeds directly from the primal Subject that identifies itself in a special time-content with a particular memory-synthesis.

In the antinomy opened up by moral praise and blame we are once more confronted with a salient example of our cardinal antithesis. No person in the present day with any pretensions to enlightenment doubts that human character is moulded by the circumstances under which the individual has grown up, or by those under which his ancestors have grown up. This character it is that is the source of his motives, and of the actions that follow therefrom. This is the theory of modern scientific psychology. "But," says its opponent, "moral judgment on actions, then, can have no meaning; you cannot praise or blame a man for that which his character necessitated his doing; if he is so made that he must do certain things, given the temptation to do them, then it is obviously unjust to blame him for doing them." The solution of this problem on the principles developed in the foregoing pages is, I think, clear. In every moral action, just as in every other event, there is a law-element as well as a chance-element. The general principle of the action can be deduced from the character of the individual performing it—in a word, can be regarded from the standpoint of the category of causation. In so far as this is the case, the individual may be said to be not obnoxious to praise or blame, since his action is determined. But this determination is only general. It represents the categorised and necessitated side of his character, and as such determines the general course of his action, other things being equal. But other things never are quite equal, for every action happening in the real world has not merely a general and logical side to it, but a particular and alogical side, irreducible to cause or to any other category. In a word, every event in the real world has a *casual* side as well as a *causal* side, and this applies to moral actions no less than to other events. It is to the former side of the action that moral praise and blame, in the strict sense of the terms, are alone applicable. The general character of a man may be provocative of either admiration

or detestation, but a man cannot properly be praised or blamed for inheriting a certain character, or even for having acquired such from the circumstances attending his upbringing. But the general character is only one element determining individual moral action. There is the other element in moral action as in every temporal event, spontaneous, aleatory, and altogether irreducible to the principle of causation. Either alone is abstract, but their synthesis gives us the concrete character of the man as displayed in his actions. In some cases, the causal element, the mere disposition of abstract character, so predominates as to completely overshadow the other element of personal will in any given moral action. When this is so, we say that the temptation is irresistible to the man. This is best illustrated, perhaps, in the case of certain typical criminals, where the alogical element entering into moral action seems to be entirely absent. Such persons approach the condition of mechanical automata (mechanism being the type *par excellence* of action dominated by the causal category). The spontaneous element that might modify this is practically inoperative. But, in the general way, it by no means follows that because a man has certain elements of brutality in his character, or because he is of a strongly erotic temperament, he will ever perpetrate a murder or a rape. A thousand men may have more or less strongly developed brutal or erotic instincts, and yet only one of the number either assault a man or ravish a woman.

Hence it is that the rough test of moral praise or blame is the average of a given community. As a man's action is above or below the average in the moral scale in his community, he is praised or blamed. Poverty, for example, is the condition predisposing to theft, but the man who actually steals is blamed because thousands of others in precisely the same circumstances as he is do not, and would not, commit the act of theft. The moral "ought" only applies to the particular or alogical element in the action. It is preponderance of this alogical-particular element over the logical-necessitated element in any personality that makes us respect a man personally as having strength of will. The man shows his strength of will especially in resisting his character—that is,

the sum of the tendencies built up in him by heredity or by surroundings.[1]

The basis of moral judgment—that is, of praise or blame—is the same as the basis of sympathy—namely, the identification of personal interest with extra-personal interest, of self-interest with social-interest. As to what the inner meaning of this identification is, of the impulse to the realisation of self outside self, I have elsewhere offered a suggestion. (See pp. 110-114.) Sympathy postulates an identity between one personality and another. It cries out against the notion that the self-consciousness associated with the animal body is the last word of self-consciousness. Thus much we may affirm, whether the hypothesis referred to above be accepted or not.

The pallogistic theory of conduct, from Socrates downwards, has harped upon the antithesis between action dominated by reason and action dictated by impulse or passion. The ideal man, on this theory, is a man whose every action is through and through penetrated by reason. The Stoics were the great historical representatives of this view in the classical world. In post-mediæval philosophy, Spinoza was the thinker who stated the principle most emphatically, and elaborated it most fully. (Cf. *Ethica*, Book V.) If by action in accordance with reason be simply meant action accompanied by a clear view of the end of the action, and by a well-grounded knowledge of the effect of the immediate ends to be attained in relation to the ultimate end, then, obviously, so far, no fault is to be found with the doctrine. The fact remains, however, and has too often been forgotten by votaries of the foregoing or Stoic doctrine (as we may term it from its most prominent representatives in history), that what lies behind all rationality in human action is feeling. It is the *felt* desire or want that dictates the process of all action to the consciousness. Rationality, the mere knowledge of the relation between means and end-in-view, is always subordinate to feeling. The end, the *telos*, of all activity is immediately determined by feeling, and by feeling alone. The determination is alogical, not

[1] We here call attention to the inconsistency of the ordinary Theist, who wishes to eliminate chance from the universe, and at the same time to retain freedom of the will.

logical. Though, in the present stage of the development of consciousness, we may not be able to formulate this *telos* in its completeness, we are nevertheless immediately conscious, beyond all dispute, that happiness or pleasurable feeling, using these words in their widest sense, is at least an essential attribute of this *telos*. But you cannot reason a man into happiness. Pleasure or happiness, as an experience, is in the last resort unreasoning and immediate, although it may very well be covered up or embroidered with reason.

Intellectual considerations may play an important part in determining the specific form that the desire for, or the belief in, happiness takes, but this will not alter the fact that happiness belongs essentially to the *telos* of human action, and that happiness rests *au fond* upon pleasurable feeling. You cannot reason a man out of the fact that he experiences pleasure or pain. As a boy, I once heard a quack doctor at a country fair arguing to the guileless swains around his stand that they might, without any hesitation, allow him to draw their teeth, since the pain they feared in the operation could not be really there at all. "It is unreasonable," said he, "to think that there can be any pain, for teeth are of the nature of bone," and taking up a skull and striking it, "there is no feeling in bone." All that reason can really do is to impress upon the consciousness the fact that the consequences of certain pleasures are more painful than the pleasures are pleasurable. In this way a man may be reasoned into abstaining from the pleasures in question, but this does not alter the fact that his feeling in the matter is the ultimate arbiter. To take an important example. I cannot demonstrate to a man by any process of reasoning that he *ought* to prefer the common welfare of humanity to the pleasure of himself as an individual, or to the material benefit of the class to which he belongs. Here, again, his *feeling* is the ultimate arbiter of his action. If he says, "What is mankind to me? I am going to enjoy myself," there is nothing for us but to pass on to the next question. Thus the "ought" of conscience is always *per se* alogical, never logical—always *per se* feeling, never reason. Reason is always the means to the end, and never the end itself. In motive, feeling is always the ultimate fact, and reason is purely derivative.

If, then, feeling remains alike the starting-point and goal of all human conduct, it follows that the theory that postulates reason as the dominating factor in human motive and action is illusory.

Even the crucial distinction between higher and lower in the pleasurableness of feeling is not rational. One always comes back ultimately upon the bed-rock of a fact, the essential of which is immediate feeling. Reason, in its relation to conduct and elsewhere, always presupposes feeling, the logical the alogical, and not conversely. The mere feeling-impulse, the mere blind want or desire, is always becoming informed with thought, or rationalised. But in the resultant synthesis, although the form of the feeling may be changed, even to becoming completely transformed, it remains feeling nevertheless, and becomes in its turn the raw material for further rationality. We start with a vague impulse, a desire, a want, as yet undetermined by thought. It discloses differences within itself. These differences become emphasised by thought as mutually implicatory and antithetical, until at last the inter-relating activity itself often assumes a more prominent position in consciousness than do the terms inter-related. The proximate end, dictated primarily by the reason as means to an end not proximate, becomes mistaken for a true end, and the original end thus disappears from view. But, in the last resort, the *telos* is found in the completed feeling or realised impulse.

Let us take the case of any purpose to be effected. This purpose has its origin in a feeling of want or desire, from which springs the primary alogical impulse. The primary feeling differentiates itself into terms, which become related and modified by thought-activity. Next arises the question of means. In the reflection on means, the craving for the ultimate end becomes obscured by the desire for the means which, now wholly or partly, fills the place of the original feeling of desire for the ultimate end. Thought itself in the shape of further reflection then definitely formulates the question of the *cui bono*, and the original desire-feeling reasserts itself, but this time associated with a determinate knowledge of all its implications. This is the dialectic of human practice. Whatever aim, be it low or high, a man sets before himself in life, for example, it is feeling and not reason that dictates that aim. Whether

it be the delights of having "a good time," or the æsthetic pleasure derived from the fulfilment of an artistic purpose, whether it be the satisfaction of scientific curiosity or the enjoyment of acquiring the point of view of an adequate philosophic insight into the innermost depths of "the world and the soul," whether his aim be bread and butter or speculative contemplation, it is alike feeling and not reason that dictates his life-purpose.

Oftentimes the reason, the reflective faculty of the individual, does not reach the final stage of recognising and bringing to clear consciousness the *telos* prescribed by the desire-feeling or impulse. It stops at the second stage, in which the ultimate end is negated in proximate ends. It fails to reach the stage at which they are in their turn negated, and in which the alike primary and final end emerges into full consciousness. It aimlessly pursues the means that have become for the nonce ends, perhaps in a purely mechanical manner, as the man does who, having made his fortune and sold his business, finding his occupation gone, begs from his successor to be allowed to sit in the old counting-house for a few hours every day. The mere feeling of discomfort at the breach in the mechanical round of what was originally means to an end forces him to do this. But the fact of his feeling it shows that he had never brought to a clear consciousness the ultimate end of which his business activity was the means.

In the view of those who hold reason to be the final principle of the mind, it is opposed to impulse as the dominant to the subordinate. The "wise man" has always been supposed to act in accordance with the dictates of reason, and not with those of unreflective impulse. But this really means nothing more than that the said "wise man" does not follow *immediate* feeling. It does not mean that feeling is not the ultimate arbiter of his action, but that the feeling that guides him forms the final term in a dialectical process—in short, that it is not raw or crude feeling, but feeling that has already passed through the mill of thought.

We said a while ago that pleasurable feeling or happiness was an essential element in the *telos* of all activity. And yet how often do we find that the man who consciously and deliber-

ately formulates pleasure as his goal does not arrive at it. This is because he places before him merely the abstract category and no concrete end. The category of happiness as abstract is unreal. It can only become *realised* as entering into a synthesis, of which the primary elements are other than itself. The man who attains happiness does so by postulating as his end some concrete goal irrespective of the happiness or pleasure which, from this point of view, appears as an adjunct, or something incidental to it. But with this question we shall have occasion to deal more fully in the next chapter when discussing the *summum bonum*, the final *telos*, of human life.

The term "will" is used in more senses than one, both by Schopenhauer and in popular discourse. It is used as synonymous sometimes with desire, sometimes with effort, sometimes with the *velleitas* of the schoolmen, the mere inwardness of spontaneity, but the will with which the ethical consciousness is concerned implies the actual consciousness of an individual. The spontaneity must be, so to say, conscious of itself if it is to constitute will in the ethical sense. For the rest, will may be defined in general as the tendency of self-consciousness to realise itself completely. The whole system of things is implied in this self-realisation, in the last resort. Kant and Schopenhauer were the first to indicate clearly the true nature of the antinomy of freedom and necessity. But Kant, here as elsewhere, failed to distinguish adequately between the self-consciousness of the individual and the ultimate ground of all consciousness. This led him to his famous theory of the doubleness of the individual will—that while as phenomenon it was necessitated, as noumenon it was free. In this distinction Kant obviously had in his mind the distinction here formulated, between the will in its alogical immediacy and the will viewed by reflection as subordinate to the category of cause and effect.

Will as entering into the ethical consciousness implies the *per se* alogical element of spontaneity as determined by the logical element of deliberation. It further implies the actual consciousness of this spontaneous impulse or velleity as being so determined. A mechanical compulsion, whether it be physical or psychical, is extra-moral; the element of spontaneity is wanting. Similarly, blind unconscious impulse

is extra-moral; the element of actuality, of self-conscious *thisness*, is wanting. In either case, the deliberative or rational element fails. But this thought-element is essential to bring any action within the realm of the moral consciousness as such. Hence, though that which primarily gives direction to the will may be alogical, the ultimate end is a logical determination of our consciousness. The liking or disliking, the choosing or not choosing, of a purpose may be irreducible to anything but the immediacy of blind feeling. Yet every end that subserves this end, every means to the final end, is logically determined. All subordinate ends which are related to the ultimate end as means, and which are the products of deliberation, are more or less fully determined by thought-activity in its various forms. Thus whilst thought cannot fix any ultimate canon of conduct, yet as soon as the alogical will-content is given, a science of ethics, embodying the most precise formulæ, may be built up on a logical foundation.

Just as the ultimate canon of ethics is alogical, and therefore not formulatable in thought, so it is with the ultimate basis of the æsthetic consciousness. The judgment which in the last resort proclaims this thing beautiful and that thing ugly is arbitrary, as based upon an alogical postulate that cannot itself be reduced to reason—that is, be resolved into terms connected by thought-relations. But as in ethics, so here, once given this alogical *point d'appui*, we can build up, on the foundation thus acquired, most undoubtedly a logical system of formulæ that will furnish us with a canon of taste in art. Any such canon of taste, just as any canon of ethics, presupposes the acceptance of a given alogical principle as postulate. A thing is beautiful to me or ugly to me, but in the last resort I can no more convince a man by a process of ratiocination that my view is right and worthy of all acceptation than I can convince the other man, before spoken of, that the good of humanity ought to take precedence of his personal pleasure or aggrandisement. In both cases, however, once we have a common basis, I can as a rule readily prove that one particular object is more beautiful than another, and why it is so, or that one particular action is more right than another, and why it is so. The definite alogical standard once accepted, all else is plain sailing.

Even in philosophy, the sphere of the logical *par excellence*, the ultimate postulate is alogical. It is on the acceptance of this as a basis that the whole superstructure of philosophic formulation rests. Hence the study of metaphysic always has as its pre-condition a mind capable of recognising the ultimate in consciousness. Without this capacity, to embark upon philosophical investigation is more futile than ploughing the sands. History and current writing afford us plenty of instances of able and even logically acute minds that stumble about hopelessly in the vain attempt to deal with speculative problems for the simple reason that they fail to find the necessary *point d'appui* in the ultimate principles of consciousness. They beat about the bush, and show much subtlety, and may even now and then have insight, but, philosophically speaking, their whole train of thought is vitiated and worthless. On the other hand, when once we recognise the ultimate principle that all reality, as opposed to certain departments abstracted therefrom, presupposes, we can formulate on this basis the self-consistency of consciousness as the general canon of philosophic truth. Having done this, we deduce therefrom the variety of subordinate canons that go to make up the philosophic synthesis viewed as a systematic whole. All three departments—ethics, æsthetics, metaphysics—rest ultimately on that unique alogical apprehension which is itself incommunicable just because its immediately given content cannot be formulated in thought, cannot be categorised. In all argumentation a correspondence between my own and other minds in this respect is assumed. I cannot even prove to a man that pain is an evil if he choose to deny it. The uniqueness and immediacy of the value-feeling that forms the material of the ethical, æsthetic and philosophical consciousness is not, as with the knowledge-feeling that constitutes the raw material of the external world, differentiated and mediatised under the form of space. Nor is it directly categorised in any act of perception itself, such as that by which an external world of objects is given as "common to all." Here also the actual feeling (sensation), hardness, colour, sound, etc., is equally immediate, and therefore incommunicable. It is the space-form and the thought-element alone that give it its objective

validity, and hence makes it "common to all" within the sphere of the ordinary "common-sense" consciousness. In the ethical, æsthetic, or philosophic, consciousness, on the other hand, we have to do with a *thisness* of feeling that acquires an objective validity *indirectly—i.e.* in reflection alone. Hence, unlike the judgments of common-sense or of science (which have at least their *point d'appui* in the world of common-sense), ethical, æsthetic, and philosophical, value-judgments, primarily have the appearance of being the special product of the individual mind. They acquire by sufferance, as it were, a quasi-objective value, which, however, can be at any moment, at least in appearance, upset by the dictum of any individual. The "ought" in which the objective validity is grounded remains in the case of these higher departments of consciousness formally psychological or subjective. There is no logical standard by which formally to compel assent to these values as in the case of the facts of common-sense reality. There is nothing in the last resort by which I can compel a man's assent to the proposition that he *ought* to perform this duty, that he *ought* to admire this work of art, that he *ought* to accept this philosophical postulate. If I attempt to do so, he will always have his answer ready, based on the uniqueness, the particularity, the *thisness* of the feeling out of which my proposition arises. Of course this may be mere pretence on his part, but it is unanswerable as far as it goes. It is unanswerable so long as one remains at the standpoint of common-sense consciousness. The only answer is to show that the ethical or æsthetic consciousness involves the postulate in dispute in order to be consistent within itself. But this, to be effective, supposes that the interlocutor is capable of raising himself to the point of view of the ethical or æsthetic consciousness, or, to use a common phrase, that he has a moral or artistic "sense." The case is similar even with the metaphysical consciousness, although it may at first sight appear to be different.

It is, of course, quite true that metaphysics has for its test the self-consistency of consciousness as a whole, *starting* from the ordinary empirical consciousness. But here also the man must be able to place himself at the point of view of the philosophic consciousness, ridding himself of the abstractions of

common-sense perception and ordinary thought, before he can appreciate the conditions that all consciousness presupposes, and recognise the meaning and value of reality as it confronts him in the interpretation of philosophic thought. The philosophic consciousness, while it embraces the common-sense consciousness, does not stop there. It presents the reality of common-sense as metamorphosed. But in this process of transforming reality, philosophic reflection brings into view ultimate elements, which, although implicit, never become explicit within the sphere of any consciousness dominated by common-sense. Hence to determine ethical, æsthetic, or metaphysical values, the categories specially referable to the common-sense consciousness are either not at all, or at best only partially, available.

In passing from this our ordinary consciousness, with its common-sense values, and, in the narrow meaning, scientific values, to the world of moral practice, æsthetic contemplation or philosophical analysis and construction, with their partially or wholly differing values, we take leave of objectivity in the strict sense of the word, including that form of reflection which is directly based on objectivity. We enter a new region which knows neither the objective nor the subjective (as antithetical to objective), but which nevertheless claims an extra-individual validity notwithstanding that its material is the unmediatised *thisness* of particular feeling. I can demonstrate to anyone the necessity of existence of a fact or a law of Nature by bringing him to book with the ultimate categories of the physical world, behind which categories he cannot go. But I cannot demonstrate to him on the same ground that he ought to prefer intellectual to animal pleasures, that he ought to place the welfare of mankind above his individual welfare, that good art is to be valued above bad, or even that all reality is analysable into conscious elements, unless he is already within the compass of these several departments of the higher consciousness, and hence stands on a foundation that renders the formation of judgments respecting them possible for him. The foregoing distinction is what Kant was obviously endeavouring to formulate as problem and to resolve in his own way, in the *Kritik der Practischen Vernunft*, the *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*,

and his other ethical and æsthetic writings. I can assume the recognition within certain very narrow limits of the same external world as existent with corresponding determinations by every man, but I cannot postulate in the same way the recognition by another man of the same ethical criterion or the same æsthetic standard as obtains for me. Nevertheless, that there is a " community," a common psychological ground, in these idealistic departments of consciousness, is certain ; otherwise the very notion of forming judgments respecting them would be absurd. For these judgments necessarily imply an ultimate postulate on which their validity depends. Kant, in the third of his " Kritiks," speaks somewhat vaguely of a *sensus communis* at the basis of æsthetic judgments. The solution of the point as to the extra-individual validity of this " somewhat "—which is based ultimately on the immediacy of particular feeling—on the lines of the present essay, would seem to lie in the recognition of the fact that it is grounded in the metaphysical elements of consciousness-in-general. As above insisted upon, we have to do here with an alogical factor, will, feeling, sensation, *per se,* which, though at the root of all consciousness, and, *a fortiori,* of all content of consciousness, does not enter empirical or common-sense consciousness, like the feelings or sensations of the objective world, which are already worked up by thought-forms, and thus acquire universality and objectivity. But we become aware of it, so to say, as unmediatised feeling, and hence (regarded from the psychological antithesis of subjective and objective) as subjective.

Here again we see that the ordinary empirical consciousness remains our norm of knowledge. What is below this plane is element merely, and hence unreal. What is above it is either science, in which the alogical in the empirical reality of common-sense sinks into being the mere adjunct of the logical category ; or aspiration and feeling, in a word sentiment, ethical or æsthetic, where the thought-element is subordinated to *nisus* and sensation (emotion). Schopenhauer was not so far wrong after all when he deduced art immediately from his ultimate alogical principle—namely, his metaphysical Will. In the content neither of scientific thought nor of æsthetic contemplation can

we find that perfect blend of the two ultimate elements of consciousness which we find in empirical reality. One side or the other preponderates. The aim of scientific thought is to obtain logical universality at the expense of the alogical—of feeling and will. The aim of art is to obtain universality of feeling—the immediate element in empirical reality—at the expense of the categories of the empirical world, and more or less of thought altogether. Philosophy, while on the one side its aim is to out-science science in the universality of the categories into which it transforms the empirically real world, is led, through the very thorough-going character of its operations in this respect, to a recognition of the truth that the *alpha* and *omega* of thought-forms are after all feeling and will-striving—that out of these alogicals the logical with its categories emerges to make reality possible, and that into them it must return if reality is to be complete.

CHAPTER VII

THE FINAL GOAL OF ALL THINGS

An attempt, known as Pragmatism, has lately been made in English philosophy to resolve reality into a system of "practical postulates," of means towards certain ends. Concrete consciousness is thus, with a vengeance, made the mere adjunct of will. We may readily admit that will, as one aspect of the alogical principle in consciousness, is discoverable as element in every conscious reality; and hence that, from the "practical postulate" point of view, consciousness as a whole and, *a fortiori*, every apperceptive synthesis within this whole, may be regarded, in one sense, as contributing to willed ends. But this Neo-Schopenhauerianism, as we understand it, like its predecessor, really goes much farther. It would treat one of its elements, will or purposiveness, as the *sole* principle of consciousness-in-general. The fallacy of this way of solving the metaphysical problem is, to my mind, sufficiently evident when we consider that all willing, all purpose, even the blindest *Trieb*, presupposes a given reality alike as its terminus *a quo* and as its terminus *ad quem*. It *presupposes* it, and hence does not *create* it. We can no more attach a meaning to will or purpose apart from the total conscious synthesis than we can attach a meaning to pure knowledge apart from the total conscious synthesis. The latter, as we have, often enough, had occasion to point out, is the fallacy of the Pallogist. But the former, that of the Thelemist, as we may term him (sometimes also described as Voluntarist) is none the less flagrant, and is, if anything, less plausible. There can be no doubt that into every conscious synthesis the element of will enters; it has a purposive side. Yet there is just as little doubt that this side does not embrace the whole synthesis. Reality, existence, we may regard, if we like, as subserving a system of ends, but it is not itself mere end or mere means to end; for if so, it would

be nothing but an abstraction. The world refuses to be whittled away into mere purpose on the one side, just as it refuses to be whittled away into mere "bloodless categories" on the other.

Can we formulate, in terms of reflective thought, the goal of the world viewed as a system of determinations of consciousness possible and actual? In other words, can we formulate reality from the purposive side, as such? If we can, what are the most comprehensive terms in which we can express, or at least indicate, this ultimate purposive goal? If not, can we attain this goal itself, or at least can it come within the finite and temporal conditions of empirical consciousness in a flash of feeling—*i.e.* in a mode of consciousness in which the feeling element predominates? The first of these questions, if answered in the affirmative, leads us directly to philosophy—the reasoned analysis of purpose, means and ends—and no less directly to the search for an answer to our second question. A negative answer to our first question opens up two avenues to us, either that leading to some form of Mysticism, or that leading to Scepticism or Agnosticism. Such an Agnosticism frankly renounces any claim to solve a problem which appeals to us as the most vital of all those revealed by metaphysic. The question here, of course, is not of anything less than an ultimate *telos* or goal. That there are ends to work for—ends, it may be, distant or deep-lying—would be denied by few outside the order of professional cynics; but the problem of an ultimate *telos* may well be treated by the most serious thinker as insoluble. For this question of the ultimate *telos* of life involves not merely that of human action or endeavour, but the time-honoured problem of the final world-purpose. It thus opens up, from a new point of view, the question of Theism in its various forms, inasmuch as certain formulations of the ultimate world-*telos* are supposed to involve the theistic assumption.[1] Starting, as we necessarily do, from the human point of view, we have to ascertain what is implied therein. We have to ascertain how far purpose can be conceived as other than the purpose of a consciousness concrete, and therefore involving a *thisness* (qualitative particularity)—in other words, an

[1] See Chapter IX.

individual consciousness. Further, we must ask whether such a purpose or willed end can only possess meaning in so far as its realisation is recognised as possibly coming within the range of the individual mind itself.

We have here to note once more that, in the general problem of reality, the moment we arrive at a *stasis*—namely, at a mode of the conscious synthesis that has no *becoming* within it, which is pure actuality—we cease to have reality, in the true sense of the word, before us at all, but are reduced to what is, truly viewed, an abstraction. (Compare the discussion on Pallogism, *supra*, pp. 56-61.) As in the general problem of knowledge, so in the special problem of teleological values, the moment we have arrived at an exhausted *willing*—the moment purpose is lost in the full fruition of all ends willed—we similarly take leave of teleological reality, and we are confronted with an empty abstraction. In the world of *purpose*, no less than in the world of *knowledge*, when we have come to the end of all potentiality—when we have no reserve fund left of unrealised possibility, in the one case of feeling (emotion), in the other of ends—we have nought but the ghost of reality there, a lifeless wraith. In this way, an absolutely perfect happiness, in which no streak of desire, of yearning for that which is not, remained, a happiness that afforded no vista of anything beyond itself, would cease to be by that very fact, happiness. This truth is illustrated in the world of common life by the phenomenon of *ennui* which dogs the steps of the pleasure-seeker. The man who can only appreciate sensual pleasure, after he has rung the changes upon all forms of sensual experience, becomes jaded, and the pleasure attendant thereon gradually vanishes. It must not be supposed that this is merely due to the fact that his delights *are* sensual, for *mutatis mutandis* all happiness, if it could become perfect, if it could exhaust all its possibilities in actual attainment, would sooner or later cease to be present *as* happiness. It would fall flat, monotonous, and prove finally insufferable. The reason why this specially strikes us in sensual enjoyment is simply owing to the limitation of the latter as to range. Its latent possibilities are sooner exhausted than those of higher and more comprehensive forms of "blessedness." Hence the *summum bonum*, if it is to be living and real, must

always be regarded as involving a happiness that is not merely *everlasting*, but likewise *ever-increasing* (*i.e.* of course, in so far as we envisage it as content of time, as having a duration).

But does a conceivable absolute goal or end-purpose necessarily consist in happiness, or even involve happiness? That an ultimate end must carry within it the highest realisable bliss is, I take it, a postulate necessarily implied in the self-consistency of the willing consciousness, and indirectly of all consciousness. For, if we examine the matter closely, we shall see that any object of desire implies the assumption that pleasure or happiness is at least bound up with it. We cannot conceive it as a goal at all for consciousness unless happiness in some form is to play an *essential* part therein. No matter under whatever other general concept we may choose to formulate it, such as harmony, completeness, perfection, self-realisation, "freedom" or the Platonic ἀγαθὸν, all these notions remain little more than phrases when taken *per se* and without further definition. But whatever their content may be, one thing, I take it, is certain, that they cannot be thought as ends of supreme desire without the notion of happiness or self-satisfaction being also thought into them as an essential factor.

Yet while this is undoubtedly true, it is no less true that, though happiness may be an essential *factor in* the *telos* of reality, it can never in itself—that is, in its naked abstraction—*be* that *telos*. Common observation shows us that the man who deliberately and directly places pleasure before himself as his sole end does not obtain satisfaction—not even the satisfaction of which he is in search—but gets *ennui* instead. If happiness, by itself, were the substantial *telos*, the distinction between "higher" and "lower" in happiness—*i.e.* in self-satisfaction—would remain unaccounted for. The hog happy, in that case, must be preferable to Socrates miserable. There could be no qualitative distinction recognisable. Satisfaction, whatever form it took, would be equally *end*. The recognition of the distinction between "higher" and "lower" in aim rests upon the assumption of an absolute end, an absolute *desirability*, which is more than mere particularity of feeling—more than any mere "subjective sense of pleasure" (as the psychologists would term it). It involves the assumption of something

extra-individual, something that is not merely particular. The *summum bonum* must have an absolute character of desirability, just as in their own spheres righteousness, beauty, or truth must have it. This character of absoluteness it is that gives the thing its " categorical imperative," so to speak. We postulate the *summum bonum* as something that all conscious beings must recognise under normal conditions as such, as the supremely desirable, when once disclosed to them. Just as we assume that a man must admire a great work of art, given sufficient education for him to understand it, or an act of moral heroism, if his consciousness be normal ; or again, just as with a still higher degree of certainty we assume that the normal man, " in full possession of his faculties," perceives the same external world as we perceive, substantially in the same manner, so here we assume an ultimate desirability, objective in its own way, as being valid for all, apart from any given particularity that enters into it.

If, then, the supreme *telos* of life cannot be regarded as consisting merely in happiness—even perfect happiness—and on the other hand, if we cannot think of any *telos* except as involving, as an essential factor, that supreme satisfaction understood by perfect happiness, what specific place does this factor occupy in the analysis of the *summum bonum* regarded as living reality ? Apart from its content, happiness is an abstraction merely, lacking the conditions of a real synthesis. This we see illustrated on the plane of everyday experience in the familiar fact that in the pursuance of mere " pleasure " we are hunting a will-o'-the-wisp, which vanishes when we think we have got it. It is only as entering into a synthesis as an element merely, however necessary—that is, into a unity comprising other elements than itself—that it becomes invested with a definite meaning. It thus acquires a character other than it possesses *per se,* or in its bare abstractness, the distinction of " higher " and " lower " emerging into view. *Per se,* happiness is merely subjective and particular ; *per aliud,* it is objective and universal. As member of a synthesis, by reason of this distinction within itself of " higher " and " lower," it acts as a criterion, so to say, of ends ; since, although not itself an end, it must enter into all ends—proximate no less than ultimate

(in so far, of course, as we regard such purposes as ends in themselves, and not as mere means to ends).

As regards the *summum bonum*, it is difficult at least to say whether the happiness or some other element in its content is the more important in view of the complete synthesis. We can hardly predicate priority of one over another, since they are reciprocally involved in each other. The other elements, apart from that of happiness, would not constitute the *summum bonum*, even though they might be concrete from a different point of view, while happiness *per se*, separated from the content, would, as above said, be a barren abstraction. We may point out once more that this is illustrated, on the plane of common life, by the fact that the man who attains pleasure, whatever form it takes, and however relative it may be, does so only in the pursuance of a definite end, which is not pleasure in itself, but something which appears in his purposive consciousness as desirable even apart from any pleasure involved in it. The pleasure indeed seems to enter as a mere accessory into the result in all purposive contents involving the highest pleasures.

The *telos* or *summum bonum*, as it has been shaped in the ideals of the various religious systems of the world that have sprung up during the period of historic civilisation, is represented notably by the Nirvana of the Buddhist, the ἔκστασις of the Neo-Platonist, the Beatific Vision of the Catholic, and the union with God of other Christian sects. The ideal of pre-civilised man is utterly different from any of these. His *telos* is the continuance and ever-increasing glory of the social collectivity to which he belongs—clan, tribe, or people—united, as he conceives it, by a kinship-bond near or remote. Hence came ancestor-worship, etc. For the introspective religions, on the contrary, which form so large a part of the moral and intellectual history of civilised man, the individual personality, *per se*, is the main or sole factor. Its complement is either the divine spirit of the universe, also conceived of as a personality in some sense, or the spiritual side of the universe considered as a self-subsistent whole. The interest of these religions centres in the relation of the finite personality to its infinite source. In saying this, I do not mean to imply that there is no social element in such introspective religions. Without a social element they

could not have maintained the hold they have had throughout varying phases of civilisation. But this social side, prominent though it may have been oftentimes in practical life, has been, from the point of view of the doctrine, always subordinated to the aforesaid spiritual individualism. Almsgiving, brotherly love, duties to one's fellow-men generally—all these things, viewed from the point of view of theological doctrine, were merely means to another end, to wit, the great central goal of personal self-realisation in the Divine Being

There is a further point about the ideals of these introspective faiths that deserves notice. In most of them personal consciousness, the individual soul, is thought of as the ultimate form of the world-principle (Theism). Hence the impulse towards the attainment of a world-purpose is supposed to come from *within*, and the whole process of its attainment to centre in the individual soul. The same also applies even to those mystical systems, notably Buddhism and Brahmanism, where personality is not regarded as ultimate. For such faiths, one and all, have this in common, that they conceive of the *telos* of life as attainable through a direct reciprocal connection between the individual soul and the ultimate world-principle. The operation is supposed to take place in the self-conscious individual, and the means by which it is effected is usually some form of asceticism—the withdrawal of the individual within himself, his separation from sensuous pleasures, and often his severance from Nature and from society itself. This point of the directness of the communion of the individual soul with the ultimate universal reality is important, or even crucial. There is yet another point to be noted about this mode of viewing the *telos*. The attainment of the *telos* is invariably regarded as immediate, or in some way irrespective of time ; it is given in one " eternal glance," in an " eternal now."

Thus, hitherto, throughout the individualist-introspective phase of religious development, the idea of all faiths included in this phase has been to strike out a short cut by which the *telos* of life, the goal of reality, can be attained by the individual soul. But the conviction is becoming ever stronger in the modern world, that the attempt to realise this ultimate ideal by any act of will on the part of the individual must necessarily

be futile. The distrust, the waning faith, in any short cut to the "final goal of all" springing from individual initiative, is ever on the increase, and this want of faith is signally displayed in the change that has come over the introspective religions themselves, as shown by the attitude of their exponents. The significance of the individual in this connection has paled, and the conviction is becoming prevalent, implicitly where not explicitly, that this "final goal of all"—if such be assumed as attainable—cannot be reached by any short cut based upon personal will and a direct connection of the personal consciousness of the human individual with the world-principle, but that it implies a long and weary course of social development, in which individual initiative can play only an indirect and, for the most part, a purely subordinate rôle. Concurrently with this change of attitude as regards the significance of the individual for the world-purpose, we may notice also another—namely, a growing disbelief in the possibility of comprehending this world-purpose itself within the four corners of any definite formula. Both these tendencies alike seem to the present writer to be signs of progress. The ultimate barrenness of the mere introspective attitude, with its doctrine of individual initiative conjoined with the direct *rapport* between the individual soul and the world-principle (whether personified or not), is written on the history and present fortunes of this order of thought. The traditional religious systems embodying it are, one and all, tending to become crystallised, and to lapse consciously or unconsciously into mere politico-economical agencies for the maintenance of the *status quo*, while with some of those who attempt to galvanise them, the old standpoint is explained away in accordance with the newer attitude of thought in these matters. Thus the social side of Christianity generally, especially in the alleged teachings of Jesus, is deliberately exaggerated, and introspective precepts presented with a social colouring which did not originally belong to them.

The hall-mark of those religious systems that seek to bring the *telos* within the reach of the individual soul is their insistence upon one factor in the moral consciousness of the individual, which they sever from its connection as part of the synthesis, and hypostatise. The factor referred to is—self-sacrifice. They

are apt to exalt self-sacrifice and constitute it the end-in-itself of moral action, in this way often becoming involved in a vicious circle, which easily leads to a complete perversion of the moral judgment. Approval may thus be given to actions that are viewed concretely—*i.e.* from the normal standpoint of moral consciousness as a whole—to the last degree immoral. For example, the case has been known of a pigeon-trainer who, becoming a "converted" character and a member of the Salvation Army, was desirous of showing the *bona fides* of his conversion by a deed of self-sacrifice. The conduct involving for him the greatest self-sacrifice he could think of was to wring the necks of his favourite birds, which he did accordingly. This dastardly act, his moral sense perverted by the introspective morality with its apotheosis of self-sacrifice, regarded as meritorious, because, forsooth, it gave *him* pain to destroy the pigeons. We have all heard of cases of religious mania in which parents have been known to murder their best-loved children in imitation of the story of Abraham's intended sacrifice of Isaac.

To the introspective morality, and to religious systems based upon it, belongs the antithesis of sin and holiness, together with such notions as that the gravamen of an ethically wrong action lies in its being an injury to the doer's self—understanding by this his "higher self." The newer ethical standpoint, the moral tendency, the dawnings of which we see at present, is necessarily opposed to this abstract morality centring in the individual. It does not follow that the antagonism need always be present to the mind of those who take this standpoint, but it is still there. The opposition itself need not even be intrinsically prominent in all cases, though none the less existent. The new point of view, when consistently held, sees moral wrong in no action that has not definite anti-social consequences. It recognises implicitly, where not explicitly, that the meaning and function of conscience is, in the last resort, the identification of individual interest with social interest. This identification does not, in the long run, imply sacrifice of individual interests, but it does imply undoubtedly for a long time to come the subordination of individual to social interests, and therefore it does involve self-sacrifice as an incident in the moral

action of the individual. But this self-sacrifice is never *more* than an incident. To be morally admirable from this point of view, the self-sacrifice must always be clearly undertaken as a means to a definite social end.

We spoke of another change of attitude as regards the ultimate *telos* of life and its relation, to the world-purpose as a whole—namely, the sense of the impossibility of attaining to a satisfactory theoretical formulation of that *summum bonum* we deem the "final goal of all." When we consider the matter more closely, it is indeed self-evident that any adequate formulation in thought or words of the world-purpose must imply finality. But we have already seen that finality in happiness—*i.e.* a happiness that has no *becoming* in it, an *actuality* of happiness without a *potentiality* within it—implies an abstraction and not a real, felt, happiness. Yet we have also seen that happiness, although not the whole of the *telos*, is, nevertheless, an essential element therein. The Beatific Vision, conceived of as completely present in "one eternal glance," in the very completeness of its finality would reach out to a somewhat beyond itself, and that somewhat, assuming the completeness, could but be annihilation, the *higher nought*. What applies to happiness in this connection applies also to the *telos* considered as synthesis. The *telos* viewed thus, and apart from special reference to its hedonic side, means in the last resort neither more nor less than the Absolute as end for the individual consciousness. But the Absolute considered as a final *ens realissimum*, a wound-up static perfection, a consummated completeness in which all desire is satisfied and all purpose finally liquidated, is after all (*pace* Mr Bradley) a monstrosity of abstraction. A being in which all antitheses (including that of being and appearance itself) are resolved into one all-embracing unity, is a *somewhat* lacking the conditions fundamentally presupposed in a true synthesis—in other words, in reality. Since reality can never be viewed *as such* save under the form of at least two antithetic elements, the abolition of either side of the antithesis (here no less than in the sphere of knowledge) leaves us with an abstraction and no reality, and the abstraction itself, when closely viewed, evinces itself as meaningless. A light without darkness would indeed be

" the light that never was, on land or sea." It would be a light that was indistinguishable from darkness. A good which had completely absorbed evil, and with which no evil was to be contrasted, could not enter into consciousness as a *real* good. A God " too pure to look upon iniquity " would be a *caput mortuum*, no better than a " bloodless category." A beauty with no shadow of ugliness, actual or potential, to set it off, would not enter into any conscious synthesis *as* beauty. Similarly an absolute truth out of all relation to falsehood or error would be a colourless and worthless platitude, and would forfeit its higher character of truth in any intelligible sense. The reader will easily see that the fallacies here indicated are at basis the same fallacy as that which in Theory-of-knowledge we have termed Pallogism, and which we have discussed at sufficient length in the course of the present work. No less than the philosophers in this respect, mystics, theologians, art-theorists, poets, and idealists of all descriptions have occupied themselves with the mad chase after abstractions, that they have mistaken for higher realities. Well-nigh all our ideals, present and past, are, when closely viewed (in the form at least in which they have been presented to us), no more than hypostatised abstractions. The seekers after the ideal have hitherto failed adequately to grasp the fact that when one of the cardinal terms of an antithesis is destroyed, the reality itself embodied in their synthetic union is destroyed also, leaving a meaningless phrase behind it. They have failed to see that the complete absorption of one term in the other implies, not a higher reality, but no reality at all—in short, stagnation, annihilation, or what I have already alluded to as the " higher nought." The youthful delusion of reflective consciousness, with its crying for the moon of an abstract-absolute, must, in the maturity of reflective consciousness, give place to the conviction that reality—be its plane low or high—lives only in the union in synthesis of what are *per se* antithetic and contradictory elements.[1]

[1] The above, I need scarcely say, does not traverse the contention that one side of an antithesis may be regarded as the positive, and its opposite as negative. The negative, after all, is only the *otherness* of the positive. What is meant is that, without this *otherness* (as its background), the positive disappears from consciousness altogether.

We can hardly do better in analysing the nature and conditions of the supreme end of life, no less than those of subordinate ends, than occupy ourselves in discussing the question of what is known as Pessimism. While fully recognising that mere abstract happiness, *per se*, does not constitute the *telos*, we have seen that it enters, as a necessary element, into it, in such wise that it affords a touchstone by which we may gauge the validity of all attempted formulations of the *telos*. Now what does the pessimist usually allege? What is the doctrine of some of the most representative exponents of Pessimism? They contend that the sum of misery in the world not only outbalances the actual sum of happiness, but even that it tends to do so in a progressively increasing ratio as the content of time unfolds itself. In this assertion, it may be noted, there are three important questions begged. Firstly, it is assumed that "happiness" and "misery" can be quantitatively measured, that it is possible to reduce all qualitative difference in the content of happiness to the mere abstract category of happiness, *per se*, quantitatively considered. Secondly, the problem is stated in terms of individual feeling, the organic individual being assumed as the sole norm and arbiter in the matter. Thirdly, the main trend of human evolution during the historical period—the period, that is, during which civilisation has been evolving—up to the present time, is usually assumed as the only possible one.

As regards the first of the points mentioned, it will be observed to involve the assumption of happiness being an independent entity, and not merely element of a synthesis. The content of happiness is continually changing, and hence happiness is qualitatively changing. Happiness, as realised, "broadens down from precedent to precedent." The satisfaction of lower needs forces on the appearance, above the horizon of consciousness, of new and higher needs. For example, for a man in want of food, clothes, or shelter, these are his *telos*—their attainment represents "happiness" for him. He can conceive of no happiness apart from them, or (in many cases) beyond them. He acquires these; no longer is he a starving man in the street, but has food, clothing, and shelter enough. His material circumstances become, let us say, affluent. Still he

is not happy. Happiness now consists for him in congenial sexual intercourse, to obtain which now becomes his aim. This once acquired he turns to personal ambition in one form or another, or to avarice. If he be a man with no intellectual or social instincts, he continues ringing the changes on these things till his dying day. If, on the other hand, he is normally developed intellectually, a sufficiency of the above necessaries of life becomes for him merely a vantage-ground for the pursuit of some other goal of intrinsically different quality. He will now find his goal, for instance, in science, in art, in social or political activity. But at each stage, the goal once attained, the ideal realised, it takes its place, as a matter of course, in the common level of his life, and a new end, representing a new happiness to be striven for, comes into view. Hence, argues the pessimist, each end attained simply serves to open up a new vista of further wants. The satisfaction, the happiness, as realised, says he, is illusory, since, when the end supposed to involve it is reached, it seems simply to remove one obstacle to happiness in order to disclose others. At each stage, therefore, according to the pessimist contention, he fails to find happiness. Now this view is at once true and false. At each stage the man undeniably *does* obtain satisfaction or happiness. This positive satisfaction, however, which he has now realised, although in the moment of attainment it may seem complete, soon acquires the character of the commonplace, and tends to vanish proportionately. It is at this point that the new end, involving the new happiness, appears above the horizon of the consciousness. The fact of the exhaustibility of concrete happiness, as involved in any realised ideal, is, on the other hand, a fact the optimist is apt to overlook. Such is the inevitable dialectic of happiness, but the qualitative evolution that it implies renders nugatory all calculations based on merely quantitative considerations. It is idle, for instance, to discuss whether a greater or less *quantum* of satisfaction is derived by the sensual man from sensual enjoyments, or by the intellectual man from intellectual enjoyments. It is idle, as the two things are qualitatively incomparable. The mere sense of unimpeded activity of achievement itself undoubtedly implies an element of pleasure common to all forms

of happiness in the pursuit of which the will is directly concerned.[1]

As to the distinction of quality, of the "higher" and "lower" in pleasure, the conviction we have that the former *is* higher—that it is, so to say, nearer the world-*telos* than the latter—seems to be an ultimate postulate of consciousness—*i.e.* it is involved in the ultimate self-consistency of consciousness. And this would seem to obtain quite apart from any question of the quantitative estimation of pleasure-value. Happiness or pleasure is an element running through every stage, through all momenta, of the world-process, of which no concrete end can be conceived that does not include it. The higher we go in this evolution, the more the other elements in this end come into prominence, the more the content is pursued for its own sake, and less and less for the happiness accompanying it. The foregoing observation, although primarily applying to the individual, may fairly be assumed as having an application to happiness as an element of purpose generally, in whatever relation we may conceive it.

The second fallacy of Pessimism, the assumption that the individual is the absolute norm in hedonic judgments, is based on the previous assumption, that self-consciousness, as involved with the organisation of an animal body—in other words, the human individual, as unit, is the ultimate natural form in which self-consciousness can be embodied. Now this assumption, I contend, is unjustified, whether or not we accept the hypothesis put forward in an earlier chapter. We have assuredly no justification, in any case, for dogmatically assuming that the terms of individual feeling—of feeling, that is, as expressed in the self-consciousness involved with a particular human body—are the only terms in which pleasure-pain feeling, in which happiness and unhappiness, can be expressed at all. This assumes arbitrarily that the individual, in the sense mentioned, is not merely a metaphysical finality, and hence to be treated as a rounded-off completeness in himself, but also a physical finality in the order of evolution in time. It would be absurd,

[1] This fact is expressed physiologically in the unchecked transformation of centripetal into centrifugal nerve stimulations. (*Cf.* Münsterberg's *Psychology and Life*, chapter ii.)

of course, to deny that the individual consciousness, with its correlative human-animal organism, does represent a definite stage, alike in the metaphysical analysis of consciousness-in-general and in the order of physical evolution, and hence may be justifiably treated, for special purposes, in abstraction from all else. We may also regard the individual, considered in himself (apart from the social life and progress into which he enters), as a proximate end to himself. But unless we are prepared to commit ourselves to the absurdity of regarding the individual as in the last resort a self-sufficient and isolated entity, we must never lose sight of the fact that when we attempt to treat him, apart from the social organism within which he has developed, and of which he is, in a sense, the result, we are really dealing with an abstraction. This may be convenient for certain purposes, but is never more than a dialectical makeshift. In the same way we may regard the individual as, from the relative point of view, an end to himself; but these abstractions, relatively correct and useful though they may be, only disclose their true meaning—often a very different one from their apparent meaning when viewed as abstractions—in their relation to the world and humanity considered as an organic whole. Viewed from this standpoint, the significance of the individual man is seen to reside, not in himself, but in the fact of his entering, as a component, into a continuing social life. He is simply a component unit in the total life of generations past, present, and future. The conception of the individual as isolated, as end to himself, confronts us in its extreme form in the practical world as the criminal type. But in a less extreme form it is also the attitude of the commonplace *bourgeois* individualist or man of the world. In theory it has been the sole point of view from which the "moral philosopher" has regarded man at all until comparatively recent times. The introspective morality, and the so-called universal religions founded upon it, at the head of which stands Christianity, have dealt in their own way with the practical results of this attitude of mind. They have postulated an imaginary higher individual in theory, and have sought to reverse the individualist attitude in practice, with their salient categories of sin and holiness, by means of asceticism. But

in the ascetic attitude individualism is not abolished, but merely inverted. Self-denial, for its own sake, or as end-in-itself, is as intrinsically individualistic as self-indulgence as end-in-itself. In either case the point of view is limited to the individual, who is thus converted into an abstraction, but an abstraction that does duty as a self-sufficient entity.

The intrinsically higher point of view to that of the self-centred man of the world is not what is usually regarded as its antithesis—namely, the ascetic—but is, on the contrary, one that transcends alike both these standpoints. This latter point of view, while recognising the personality and its immediate purpose of self-interest as constituting a proximate end, sees in it *no more* than a proximate end—to wit, a stage—necessary, it may be, but still no more than a stage—towards something higher than itself. But, it may be said, this is also the case with the introspective faiths above alluded to, with their ascetic ideals of conduct. Yet though apparently this is true, in reality it is not so. The introspective faiths may indeed point to a divinity, the spiritual side of things, or what not, into which the individual, by renouncing his self-interest, may become in some sense absorbed. But this latter is a conception, an imagination, special to the individual consciousness as such. As conceived by the individual, this God, or spiritual essence of things, is always a reflection of another—a higher, if you will—aspect of his own human nature. It is the appeal of the natural individual to the spiritual individual. We therefore remain still within the ban of individualism. From the standpoint we are here dealing with, on the other hand, the standpoint which is embodied in what we have termed the newer tendency in moral sentiment, we see clearly that what are termed "bad" (*i.e.* abstract-personal) instincts of men can only be effectually abolished by their transmutation, that is to say, by the identification *through sheer necessity of circumstances* of individual interest (in the narrower sense) with the interest of society as a whole. The abstract-individualistic, the anti-social, impulses thus, and thus only, will finally die out, through a process of self-exhaustion. The higher self, to which the individual subordinates himself, thus is no longer a transcendent divinity holding mystic communication with his soul, but an

immanent concrete social fact into which the individual now consciously enters as a physical and psychical factor. The antagonism, therefore, which seemed from a lower standpoint irreconcilable, has vanished. The pessimistic argument, also in so far as it is based, as has largely been the case hitherto, on the individual as an abstract entity apart from the general movement of society, falls to the ground. Yet, though we now see the individual in a new light, and can no longer regard him *per se* as the unconditioned norm of pleasure and pain, good and evil, it still remains open for the pessimist to deny progress in the sense of the movement of human society towards a goal, or in a direction involving progressive increase of happiness as an element. This leads us naturally to the third fallacy of Pessimism.

The third assumption of the pessimist, which is equally an assumption of the " man-in-the street," is that the main trend of human progress, which from the dawn of history up to the present day has been in the direction of the autonomy of the individual, will continue in this course.[1] The above assumption underlies most of the pessimistic theories, at any rate as to the future of human evolution. Yet that this too is a fallacy is becoming more evident every day to one who studies the economic conditions of the modern world. Such an observer can hardly fail to see that the autonomy of the individual is doomed, that it is disappearing under his very eyes. Without discussing the question here in its larger bearings, I contend that few will deny that we are face to face with conditions in the production and distribution of wealth which forebode a vast social transformation in the immediate future. It is enough to refer to the revolution going on in the domains of industrial invention and organisation, and to the growth of state and municipal enterprise in all departments. Each of these things in its own way naturally tends to the abolition of the notion of individual autonomy, and in so far also, to that of any necessary antagonism between individual and community

[1] We may observe in passing that the fallacy noticed in the last section is the intellectual product, or at least concomitant of this general autonomy of the individual, in its later stages. The loosening of the social bonds of the elder world has given colour to the treatment of the individual, theoretically, as a self-centred and self-sufficient unit.

as such. The present work not being specially a treatise on political economy, or any other historical development, it would be out of place to dilate at length on these matters. It is nceessary, however, to allude to them in connection with our present problem as to the tendency of social evolution towards increase or diminution of human happiness.

We are too much accustomed to judge the present question from the relatively short span of time that is included under "history"—short, that is, in relation to the whole period of man's existence upon this planet. It may be quite true that a study of this limited period might lead us to the conclusion that happiness and misery have not so much positively increased or decreased in total amount as varied in the relative proportion of their distribution. It seems to be the tendency of misery, as of happiness, to become less acute and more massive, less concentrated and more widely distributed. The excessive hardships of the most fast-bound and hopeless class of serfs in the Middle Ages, the acute and devastating epidemics of that time, the *oubliettes* of the feudal castle, the torture-chamber of the criminal court, the perennial imminence of fire and sword, the general violence that characterised the social life—all these belong to a class of evils that have, under the influences of modern civilisation, either passed away entirely, or, at worst, have been mitigated past recognition of their former selves.[1] But in the present day, as a set-off against this, we have the ever-widening gulf between poverty and wealth, the volume of poverty growing in mass, if not in intensity. The sense of economic insecurity pervading all classes but the very wealthiest is a constant burden hardly compensated for by the increase in physical security of life and formal liberty. The present day shows us a huge agglomeration of coagulated misery in the proletarian quarters of the average modern city, with its ugliness, its filth, and its squalor, all expressing the sordid struggle for existence among the vast majority of the population. We see the dreary hideousness of the modern world, with its commercialised production for profit, consequent on the triumph

[1] Of course we leave out of account here the survivals of similar conditions in countries as yet imperfectly touched by modern civilisation, also the (as we may well believe) unique course of the recent "great war and its offshoots."

of machine industry as exploited by the capitalist system, in all departments of industrial activity. With all their drawbacks—drawbacks which the panegyrist of modern times is accustomed to dilate upon with so much *impressement*—the Middle Ages exhibit to us a careless and joyous life for the majority, free, generally speaking, from overwork, grinding poverty, or carking care, lived for the most part in fresh air and amid healthy conditions. These material advantages were accompanied by a rough-and-rude, if you will, but unaffected natural culture, extending over all classes—a culture from which sprang the noblest products of art and fancy. The sacrifice of most of this is the price which we have, thus far, had to pay for our freedom from the exceptional and acute miseries peculiar to the earlier phase of society. But it would be a mistake to draw from the foregoing data of the conditions prevailing during what is, after all, a very limited period of history, any general conclusion as regards the increase or diminution of the sum-total of happiness in the future, or even as to its distribution. We may well conceive the whole period of civilisation with which history is concerned, as being itself, in a sense, a preparation for something organically *higher* than itself, for a state of things which may, therefore, well involve a positive increment in happiness such as is not clearly apparent in the comparison merely of one period of history with another. In this case the whole process of history, with its variations in the proportion of happiness and misery obtaining in different epochs, yet apparently without any definite result in the subordination of the one to the other, could only properly be judged in the light of its outcome in such a remoter future as we have indicated. We can only properly judge the various periods of civilisation in the light of what is to succeed civilisation. For only in the light of this can we see civilisation in its true significance.

However we may regard the, for us, ultimate goal of human evolution, whether or not we accept the speculation suggested in Chapter V., and conceive it as tending towards a new *persona* —a corporate consciousness, having its material ground in social conditions, just as our present individual consciousness has its material ground in organic conditions—the fact remains that the antithesis we comprehensively term good and evil,

including happiness and its reverse, is one of those ultimate oppositions, lying deep down in the nature of things, which cannot be transcended without abolishing reality itself. But let us not be mistaken; every concrete evil—*i.e.* all evil as particularised, all evil that is realised, as "this evil thing," "this evil institution," "this evil tendency"—must necessarily pass away, since arising and perishing are inseparable from all time-content. Every content of reality that has begun in time must necessarily end in time, precisely so far as it has begun. Such necessity is given in the particularity attaching to it. This fundamental truth may be formulated in the guise of a reasoned explanation as follows:—Every particular object, by the fact of its having come into existence when before it was not, shows that it had no necessity attaching to it. It is therefore contingent upon the infinity of things in time, and in the ceaseless change proper to the time-content it is uninterruptedly exposed to the occurrence of a collocation of circumstances incompatible with its existence, which collocation must obtain at some point of time or other, near or remote, time and its content being infinite. Hence all real evil is transitory.[1] What does not pass away is the *potentiality* of evil, or, if we like to call it so, the immanence of evil-in-general. Evil is immanent in all reality as part of its essence. This is what we mean by the pseudo-concept evil into which reflective

[1] The transitionness of evil spoken of in the text does not, of course, mean that any particular evil necessarily passes away within the life circle of the given concrete system into which it enters. A disease may pass away from the human organism, or it may destroy that organism. The symptoms of old age, again, accentuate themselves till the death of the human being. Even particular evils in a given society may destroy that society, and hence cannot be said to pass away from it. Our point is, that if the concrete or real system into which they enter continues itself to exist, all particular evils arising *within* it must necessarily pass away. The period of developmental existence of the animal or human individual is too short, it is in its nature too precarious for the above principle in many cases to have time to operate. Given a larger and hence more enduring system—say, a given society or a given race—and the truth of the principle, though even still not absolute, will be much more obvious. But in the case of humanity as a whole, to which we are more particularly referring in the text, the principle has, for all practical purposes, a full application, since humanity in its widest sense, as including all possible developments, must be conceived as a continuity without reference to any final term.

thought transforms the alogical element of evil as present in the object. It is this abstract quality of evil that is eternal, in the sense of present in all time. This abstract quality, evil, runs through all the divers concrete and particular evils that, in the guise of realities, enter and disappear from the time-content.

By "good," in the empirical and relative sense, we mean all that content of consciousness that suggests or makes for the supreme good, our ultimate *telos* of life. But this ultimate *telos*, however we may conceive it, includes, as we have seen, pleasure or happiness as an essential element. All pleasure, *as such*, therefore, is good, viewed abstractly. This character only becomes modified when treated, not *per se*, but as a factor in a synthesis comprising other elements than itself. It is the whole wherein it realises itself that determines the *value* of pleasure or happiness, properly speaking, and therewith the question of preferability, including the solution of the old conundrum of "the hog happy and Socrates miserable." Abstractly considered, that is, as regards mere *quantum* of pleasure, sensual delights—*i.e.* those hedonic syntheses, considered as ends, in which pure sensuality predominates, may very possibly outbid those other syntheses in which what are usually classified as the intellectual and spiritual elements are the salient ones. The tendency to self-exhaustion so conspicuous in "sensuous delights," the obverse side of which is *ennui*, of itself shows us the unworkability, in the long run, of any hedonistic theory that takes account solely of pleasure in the abstract, considered quantitatively. The new synthesis involving qualitatively "higher factors," as we term them, enters the consciousness as purpose, inasmuch as the want of a new synthesis involving these higher factors is felt as entailing a greater *quantum* of pain than the mere satisfaction of the lower or sensual purpose does of pleasure.[1] The fulfilment of a higher synthetic purpose,

[1] This apart from another generally perceived fact, that while the lower or sensual pleasures, as well as their hedonic antithesis, are, as a rule, more concentrated or acute, the "higher" (in this qualitative order of value) are more profound, more massive. The emotions of joy and grief, however, in their paroxysmal expressions, partake largely of both these characteristics, being both profound and acute. Hence they are generally and rightly regarded as typical forms of pleasure-pain.

therefore, appeals to the willing consciousness at this stage as more desirable than that of any lower purpose. Compare the cases, for example, of the man who is prepared to sacrifice all the good things of life for an artistic end, a scientific end, or a socio-political end. In dealing with this question we must not expect too much precision. In the reality that we are here analysing no less than elsewhere, we have before us an entanglement. As in theory-of-knowledge we have an entanglement of *apperceptive* syntheses often difficult to distinguish with precision in reflective thought, so here we have an entanglement of *purposive* syntheses, of teleological wholes, wreathing within each other and interchanging, of which it is equally difficult for reflective thought to determine the place of any given one with exactitude. In these questions generally, sharp boundary lines can seldom be drawn, or at best only in their broadest aspects.

If pleasure, in its widest sense, is to be regarded as of the essence of all good, whether ultimate or proximate, and hence in a derivative sense, as "good" *per se* (although the content of any particular pleasure may be "evil"), so pain is always an essential constituent of evil. Pain *as such* can never be anything else than evil; it is, so to say, the hall-mark of concrete evil. It can only lose its character relatively of *evil-ness* in so far as it enters into a synthesis, which in its totality assumes the form of means to an end in which pleasure inheres. But even as such, pain in itself remains evil. Neither pleasure nor pain, strictly speaking, lose their good or evil character from their relation to the content into which they enter. They are antithetic alogicals which penetrate consciousness through and through. The specific content into which they enter may, in its concreteness, be good or evil; and hence, in practice, we apply the same epithet to the pleasure or pain accompanying it, and for practical purposes rightly so. But, philosophically speaking, we are not strictly accurate in thus doing.

It remains, before concluding the present chapter, to return to the question raised above, as to the tendency and, so to say, the general law of human evolution in this connection. We have already pointed out that the good and evil that are eternal (that persist as basal elements in the hedonic consciousness

throughout all its phases), are abstract good and evil considered apart from any specific determination as constituent of any given synthesis in the real world. Every such given synthesis, all *incarnated* evil, so to speak, as surely as it now exists so surely will a time come when it will have ceased to exist. The same, of course, *mutatis mutandis*, applies to every incarnated good; here also, as surely as the good is here now, so surely will it have perished in a future time-content. But then, it may be alleged, does not this imply an eternal Dualism, a never-ending see-saw of Ormuzd and Ahriman, without either gaining any permanent advantage over the other? To this I answer No! For, though concrete good and concrete evil are alike transient, yet there is a difference between the two considered as elements of the time-process in its general movement. Concrete or particularised evil appears as the beginning, or as the first term, of a given cycle of evolution in the dialectic of the time-process. The good, on the other hand, acquired by its elimination [1] or through its transformation, evinces itself as the *telos*, the fulfilment or *completed* reality of the cycle in question. Hence it is evident that a "point" is always given in favour of the good, in the sense that all concrete evil *issues* in concrete good, and not conversely. Thus the trend of all evolution is towards the good, notwithstanding that we cannot conceive this good as ever absorbing and exhausting all possibility of evil. The latter assumption, which would mean not the ending of a cycle but the winding up of the process of reality altogether—in short, the ending of eternity itself—is a reappearance in this sphere of thought of our old friend the pallogistic fallacy, already disposed of in connection with "theory of knowledge."

The moment evil puts on the vesture of reality and is embodied in *this evil*, here and now—a particular *actual* evil out of an infinity of *possible* evil—it has become mortal. Thus every evil falling within human experience is doomed. For

[1] I have not yet gone into the question, so interesting from the psychological and other points of view, of the mere negation or cessation of pain itself constituting positive pleasure and *vice versa*. This point, which plays such a large part in the writings of the pessimist school, falls to be dealt with rather from a more concrete standpoint (*i.e.* that of the science of Hedonics) than the purely abstract analysis with which we are here chiefly occupied.

example, all ignorance, all un-knownness, once become definite must vanish in knowledge. The fact that the *unknown* is recognised as *unknown* is the first step towards the extinction of its un-knownness. Though the unknown may always be with us, any *this unknown*, we may rest assured, will soon cease to be unknown. We cannot formulate a problem as unknowable. This I have pointed out elsewhere. "The fact of your being able to formulate it is sufficient proof that it is not *per se* incapable of solution. I am here speaking, of course, of *real* problems, and not such as have their origin in a misunderstanding or false assumption. We may never be able to explain the process of creation out of nothing, or to form an inventory of the feathers in the wing of the angel Gabriel, or to know whether the devil really has a tail or not, but we may reasonably expect to find a rational formula expressing the essential nature of reality or the concrete world and of man's relations thereto—of thought and being, will and necessity. When I say 'we' I mean, of course, humanity, not necessarily this generation or the next" (*Ethics of Socialism*, pp. 217-218).

It is similar with other specific determinations of evil. The ugliness that is *recognised* as ugly has had its death-sentence passed upon it. History affords illustrations enough of the point we have been elaborating. "The concrete realisation of evil in any given thing has been the signal for its destruction. A physical fact no sooner assumes the character of an evil in the social mind than conscious energy is aroused against it, and sooner or later it disappears. As an illustration take epidemic disease. As soon as zymosis loomed big as an evil in human consciousness, the improved sanitary science began to arise which has found increasingly successful means of checking it, with every prospect of its ultimate extinction. The recognition by a William Morris, a Burne-Jones, and others of the ugliness of modern English decoration [1] has denoted the beginning of its end. But this is particularly noticeable in the moral and social sphere. Any institution, form of society, belief or practice which man has become conscious of as an evil has speedily disappeared. Three centuries ago, and more or less until the French Revolution, the evils of feudalism filled

[1] What we should now call Mid-Victorian.

the mental horizon of good and thoughtful men. It seemed to them that were the cruelties and abuses of the feudal noble, the tyranny of priesthoods, the restrictions of the guild system, of local jurisdictions, and the unrestrained caprice of monarchs, abolished or modified, all would be well. These evils have been all at least mitigated and some of them abolished. Earnest men to-day see another and totally different set of evils, and the fact of their seeing them as evil is one indication of their disappearance within a measurable distance of time" (*Ethics of Socialism*, p. 218).

It is a consolation indeed to reflect that every "evil," physical or moral, within the field of experience at any given moment is in its nature transitory and destined to be overcome by its corresponding "good." The particular or concrete evil in question vanishes completely and for ever. What does not vanish is the *element* or *principle* of evil in general undetermined and unrealised. Every realised ideal, every concrete good, although it has completely exhausted and vanquished the evil to which it was originally opposed, discloses, nevertheless, in its own complete realisation, a vista, gradually increasing in distinctness, of some new evil or set of evils undreamt of before —evils specially growing out of itself. These in their turn become the starting-point of a new cycle, in which the same process is repeated. The assumption of the absolute triumph of good *per se*, then, over evil *per se*, is as much of a *chimera* as the search for a light in which is no darkness—the assumption involving a pure abstraction lacking the conditions of a real synthesis. We may, however, put the matter hypothetically, and say: Did the case *not* resemble the relation of the asymptote to the hyperbola—*were* there a finality to the infinite process—*then* that would imply the complete absorption of evil by good. The result of an investigation, as the matter stands, can do no more than indicate to us that there is an undoubted increment of good, with its pleasure, over evil, with its pain, at the conclusion of every cycle—at the moment, that is, when the realised good which was its end has completely supplanted the realised evil to which it was opposed, and before the new evil destined to be disclosed by the time-process (in this realised good itself) has appeared prominently above the horizon. To

this process of the absorption of realised evil by realised good of specific misery by specific happiness, it would seem that we are unable to assign any finality.

In our discussion of the *telos* of life we have referred to the new doctrine, fashionable some years ago at Oxford, which is called by its protagonists sometimes Pragmatism and sometimes Humanism, but which also might be termed Neo-Schopenhauerianism. This school would regard conscious reality as a system of practical postulates—*i.e.* as the creation of will, as the product of purposive activity. We have given reasons for regarding this doctrine as invalid, since it belongs to that class of theories that would whittle down what should be a real synthesis, to one of its elements merely, thereby resulting in the hypostasis and often apotheosis of what is, truly viewed, an abstraction. We have shown that the end of reality, the ultimate goal to which reality tends, must also constitute a synthesis, a synthesis more perfect, more complete, than that of reality in its usual and more limited sense. Happiness itself, though indeed a necessary element in this *summum bonum*, is nevertheless not the complete *summum bonum* but merely a factor therein. Throughout the period of human history this ultimate *telos* of the world and of life has been formulated in various ways by religious and philosophic thought. But in all these formulations the dual assumption has invariably been made (1) of a direct relation between the individual consciousness (the personal soul) and the ultimate world-principle; and (2) of a final goal of all, attainable by the individual, by means of this direct relation. Such view, we have pointed out, has of late been steadily waning before the notion (whether definitely formulated or only instinctively felt) that the way of destiny towards the *telos* lies not in any introspective relation between the "soul" of the individual man and the ultimate principle of consciousness, but along the more prosaic path of social development. It amounts to this, that the goal of life cannot be attained by the individual *qua* individual—stretch out towards it as he may—but that, however regarded, the realisation of this goal lies on the other side of a long, it may be arduous, cycle of sociological *stadia*; and we cannot but consider this as a highly significant change of attitude. The

former view, that of the great introspective religions—the "universal" religions, as they are termed—has held the field among earnest-minded thinkers throughout the later phases of civilisation. It is pre-eminently the individualist ideal, which supplanted the at once vague and limited social, or rather kinship, ideals of primitive man. The tribesman of early society thought of himself not as an independent individual, but as member of his tribal society, which was, so to say, his own larger life. The function of civilisation, historically considered, has been the achievement of the independence of the individual on the economical basis of private property. The speculative individualism embodied in the great ethical religions of the world was another *facet* of the same stage of social development. This individualist stage having done its work in human evolution, it is hardly too much to assume that we are on the threshold of a fresh stage, in which the ethical and speculative view of the *telos* will wear quite a new aspect to what it has worn heretofore. Of this aspect the change of attitude already spoken of seems to be the precursor. In ethics this change of attitude is marked by the surrender of the ascetic notion of the destruction, the mortification, or at least the complete subjection of the personality, in favour of the formula we have given as *the identification of personal interest with social interest.* The perfection of the individual, not through himself—either *as such* or as mirrored in the God of his imagining—but through society, is the idea underlying the new ethic ; and this doctrine involves the complete inversion of the traditional ethical theory as promulgated by all the great historical religions.

Hitherto our ideals have been based upon the hypostasis of abstraction, as we have repeatedly pointed out in the course of this chapter. In the department of Epistemology we have the pallogist who seeks a reality in which the logical has absorbed the alogical. In the sphere of Hedonics we have the optimist who postulates a *telos* in which good and *a fortiori* happiness has completely absorbed evil, and, *a fortiori,* unrest ; while in the same sphere we have his converse, the pessimist, who postulates evil as having extinguished good. The mystic seeks a spiritual "light in which there is no darkness." The theologian imagines a being too pure to look upon iniquity. The

artist dreams of an ideal beauty that excludes the shadow of ugliness. The speculative philosopher seeks the *telos* of reality in an Absolute which is form without matter, an actuality in which all potentiality is sucked up and exhausted. As we have said before, this juvenile superstition of reflective consciousness, crying for the moon of the abstract Absolute, must give way in the maturity of reflective consciousness to the conviction that reality lives only in the union (in synthesis) of antithetic and contradictory elements. Taken in conjunction with the modern insight gradually forcing itself upon reflective thought —namely, that there is no short circuit from the individual consciousness *here* and *now* to the ultimate ideal, the world-*telos*, but that the way to this *telos* leads solely through the unfolding harmony of social relationships—this more mature conviction regarding reality and its goal leads us to a further consideration. The latter concerns what we may call the dynamic of reality—to wit, its unfolding in the time-series, taking the evolution of human history as type of this process. Reflection on this process shows us that, though all specific evil passes away, yet in the very good into which that evil is absorbed there is further *potentiality* of evil—albeit not the same evil; in other words, that though the particular *evil thing* passes away, the potentiality of evil in general remains, being coincident with consciousness itself. But, it may be said, the same is true of good: the good, as realised, has the evanescence of particularity attaching to it also, and just as inevitably passes away. "Though the morning shall come, the night shall come also." But there is a difference between the two cases. The good realises itself as the *telos* of every dialectical cycle through which the process works; the dynamic of reality always implies a progressive approximation to absolute good—to the *summum bonum*—although the latter may never be absolutely attained. This approximation and relative realisation of good in all its forms, this appearance of evil as the middle term of a cycle in the dynamical process of reality—a germ only at the beginning of the cycle, and exhausted and done away with at its close (*i.e.* in its realised form as a definite and particular evil)—is strictly all that we can discover by investigating the conditions of reality. But it is

already something, for it shows us plainly that there is always a "point" given in the process in favour of the good. Realised good, in some sense, appears as the beginning and as the end of every dialectical process, evil being realised in the middle phases alone. This is what we meant by saying that a *point* is always given in favour of the good.

We come now to the question that constitutes the innermost core, the true inwardness of the matter under discussion. Can we envisage the *summum bonum*, the *telos* of the real process? Can we give any positive formulation of it? Our whole discussion has tended, I think, to show that we cannot; that the Absolute, as end-goal of the dynamic of reality, of the process of reality in time, eludes the modes of consciousness in which we "live and move and have our being." It eludes them, no less than does the Absolute, as the ultimate unity and completion of knowledge as such—of the static of consciousness, as we may term it by comparison. This perfected synthesis of knowledge in which the antithesis knower and known has lost its significance likewise eludes the modes of consciousness actualised in us. But if we cannot divine in feeling, much less formulate in thought, any final, or indeed any but the most proximate, purpose of the time-process, the fact that our analysis has disclosed to us the truth that this process exhibits at every stage an increment of good over evil—a gradual harmonisation of the system within systems of which the world of consciousness consists, over the warring particularity of their components—represents no slight gain. If we seek for more than this then, as the consciousness through which we work is at present constituted, we are seeking after will-o'-the-wisps which cannot be clearly formulated in thought, since they lack the conditions of a real synthesis. In acknowledging this dynamical, this asymptotic perfection, this eternal movement of consciousness and of the object-world "spun out" of itself, towards the good, which, if not precisely "ourselves," *here* and *now*, is yet still less "not ourselves," we have assuredly seized the highest ideal that lies within our grasp. Such an ideal may surely afford us more inexhaustible hope, and therefore more stimulus to action, than any of those ideals professing to bear upon them the impress of finality, which have served the world hitherto.

CHAPTER VIII

PROBLEMS OF METAPHYSIC

The problem of the one and the many has, from the dawn of speculation, been recognised as the crux of metaphysic. There are two forms in which the problem of the one and the many presents itself, that of the one *of* many and that of the one *in* many. The one *of* many exclusively concerns the alogical, in this case the *particular* aspect of reality. The one *in* many, on the other hand, concerns reality as a synthesis. It was in the latter sense that it interested Plato and the ancients generally. It was the relation of the logical universal to the alogical sense-particular—how the latter participated in the former, how the former was corrupted by the latter—that formed the theme of philosophic speculation in the classical world from Plato to Plotinus. In the first sense of the problem, as we have said, we are concerned with the element of the particular alone. The puzzle is one between its qualitative and quantitative modes. We are not dealing here with the particular sense-term and the thought-universal, we are not dealing with the many-ness of sense and the one-ness of thought, but with a given one of sense as against the infinity of other similar ones of sense actual and possible. We have in Chapter III. analysed particularity in its general bearings. From this it will be evident that, owing to the alogical character of the particular considered *per se*, a complete knowledge of the particular or individual aspect of reality is impossible. The self-centred uniqueness of the individual has been more than once remarked upon in recent philosophical literature. It is a point that seems to have specially struck Mr H. G. Wells (see the essay in *Mind*, vol. xiii., No. 51). Certain is it that the element of alogical particularity in the real individual thing or person gives it or him uniqueness. This uniqueness extends to all individuals, but in different degrees, from the realm of

mechanism to that of organic or psychic life. The higher we go and the more perfectly the individual represents a self-contained system, the more obviously will the uniqueness strike us.

The particular as realised, especially as realised in a more or less self-contained or organic synthesis, becomes the individual, for the term "individual" in this sense must not be confounded with the mere bare particular. All reality is in a sense individual in so far as it is reality at all, but the word "individual" usually implies an object or real thing that is also *per se* an organic whole in some sense or other. We do not impute individuality, for example, to mechanically produced things, as a rule. A match or a cannon-ball is not in the true sense of the word individual. Every match or cannon-ball expresses merely a bald synthesis of particular and universal. On the other hand, a plant may exhibit that internal uniqueness which justifies the application in a special sense to the particular instance, of the term "individual." Individuality implies a special *causal* efficacy which the mere particular does not possess. In the animal kingdom the tendency of the particular instance to assume individuality becomes more marked than in the vegetable kingdom, while in human beings and in human societies it reaches its highest expression.

Now the complete knowledge of this individual aspect of reality is impossible. We can never know the object-world in its uniqueness. Our apprehension of reality in its individual aspect is confined to the imperfect knowledge of a fragment at most. For the rest, we have to content ourselves with knowing it through symbols merely. To take the instance from one department only, previously cited (footnote, pp. 128-129), how much does the greatest historical scholar know of the concrete detail of history? How little we comprehend the springs of personal action, even of our contemporaries, is a commonplace remark. How much must our ignorance be intensified as regards persons living in a past age. But, apart altogether from this, the detail of fact, of events, of the life of a period, even that which we know best, is for the most part submerged in time. What the most persevering scholar can collect is never much more than an insignificant fraction of the

whole. We are apt to forget, in our shorthand generalisations, our symbolic conceptions, concerning history, that in all ages, the life, the living reality of a period, is a seething mass of detail—in other words, of individuality—individuality of personal and social factors and individuality of events; for an event, a happening in time, or a series of such happenings, may also possess that internal uniqueness which constitutes individuality. It is difficult for us to realise that in all ages, every social group, every clan and tribe, every town, every village and hamlet, not to mention every individual man and woman, have had more or less unique life-histories of their own. Yet the total amount we know of these life-histories as regards all ages is infinitesimal.[1] Thus the bulk of the reality of any given age, of any given country, eludes us. It cannot be taken up into our intellectual system, and hence it is lost to those symbolic conceptions of which our historical knowledge consists, and which are present to our minds when we speak of any historical period—the eighteenth century, the Middle Ages, Antiquity, etc. Now the question may be asked how far the truth of our experience would be modified were this mass of detail taken up into it. Our outlook on history, were this the case as regards the human past, would certainly be very different from what it is now. It need not necessarily contradict our present symbolic conceptions, the intellectual shorthand into which we transform our meagre knowledge of the living concrete past, but it would certainly in most cases modify them beyond all recognition. What place, then, has this limitless mass of particularity, of which the above is one illustration only—what place has even the individuality, the uniqueness of content which accompanies it in such profusion—what place has it all, I say, in the system of reality, of conscious experience as a whole? Are we to assume it as existing in some sense in an absolute consciousness, the complement of our empirical consciousness with its finite centre? The alternative would seem

[1] The force of what is said here can only be fully realised by the historical student who has worked himself into the detail of a particular period. He alone can fully appreciate the infinite immensity of the particularity, the minutiæ, of history in all periods. His very knowledge indicates to him the vastness of his ignorance.

to be to regard the truth of a great part of reality as hopelessly lost. We have here only referred to the particularisation of the object-world, but similar remarks will apply to the particularisation in the subject. Every diremption of consciousness as particular, as *this* consciousness over against the other postulated conscious *foci*, gives rise to another instance of substantially the same problem. Of the problem of the one *in* many, of the universal in the particular, as the main problem of metaphysic, we are all familiar. But here we have a problem the stress of which lies in the opposition of the one *to* the many, of the particular *to* the particular, of the qualitative aspect of particularity, which is at the basis of individual uniqueness, to the quantitative aspect which is at the basis of individual futility and transitoriness. This applies, of course, to the individuality of the particular, whatever form it take, whether of personal character as such, or of events, or of artistic products, or what not. In history as elsewhere, we may remind the reader, it is this alogical element of the particular, the many, which is the driving force of progress and of events. It has, of course, to operate within the framework of the logical. There is undoubtedly law in every department of human evolution. But those determinate laws can never of themselves exhaust the meaning of the historical process (*cf.* the discussion on Chance and Law in Chapter III.). The problem here is to determine the inner significance for reality, as a whole—of the element of uniqueness, of individuality, as distinguished from that of mere particularity and of mere universality, in the synthesis of which the bare real is given.

Pluralism as an ultimate formulation of the principle of reality is hardly adopted, at least explicitly, by any serious metaphysical thinker in the present day. I emphasise the word "metaphysical" because there may be certain psychological thinkers who, nominally at any rate, profess adhesion to it. The most rudimentary metaphysical analysis suffices to show us its untenability. The individual consciousness either comprises the whole universe within itself (the position of Solipsism), or, as Mr Bradley has shown, it is incomplete and contradictory *per se*, and thereby proclaims its own want of finality, and this would not be obviated by the postulation

of a numerical infinity. Moreover, we need scarcely remind the reader that metaphysical Pluralism traverses the first of our fundamental postulates, as discussed in Chapter I. That it is incompatible with our ultimate test of truth, that of self-consistency of consciousness, is sufficiently obvious, even from what has just been said, without labouring this point further. In fact, it would seem unnecessary in this place to weary the reader with a recapitulation of the well-known arguments, by which the impossibility of Pluralism as an ultimate philosophical resting-place has been often enough demonstrated. But there is, nevertheless, a problem connected with the opposition of the one and the many in the subject of consciousness—that, namely, of the relation between the subject considered as absolute *prius*, and as particularised in the finite conscious centre—the individual ego.

It may perhaps here be desirable to review briefly an argument that has already been dealt with elsewhere in the present work—namely, the justification for speaking of the ultimate principle of consciousness as subject. This is largely, I take it, a question of terminology. Mr Bradley would apparently object to his Absolute being regarded as subject or ego. He is fond of endeavouring to show that ego, self, will, are what he calls "subsequent constructions," and do not represent elemental conditions of consciousness at all. This point of view is sure not to lack a certain popularity in the present day. It is all the rage to repeatedly throw back into the crucible every notion that has hitherto done duty in metaphysic, and the word "ego" has been for long a red rag to the Philistine bull. But I venture to think that we have here to do with a confusion between a principle in its immediacy and the corresponding idea of reflection. The latter, together with the whole of reflective thought for that matter, is, of course, a secondary or subsequent construction. The subject, like the object, is undoubtedly "contained by experience" in the sense that the primary synthesis of consciousness is the condition of its self-recognition, but it is none the less presupposed as element in this synthesis. There is no stage of consciousness, I contend, in which the elements of this primary synthesis are not traceable. You may ignore them in your language, or even in your thought,

but you are implying them all the time. You may readily enough show that subject and object, ego and non-ego, in a developed form, are subsequent constructions. But this is really beside the question. If the antithesis of subject and object in its elementary shape is, as antithesis, primary and ultimate, it is no less true—*i.e.* recognisable—that of these antitheses the subject has primary validity in the sense that on a critical scrutiny the object discloses itself as nothing more than the *other-ness* of the subject, while this can never be reversed. The subject never discloses itself as the *mere other-ness* of the object, inseparable from it though it may be within the conscious synthesis.

It is astonishing how often one can detect old philosophical positions lurking under the guise of new terms. Thus, in Dr Bradley's last work, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, in an interesting chapter (xiv.), in which he discusses the question: "What is the real Julius Cæsar?" he discusses personal identity and its relation to knowledge.

He begins the discussion with the following explanation:— "A finite centre is not a soul, or a self, or an individual person. Hence in the following pages we have throughout to bear these distinctions in mind. And these distinctions are so important, they seem to be so difficult to apprehend, that I must begin by attempting, even at considerable length, to make them clear to the reader" (pp. 409-410). He then proceeds to discuss them severally.

Dr Bradley's general position, to which he once or twice makes allusion in the form of a general statement in the chapter under consideration, is well known. He regards the Universe as one Reality or Experience. Even if he does not explicitly make it clear everywhere, from the general tendency of his exposition, it is pretty evident that it is in this sense, that of the Hegelian right, that he regards it.

A finite centre, he says, is not in time. This, of course, as Dr Bradley himself admits in a footnote, is not original. When closely examined, it is, in fact, identical with Kant's Transcendental Unity of Apperception, or Fichte's Pure Ego. I admit that much may be said for the Bradleyan terminology, but myself, I have on the whole preferred to adopt that of the

German post-Kantian movement in this work as in *The Roots of Reality*. The Bradleyan Finite Centre, like the Fichtian Pure Ego, is the first stadium in the becoming of Reality or Experience. It is that which all Consciousness presupposes, so to say, as its own absoluteness. This absoluteness, though not identical *with*, is presupposed *in* its finite centrality.

Mr Bradley next goes on to discuss the nature of the soul. A soul, says Mr Bradley, is a Finite Centre viewed as an object existing in time, with a Before and After of itself. He goes on to develop this in what follows, but here again it is plain to my thinking that we have simply Kant's "*Object der inneren Anschauung*," which he further defines as "*das Gefühl eines Daseins, ohne den mindesten Begriff.*"

We have next an examination of the notion of self. Mr Bradley rightly refuses to identify self with the Finite Centre as such. It is, however, undoubtedly quite commonly used in this sense. Moreover, surely he is going too far when he alleges we may even have a Finite Centre without any Self. Surely a Finite Centre always contains implicitly, at least the elementary form of the opposition of Self to Non-Self, as indicated in the "*Anstoss*" of Fichte. In differentiating the Self from this Finite Centre as such, it seems to me that he can scarcely, in any intelligible way, distinguish it from Kant's "Soul," which he defines as the "object of the internal Sense." "All that is experienced," says Mr Bradley, "comes within a Finite Centre, and is contained within that whole, which is felt immediately—*i.e.* Kant's Ego as "Transcendental Unity of Consciousness," or Fichte's "Pure Ego." This is all very well, but when we come to the empirical ego, as it is sometimes called, to the self that is recognised as object, the self in this sense is surely indistinguishable from what is both in ordinary and philosophical language called the individual soul or personality.

The "Finite Centre," the well-spring of consciousness, is, as Mr Bradley justly insists, in no way to be confounded with this latter. The focalised individual consciousness which Mr Bradley terms the "Finite Centre," is a direct determination of the potentiality of consciousness as ultimate, or as the ultimate factor in experience, of the *that* of consciousness beyond which

experience and *a fortiori* reflective thought cannot penetrate—in other words, it is a determination of the "pure ego" of the German Post-Kantian thinkers, and hence is to be sharply distinguished from the Object Ego or Soul with which it identifies itself in time. It is this primordial determination of the infinite potentiality of consciousness which Dr Bradley, under the term "Finite Centre," describes as "an immediate experience of itself and the universe in one." This assertion may perhaps be open to criticism on the ground that the pure potency of consciousness cannot be determined even as bare "Finite Centre," without the first stage in the dualism of subject and object being given, and hence the undifferentiated unity having been transcended (*cf.* Fichte, "*Wissenschaftslehre*"). Similarly it seems to me doubtfully correct to speak of this "Finite Centre" or focalisation as *this* Particular (of the Universal Possibility of Consciousness) as "not itself in time." It is true it is the determination of that which is itself timeless, but does not the very differentiation of the Infinite Oneness it presupposes itself imply time? If this be admitted it of course affects other statements of Dr Bradley, such, for instance, as that "A Finite Centre has no identity with any past or futurist self." Here, however, questions may arise as to the definition of identity. Dr Bradley probably means that his "Finite Centre" having no qualities, there is nothing to identify. But does not the fact of his "Finite Centre" being a Finite Centre *of* Consciousness, itself give it a quality?

Accepting, then, as we inevitably must, whether we admit it or not, the ultimate subject as the basis of the empirical "centre of consciousness," as Mr Bradley would term it,[1] the problem, the perhaps insoluble problem, is as to the meaning of the one with reference to the other. What is the meaning of the subject of consciousness considered *per se*, on the one hand, and as determined as myself—this particular personality

[1] I am perfectly well aware of the fact that the above words are sometimes used not for the empirical ego as centre of consciousness, but for the mind or object-self—*i.e.* the *ensemble* of individual experiences special to oneself as contained within the memory-synthesis. This is Kant's "object of the internal sense," the "object-ego" of some writers. It is important to keep this meaning of the terms ego, self, soul, etc., distinct from that of the personal ego as meaning merely the particular diremption of the Subject of all Consciousness.

—on the other hand? This problem is more or less directly connected with that of the way in which we envisage the Absolute—whether as a complete self-determined *system* of unchanging perfection, or as a *principle* merely of eternal change. To this point we shall return later on.

Let us turn now for a moment to a problem which though at first sight psychological yet undoubtedly has a metaphysical bearing. I refer to the determination *per se* of alogical elements. Let us take sensation. Feltness or sensation as such discloses intrinsic differences within itself. We have not merely the apparent disparity between the different senses themselves—*e.g.* between sight and hearing—but we have far-reaching differences of quality within the same sense. Now this agreement and difference of quality in sensation may be described as a relation, although certainly not as a logical relation. We may regard the specific distinctions between the several senses no less than the differences of quality within any one sense as derivative, if one will, from an original homogeneous whole of undifferentiated feltness. But none the less the problem remains that these differences arise *within* this whole, and that they disclose themselves as existent in mere sensation *per se*. Now the question arises as to what metaphysical value we are to assign to these alogical determinations, standing in the relation of agreement or contrast to one another. Are we to regard this alogical relation as indicating a transition in the sphere of the object, the transition from mere sense to thought? The differentiation as regards quality or intensity of sensation within itself does involve a relation over and above the mere sensation itself, notwithstanding that it is no relation of thought. This point of identity and contrast in the mere feltness of sensation might possibly have a bearing on the theory of æsthetics. In any case it should require dealing with in any attempt at a systematic interpretation of the world from the standpoint of philosophy.

Mr Bradley has introduced into philosophical terminology the terms "adjective," "adjectival" etc., as applied to that which is self-contradictory and unreal *per se*, but which finds its reality and its meaning solely in the completed synthesis of his Absolute. It is doubtful, perhaps, whether Mr Bradley

regards his Absolute as subject at all—*i.e.* as *the* ultimate "centre of feeling" (to use his favourite expression), of which the subordinate finite "centres of feeling" are but the pale expression. So far as I understand the Bradleyan doctrine, the Absolute remains nothing more than the final and all-embracing synthesis of all the terms given in experience with their relations. But if I am correct in so reading the doctrine in question, I would point out that this reduces the Absolute itself to a mere bundle, or, if you prefer it, chemical combination, of "adjectives." We thus, it would seem, do not, even with regard to the Absolute, get out of the region of adjectivity, but at best into a higher and potentiated sphere of the adjectival. But the question may very well arise whether out of the adjectival anything but the adjectival can come, and whether Mr Bradley is not deluding himself in thinking that out of what practically amounts to a sum-total of transmuted "adjectives" he is, properly speaking, getting any nearer the ultimate or the Absolute as such. What, on the foregoing assumption as to the Bradleyan position, is wanting, then, to the ultimateness of his formulation of the Absolute? The recognition, I answer, of that bogey of the modern metaphysician, the basal Ego, the ultimate Subject. To prove the Subject (the Ego in an Epistemological and metaphysical sense as opposed to a psychological sense) to be a derivative construction is very easy, and in fact cheap. It is easy, that is, if, first of all, a confusion is made between the ultimate Subject *per se*—namely, as the necessary presupposition of all conscious experience whatever, and the symbol that abstract or reflective thought constructs to indicate this in its own terms. The further procedure is then, by means of the logical faculty functioning in reflective thought, to prove that the ego is the creation of the latter, since its quasi-logical symbol, which alone directly enters into language and, *a fortiori*, into philosophical formulations, undoubtedly is. But, as I have had already occasion to point out on an earlier page, all the time that the philosopher is showing the fallacy or illegitimacy of the notion of ultimate subject he is himself unawares presupposing this ultimate subject in all his reasoning. The Subject out of which all consciousness wells up—including that objectivity which is no more than the otherness of the

subject itself—is in its first intention *alogical*. Hence it cannot be grasped by the (at once) unifying and differentiating logical, and the logical in its attempt to seize it retains only its *simulacrum* so to speak—to wit, the pseudo-concept which is the logical's own "derivative construction." It is *au fond* this ultimate principle, to which all else is "adjectival"—it is this ultimate principle that we imply, as already explained (see Chapter III.), when we speak of "being," when we postulate a substratum of qualities, in fact, when we find the adjectiva *per se* abstract, unreal, and meaningless. The reflective consciousness, with its concept of substance, in which logical analysis can find nothing but a bundle of attributes or "adjectives," unawares *feels*, so to say, *into* the concept this principle. Having dealt with the foregoing point as a preliminary step, we will now proceed to discuss certain problems arising out of the ordinary philosophical conception of the Absolute, which is or was shared by the latest modern writers on philosophy—*e.g.* in the English-speaking world by Messrs Bradley, Bosanquet, Royce, Taylor, Mactaggart, etc.

The assumption of the old Idealism of the right, the aggressively pallogistic Hegelianism, of which the late Professor T. H. Green may be regarded, in his own way and with certain modifications, as the protagonist in this country, is that the Absolute, the *Idee*, is something finally and eternally complete, the *durchsichtige Ruhe* of Hegel. Such is the Absolute, regarded not in its at best partial manifestations in the processes of the real world, but under its highest and most perfect aspect as in and for itself. This view, in the special form it takes in the school in question, is naturally obnoxious to the criticism of Pallogism dealt with in an earlier portion of the present work. But others besides professional pallogists (*e.g.* Messrs Bradley, Royce, Taylor, and Mactaggart) adopt something very much like the same position. The Absolute also in their case is wound-up and finished, so to say. It is rounded-off totality and completeness, with nothing outside itself, an *ens realissimum*, existing, but not becoming. Under whatever guise it appears the view in question is at basis pallogistic. It eliminates the alogical—*i.e.* the factor of which change is the essence. The impossibility of the notion of finality has already been discussed apropos of

the world-*telos* (*cf.* Chapter VII.). But if a wound-up Absolute, which inevitably involves this elimination of the alogical factor —the material and the potential in reality—is, when closely viewed, a hopeless postulate, it behoves us surely to reconsider our formulation of the Absolute altogether. A return to the inanities of the old Empiricism, for which the bare word "absolute" is anathema, is impossible for most thinkers of the present day. But the recognition that the notion of the Absolute is implicitly given as a postulate in all consciousness does not necessarily mean the acceptance of the formulation respecting it at present current in the philosophic world. The idea hitherto has been, it would seem, to envisage the Absolute as a concrete fact or thing, in which all other things are contained, in a transformed guise, it may be, but none the less contained. Now, is this notion of an all-embracing Concrete workable, or even thinkable? Even if the objection raised above to Mr Bradley's special formulation be obviated, even though we regard the Absolute as a supreme synthesis of experience, as unsurpassable fulness of consciousness centring in the ultimate subject, presupposed in our own and in every other limited consciousness, we have still the difficulties just now raised to contend with.[1] In addition, we are confronted with the unthinkability of an Absolute which is at once a totality and not a totality, in which at once all particulars have their being, and hence which embraces an infinitude and is nevertheless complete.

In fact there is no term in common use in philosophy which staggers the non-metaphysical man of average intelligence more than the term Absolute. He wants to know whether it is identical, or has anything in common with the "god" of theology. He is strengthened in the assumption that such is the case by the practice of certain metaphysical thinkers, eminent or otherwise, who have persisted in identifying the two terms. The answer to the aforesaid man of average intelligence is that the fundamental postulate of philosophy and that of theology have really nothing in common. The latter always involves the notion of personality in some form or

[1] As above pointed out, Mr Bradley, as I read him, would not admit the Absolute in any sense as ultimate subject.

shape either explicitly or vaguely. The former excludes the notion of personality at the very outset. But what then, persists our ordinary man of average intelligence, does the term really mean? It may be useful to devote a short space to the chief senses in which the term Absolute has been used by various prominent thinkers.

For the Hegelians, and indeed all systematic thinkers of platonising tendency from Plato himself downward through history—the "pallogistic" schools as I have designated them in these pages—the Absolute has always meant the world of Reality considered as the reflection, the partial and imperfect outcome of perfect and complete conscious experience, an experience for which personality, individuation, is merely a means of manifestation—*i.e.* of relative manifestation. And this leads us back to the etymological meaning of the word. The Absolute is the antithesis of the Relative. It is that which is *per se* and in perfect independence of aught else. Hence it is as such that personality cannot be attributed to it, for personality is essentially relative. It presupposes a relation to a somewhat, a world, outside self as individual. The Absolute, of course, in the above sense may be conceived as embracing or absorbing into itself all personalities with their several conscious contents, but as such it is plain that personality in any intelligible sense of the word cannot, as already said, be predicated of it. But the pallogistic definition of the Absolute by no means answers to the only sense in which the term has been used in modern philosophic thought.

The term Absolute itself was, if I mistake not, first introduced into the terminology of metaphysic by Schelling, but the notion for which it stands is as old as metaphysical inquiry itself. Other words have been used to express the same notion—namely, that of the ultimate postulate presupposed in all conscious experience. The expressions used to indicate this ultimate postulate emphasise some one, some another, aspect of it. The word Absolute itself, as most commonly used nowadays, emphasises its non-relative nature. Similarly the term "unconditioned," which has also been applied to it, emphasises its self-sufficedness as regards external influence or causation. Other definitions again stress its universality, its all-embracingness- *e.g.* with

Spinoza. But the pallogistic conception of this ultimate postulate and its relation to ordinary experience—to wit, that of ultimate static perfection—static inasmuch as it is conceived as the final fruition of all things as regards which there is no above and beyond of further perfection (if I may be pardoned the apparent solecism) is by no means the only way of envisaging the ultimate postulate of experience, as it has been one of the aims of this book to show. On the contrary, more than this, we have endeavoured to show that this conception involves inconsistencies and impossibilities of thought when critically considered. In our view the whole notion of the static all-embracing perfection and completeness of the Absolute is fallacious. To our thinking one cannot eliminate movement, becoming, *nisus*, from the notion of the Absolute, and such being the case one cannot envisage the Absolute as a once for all perfect synthesis. As such our Absolute cannot be more than the ultimate element, the fulcrum of a moving synthesis. It is this element or fulcrum alone, that is, so to say, outside time. For the synthesis itself time is always of its essence. This permanent element or fulcrum we find, as I contend, in the ultimate possibility of conscious experience expressed in the classical German philosophy by the term Pure or Transcendental Ego.

When closely viewed, this notion of the Absolute as in some way *static* Perfection,[1] to which all time-experience tends, and of which it is, so to say, the function, is seen to be but the hypostatisation of an abstraction. All experience of which we can have any conception whatever, in so far as it is real, not only presupposes an antecedent experience, but also in its very nature involves the stretching forward to an ulterior experience. Towards the former the given stage of experience is real, in Mr Bradley's sense, and its predecessor unreal or abstract, in relation to itself. But this given experience, on the other hand, is equally abstract, is equally unreal "appearance," in relation

[1] Some may object to the use of the word "Perfection" otherwise than as an unconditional superlative. I have, however, used the word "Perfection," as I have "Completeness," for an experience, perfect and complete only in relation to other phases of experience antecedent to itself, and hence as not excluding greater and less.

to that which succeeds it, and whose potentiality it contains within itself. Bergson, as I understand him, is fully justified in his polemic against the notion of a *nunc stans*. Perfection, absolute and complete in actuality, containing within itself no potentiality—or perfection, more real than itself, however viewed—means stagnation; it means an abstraction lacking the elements of Life and Reality. No stage of perfection is conceivable that, as such, is more than relative to a lower stage of perfection; and that does not in its very actuality essentially indicate possibilities higher than itself. In this sense we may accept Hegel's first definition of the Absolute as eternal process, though in his ultimate concept, the *Idee*, the notion of process is thrown overboard in favour of that of abstract completeness. The origin of this fallacy is to be found in the refusal to admit the alogical as a primary element of all reality; in denying to potentiality a positive value in every real synthesis. We have traced this fallacy already in the various guises it assumes in the course of the foregoing pages.

It is the "being" which projects itself, so to say, into its own determinations and thus constitutes them objects and a world. If it be asked, What is the value for practical philosophic thought of this regarding of the Absolute as principle, as distinguished from the regarding of it as an actually existent, ideally perfect system of experience? our answer is that, while not lending itself so readily to flights of literary rhetoric as the latter, it does at least afford us a clue to the method by which the self-realisation of the Absolute as principle works in time through all its stages, which is imperfectly adumbrated in the "trichotomy" of Hegel, but which it will remain for the future more adequately to work out and formulate.

The differentiation of the object as the *otherness* of the subject merely, and thought as relating energy at once uniting and distinguishing this double alogical while issuing therefrom as its result, affords us alike the most elementary and the most ultimate type of the "becoming" of all reality since it is the condition of all conscious experience whatever, stated in its barest form. Those who take this view are not involved in any dogmatic denial, as we have already said, of the other view

which we have criticised. They merely adopt an agnostic attitude with regard to it. The contention is that the opposing view—viz. that of the Absolute as eternally actualised statical system—is a hypothetical construction suggested perhaps by certain sides of the analysis of the condition of our experience, but not in itself falling, strictly speaking, within the proper limits of that analysis. While, on the other hand, it is claimed that the notion of the Absolute as principle merely, adopted in the present work, is a direct and necessary result afforded by the analysis itself. We should say the Absolute *may* be eternally actualised as the system of static fulfilment of the things inadequately shadowed in our experience as realised in individual centres (though not certainly a pallogistic system of thought-forms as Plato, Hegel and others have postulated, which, as already sufficiently pointed out in this book, lands us simply in abstraction). And this may be an interesting enough speculation, but, we repeat, it is a speculation merely and can hardly deserve a place in the stricter side of philosophic thought. The very difficulties of its formulation, even by its ablest exponents, would in itself seem to indicate the truth of what we have been saying.

It is to get rid of these and similar difficulties that Professor Royce put forward his doctrine of "a self-representative system," supported by mathematical theories and illustrations derived from Dedekind. That for most of us these are unsatisfactory, I think I may say without fear of contradiction (*cf.* the note at the end of Chapter III.). The whole question, to my thinking, turns upon the distinction between regarding the Absolute as a wound-up whole, a closed system, a finally complete synthesis, and regarding it as principle merely, timeless principle of eternal change in time. If we adopt the latter view, we at once escape the contradictions and inconsistencies raised by the notion of the Absolute as system complete once and for all. The whole course of our investigations in the foregoing pages has tended to show the impossibility, nay, the inconceivability of finality or completion in the world-order. We have seen that this notion is, in the last resort, identical with the fallacy that in theory-of-knowledge presents itself as Pallogism. It involves the contradiction of confounding what

is really an abstraction with a real synthesis. It implies the conversion of an abstraction into a reality.

Yet it may be said that our ultimate sanction, the self-consistency of consciousness, presses forward towards unity. It requires unity. It cannot rest satisfied with anything short of final unity, all-absorbing completeness. But surely it may be considered as arguable that the unity that seems demanded by the self-consistency of experience is no more than unity of principle and unity of direction. If we are content with this, we are relieved at once of the unthinkabilities and formal contradictions involved in the favourite theory of the actually complete Absolute. The bare fact of these contradictions would surely seem to indicate that we are on the wrong tack in seeking to achieve unity in this direction. We start with the assumption that the self-consistency of conscious experience demands the formulation of the Absolute as an all-embracing unity—as a totality. But yet no formulation in this sense has as yet been suggested that is not obnoxious to the most obvious criticism as involving fallacy at its very core. The moment you pose as your problem a formulation of the Absolute as completeness, perfection, you have started on a road leading to a *cul de sac*. Be your formulation what it may, you are bound to admit with an apology its difficulties and general unsatisfactoriness on certain points. You admit, in fact, generally speaking, that it is a *pis aller*. But yet, at the same time, your conviction is, whether you say so in so many words or not, that the self-consistency of experience demands some formulation of the kind you have attempted. Now this, I take it, is a delusion. That our test of truth—namely, the self-consistency of consciousness—demands unity, that it will not be satisfied with anything short of unity, is undoubtedly accurate. But (and here, I submit, lies the error) this is interpreted by most constructive thinkers of the present day to mean a unity in the sense of an eternally actual experience, in which all things are gathered up and transmuted. Now such an interpretation is surely by no means warranted by the original thesis. The unity, I would suggest, to which all experience points is alogical rather than logical, material rather than formal, potential rather than actual. Its ultimate principle we must

surely find in the subject presupposed in all consciousness and in a secondary degree in the *this-ness* of immediate apprehension. For the latter, being analysed, discloses itself as consisting of the subject of consciousness, of the object that is no more than the other-ness of the subject—*i.e.* itself under another aspect—and of the reciprocal relation between them called thought. Its ultimate end we may as surely find in perfection (if you will)—perfection in its three kinds, of truth, beauty and goodness—but a perfection, a harmony, that is eternally changing in such wise that, although every concrete ideal in which it presents itself may be attainable, yet once attained the ultimate perfection is seen to lie beyond it. On this view the higher meaning of reality is to be found wholly and solely in the unhindered process of this eternal tendency—in a word, in the potentiality of self-realisation eternally inherent in the world-principle.

To sum up. There are certain *données* of modern philosophy, which are common to all systematic thinkers of the present day. Chief of these is, of course, the idea of reality as involving a completed synthesis. This again, as generally interpreted, culminates, as we have seen, in the notion of an Absolute representing a vast self-contained knowledge or experience which is the completed expression of the content of all time—*i.e.* of all that was, that is, and that shall be. This is the position, as I understand it, of Mr Bosanquet, Professor Pringle-Patterson, and most present-day thinkers of the Academic School. As stated by them it represents, I need scarcely say, in the main what I have termed "Pallogism," and as such is open to the criticism contained in the present work and also to that of Bergson and his school. The "Absolute" of the academic thinkers in question is undoubtedly *au fond* the hypostatised form of thought or the concept-form, as we find it in varied modifications from Plato to Hegel. Like all pallogists, these thinkers are never tired of girding at the notion of the *Pure Subject* (in contradistinction, of course, to the individual Ego as empirical fact). Thus Professor Pringle-Patterson: "It was the substantiation of the logical form of consciousness . . . which led to the idea of the universal subject which thinks in all thinkers" (*Idea of God*, pp. 389-390). The writer goes on to object to this "unification of consciousness

in a single self," as he terms it. But nevertheless he and the other exponents of this school are insistent on the Absolute as a self-contained experience, at once the primordial postulate and the ultimate result of philosophic thinking. Now it would be interesting to know how these gentlemen arrive at their all-embracing Whole of experience without a That which experiences—the experiencing centre—in other words, the universal Subject of this Whole of experience. The experience they postulate in their Absolute is a circumference without a centre. Or, to vary the metaphor, like Mahomet's coffin, it hangs in mid-air. Now of such an experience, of such a consciousness, we have no possible notion. If the word "experience" or "consciousness" is to retain any meaning at all, it can only be that of the modification of an experiencing Subject. Hence, granting their assumption of the Absolute as the self-contained and completed totality of all experience, it can only be related to us finite conscious *foci* in so far as it is *identical with ourselves as experiencing*—in short, as the *ultimate subject of our conscious life*.

Professor Pringle-Patterson and his friends would retain the Absolute as universal consciousness while denying it as universal Subject of consciousness. How they can justify this, in spite of an unlimited amount of talking round the problem, has never yet been clear to me. If experience is to be considered as in the last resort *one*, then its subject cannot certainly be other than *one*.

The present writer would reverse the procedure of our academic metaphysicians. While getting rid of the notion of completeness or wholeness in the Absolute, he would treat it, not as finished experience in itself, but rather as the eternal *principle* of experiencing or knowing, as being the *eternal subject* of all concrete consciousness whatever. The notion of the universe as a whole and as involving a definite end or ultimate purpose is, as I have already pointed out, in contradiction with that ultimate datum of all philosophical analysis—the postulate of infinity—which, though symbolised in abstract thought, is *per se* alogical and hence impossible of being fully accounted for by any or all of the determinations of thought. The notion of a completed whole, of the universe, or "experience-in-general," as in the last resort a closed and finished synthesis, is clearly untenable. There can be no *whole* of the *content*

of Time any more than of the form of Time, and yet the Absolute admittedly unfolds itself in infinite time. For this reason—*i.e.* as not implying any determinate synthesis but rather the contrary—Schopenhauer's "will" is perhaps a better expression for the Absolute than any other single word or short phrase hitherto formulated. Apart from the conclusion arrived at by the distinguished pessimist philosopher, which is unessential to the formula itself, the latter indicates at least that the evolutionary process, the will-striving, is never "lost" in the "full fruition" to which none the less it unceasingly approximates, Schopenhauer notwithstanding.

As it seems to me this is perhaps the crucial problem of constructive metaphysic in the immediate future—whether, *i.e.*, we are to envisage the Absolute as a definite wound-up sum-total of all reality, transmuted or otherwise, or are to think of it as an eternally completing, yet never complete, process of the self-realisation of the subject of our consciousness and of all possible consciousness. Here we have the true issue. If we regard the Absolute in any form or shape as a completed synthesis or system of experience, look at it as we may and safeguard its formulation by waver-clauses as we will, we are, nevertheless, confronted with a basal duality between my consciousness here and now as individual, and the absolute consciousness into which it is supposed to enter, in some sense at least, in the relation of part to whole or of element to concrete. Such an eternally complete Absolute, turn the matter as we may, must necessarily mean a somewhat *over against* my consciousness here and now.

Hence the assumption in question, whatever attempts at verbal accommodation may be made by its advocates, while professing to be a satisfactory and ultimate postulate, leaves us in presence of an unresolved opposition.

Let us suppose, on the contrary, that we renounce the attempt to arrive at any conception of the Absolute, involving completeness, perfection, in other words, of the absolute as a perfectly finished system, and are content with the postulation of it as principle merely, treating completeness, perfection, all-embracing harmony, etc, as for us naught but asymptotic tendencies, potencies of the alogical principle at the centre

of all experience working through the infinity of apperceptive syntheses involved therein. In this case, we are at once rid of the difficulties that confronted us on the former assumption. While holding fast to the principle, to the recognition of which as ultimate postulate the self-consistency of our consciousness forces us, we nevertheless acknowledge the unworkability of any attempt to formulate this same principle as actualised reality. We recognise it none the less as a problem, but our attitude towards it remains essentially "agnostic," to use the well-worn term. Its solution in the formulæ of reflective thought would seem unattainable, and unattainable owing to the very conditions of that thought. Hence for philosophy it remains formulable as problem merely. In saying this we neither affirm nor deny the possibility of its solution in terms of the æsthetic or even the ethical consciousness. As practical postulate the conviction of the realisation as a concrete unity of completeness, perfection, harmony, can affirm itself in what shape it may. We are content here merely to maintain its invalidity, viewed either as postulate or result of philosophical analysis.

For philosophy, at least, the Absolute, so far from being the unchangeable eternal, is, on the contrary, the eternal principle of change. It is eternally realising itself under ever new forms to which we can assign no finality. Viewed, if we will, time apart, *sub specie eternitatis*, then it is surely, so far as metaphysical analysis is concerned, a bare principle and no more. But this question as to the ultimateness of time, as to the validity of the introduction of time-considerations into the deeper problems of metaphysic, constitutes a problem in itself.

This problem confronts us on the very threshold of a thoroughgoing metaphysical analysis. Is duration a basal condition of consciousness *per se* or is it merely a condition of our consciousness as individuals? That the ultimate principle of conscious experience is presupposed by time, and cannot be regarded *per se* as itself involved in time, is clear. It is likewise clear that time is a root-form of the individual consciousness. The difficulty arises when we attempt to determine the limits within which we are justified in importing considerations involving time into the ultimate problem of metaphysic. It is quite true that we can envisage nothing except under the form of duration with its

present eternally severing a *past* and a *future*. We cannot conceive any one of the dimensions of time as isolated from the rest. An " eternal now " unrelated to a past or future moment is the thinnest of all abstractions—a mere poetic phrase, in fact. On the other hand, a past or a future out of all relation to the " now " involved in the immediacy of consciousness would be, if anything, still more vapid. The problem remains, then, whether we are to regard time as exclusively pertaining to the particularity of our consciousness, to its limitation as focused in the finite individual, or whether we are justified, and if so, how far and in what sense, in imputing to it an absolute value. This question is answered differently by different thinkers. For Jaurès time and space were both direct attributes of the Absolute ; for Dr Bradley they are alike mere " appearance " belonging to the limitations of our consciousness in its particularity. It is not within the scope of our present intentions to offer any solution of this difficult question ; it suffices for our present purpose to state it.

The notion of an unchanging finished Absolute is at the root of what is known as philosophical Theism. But before considering this it is necessary to say a few words on Theism, Atheism, and Agnosticism as popularly understood. Popular Theism postulates a personality, an individual consciousness with at least its intellectual and conative sides, if not its sensory side. This supreme individual, infinitely surpassing ourselves in degree if not altogether differing in kind, is assumed, in the manner of Aristotle s " First Mover," as the Originator or Creator of the world and all things that are therein, including the innumerable finite centres of consciousness represented by human, and possibly in a less degree by animal, intelligences. The former, at least, are made after the pattern of himself as the supreme individual intelligence—" after his own image." The above, I think, is a fair description of " God " as conceived by the average man. The atheist, on the contrary, is supposed to profess to be able to bring forward a demonstration of the non-existence of the aforesaid individual Creator and " Universal Provider." The agnostic, again—wise man that he is—whilst vehemently repudiating the folly and intellectual perversity of the above-described atheist, proclaims the path of wisdom

to lie in an equipoise of mere nescience. Now the agnostic no one will deny to be a real character; but as regards the atheist who believes that he can furnish a conclusive demonstration of the non-existence of God as above defined I am inclined to doubt his reality, and would go so far as to deny positively the existence of any considerable section of persons coming within that category. This is not where the line of demarcation between the theist and the true atheist obtains.

The distinction between the atheist and the agnostic as regards their mere intellectual position is purely academical and of no practical bearing whatsoever. The dogmatic atheist, it is said, alleges that he can afford positive demonstration of the non-existence of a divine personality as conceived of by the ordinary theist. The agnostic repudiates the dogmatic atheist's proofs of the negative proposition, but affirms just as stoutly the invalidity of all attempted proofs of the affirmative —nay, in many cases would even deny the possibility of such proofs. But the demonstration of the non-existence of a fact and the demonstration, not of its non-existence, but of the absence of all grounds for believing in its existence, leaves us, from a practical point of view, in exactly the same position. The scientist can prove to me that basilisks do not exist, being contrary to the laws of Nature. He can also prove to me that thunderbolts or meteoric stones do exist and sometimes reach the earth. But, whilst not impossible, there is no reason whatever for believing that an aerolite is likely to descend upon the south-western district of London this evening. There is, therefore, a theoretical distinction between the two cases—the one is impossible; the other is possible. But if I am contemplating a stroll across Clapham Common the danger of being struck on the head by an aerolite—a possible occurrence—and the danger of being scorched by a basilisk—an impossible one—are, so far as the purpose of my walk is concerned, precisely on the same level. In the same way, *quoad* the purposes of human life and conduct, the distinction between the position of the assumed dogmatic atheist and that of the agnostic is of no importance whatever.

The real, the vital difference between the point of view of the theist and that of the atheist lies not in any theoretical

equivoque, but in the practical sphere of ethics. The theist, in contemplating the evil and pain of the world, and their apparent incompatibility with the high ethical attributes he ascribes to the personality of its alleged author, is satisfactorily consoled by the reflection that, to use a well-known phrase, " it will all come out in the washing." He is convinced that, whilst his God has created or permitted this evil, it is all part of a scheme of ulterior good, and that its creation or toleration is justified by the benevolent end in view. The atheist, on the contrary, finds insuperable difficulties in accepting this position. Granting, he says, the existence of your Supreme Being, the mere fact of the presence of evil, misery, and pain in the world is incompatible with the moral attributes, if we use the word " moral " in any intelligible sense, of the Creator and Orderer of such a world. " The evil is there," says the atheist ; " you cannot get away from the fact." No amount of specious confidence-trick assurances of mysterious " divine purposes " behind it will divest it of its character as evil. " The application to the Deity of the theory that the end justifies the means," continues the atheist, " I cannot in any way accept. I will not press the point as to the omnipotence of your personal God since I am aware that many theologians of the present day do not insist upon it ; but in any case the power you attribute to Him must be transcendently greater than that at the disposition of our finite wills. Yet, necessary though it may be in human affairs not altogether to exclude the admission of the end justifying the means, it is well known that the moralist always does this with reluctance in any given case and with the greatest reservations as a general principle. But if I only admit the principle in question with reluctance as a concession to the weakness of human powers acting in a limited time, how inconceivably less is the excuse for a Divine Being whose powers, if not amounting to actual omnipotence, must nevertheless, as compared with human powers, be hardly distinguishable therefrom, and who works not in a limited time, but has eternity to play with ! Such a Being, who erects the principle of the end justifying the means into an integral element of His world-order, I cannot regard as moral in any sense to which I can attach the word, and hence I cannot worship such a Being."

The true atheist, the ethical atheist, who insists that the theist's assumption of a personal Deity, even if granted as regards the question of bare existence, is worthless for religious purposes, owing to its incompatibility with ethical principle, might also be described with equal accuracy as an anti-theist.

But it may be objected that in an earlier chapter we have ourselves expressly insisted on the correlative nature of good and evil in the ethical universe and of truth and error in the scientific and philosophical universe. The atheist's criticism of Theism from the ethical standpoint might, therefore, seem to be inconsistent with this principle of antithesis. This is, however, not really the case. Evil may be considered as the mere other-ness, the negative side, of good. Such evil is evil in the abstract, but there is also evil as concrete, evil as embodied in the particular evil thing. The satiation, the *ennui*, that pleasure engenders is the negative side, the other-ness of pleasure-in-general. But a positive disease or discomfort, a fever or toothache, has no inherent metaphysical necessity attaching to it, nor is it, like the former, deducible from such. As a particularised real it has a positive and independent character of its own. Such positive concrete evils may be deducible from the physical constitution of the world, but they have no metaphysical significance. As matters of fact they are actual but not *necessary in this sense*, and hence the granting of a general *physical* necessity does not improve the case for the theist's contention. "It must needs be that offences come, but woe unto him by whom they come!"

The difficulty involved in the foregoing problem arises from the fact that the moment we envisage the world as in any sense the outcome or the product of the will of an individual consciousness, hedge the notion round with whatever qualifications we may, we are within the sphere of ethical judgment, within the jurisdiction of the human conscience. But the decisions of the human conscience are very definite in character. The ethical court of appeal claims that its judgments shall extend to, and be respected by, all that wears the aspect of personality, by all that is individual consciousness, no matter what the difference may be, quantitatively or qualitatively, in the content or range of such individual consciousness. Hence the

unsatisfactory character, admitted by straightforward advocates of Theism themselves, of the attempts made to evade or attenuate the distinctive dictates of the moral consciousness concerning the responsibility accruing to any Author and Regulator of the world for the evil that obtains within it. Once, however, we are outside the region of personality, of actually conscious will, we are outside the jurisdiction of the moral consciousness. An immanent *trieb* or *nisus* towards realisation—a subject, let us say, not clothed in personality—is outside the sphere of moral predication. For such subject, viewed as the root principle of all that is, at once the ultimate *terminus a quo* and *terminus ad quem* of all conscious process, the moral consciousness is simply a phase or aspect of the realisation itself. Hence from this point of view there is no moral problem in the existence of the world at all. So long as we confine ourselves to it we are outside the jurisdiction of the moral consciousness, which always presupposes the distinction of "I" and "thou"; in other words, a relation between one self-conscious personality and another, or at least between such personality and a corporate social entity. Abolish this distinction of personality, eliminate the element of individual consciousness and will, and you abolish at once the moral problem. Just as the speculative difficulties attending the assumption of a finished Absolute, which involves, as we have shown, the ascription, in some sort at least, of personality to the Absolute, are got rid of by confining our assumption to a unity of tendency and direction merely, so here the moral difficulties attached to the former view are eliminated by a like procedure. A parallel line of argument as regards the æsthetic sphere, the perfect ideal of beauty, conceived as eternally realised in the "Beatific Vision," rests also on the assumption of a personification of the world-principle, and is, therefore, incompatible with the concrete ugliness of the world conceived as the product of a conscious will, whose essence involves æsthetic perfection. When, however, we abandon the position of the eternally complete, self-realised Absolute, and take our stand, not on an absolute *self-realised* unity but on a *self-realising* unity of simple tendency and direction, the problem which is the source of our difficulty has lost all meaning and disappears.

There is yet another problem which, although not strictly speaking metaphysical in the sense of the foregoing, yet nevertheless fills a large space in the popular philosophy of the present day. It is that expressed in the theories known on the one hand as Psycho-Physical Parallelism and on the other as the *Influxus Psychicus*. How shall we envisage the dual aspect of phenomena? The real world presents itself as a double series of phenomena—a physical series and a psychical series. Can we apply the category of causation to both these series alike, and especially can we apply it as between the two series? Can we treat the physical as a cause of the psychical or *vice versa*, or are we to regard the two as a double series, each with a line of causation strictly independent of the other; or yet again must we confine the category of causation to the physical series alone, treating the psychical as outside causation altogether? As regards this problem there is, first of all, the position of the older Materialism, according to which the psychical is, strictly speaking, caused by the physical, is a mere epiphenomenon of the physical. This position, which involves metaphysical absurdity, the position of the French Materialism of the eighteenth century, and in the main of Vogt, Büchner, and Moleschott, of the mid-nineteenth century, is now practically abandoned by all serious scientific thinkers as much as by speculative philosophers.

The theory of Physical Parallelism in its usual form, as stated, for example, by Fechner, postulates a double causal series not causally interactive but corresponding strictly in the result at every stage. This theory, of course, is practically a resuscitation of one of the sides of Spinoza's system. The causal line of each series is postulated as in itself absolutely independent of that of the other, notwithstanding its precise and invariable correspondence. Hence the physical effect apparently resulting from a psychical cause—an emotion followed by an act of will having as its apparent outcome a modification of the physical world—is really not due to the emotion or the velleity as psychical phenomena, but to the liberation of nerve energy which is their physical accompaniment. The emotion and the velleity followed by the bodily movement cannot be regarded as a case of cause and effect in the strict sense of the word.

Similarly in the psychical life there is a continuity of cause and effect through the series of psychic states and activities. As Spinoza insisted, ideas can only be determined causally by ideas, just as motions in space can only be determined by motions in space. There is no passing over causally from the one to the other. This doctrine has been lately attacked from various sides. The difficulty has been pointed out of tracing, even with the most liberal aid of the hypothesis of sub-conscious and unconscious states, any satisfactory continuity on the psychical side. Hence it has been urged that the category of causation in strictness only applies to the physical plane of phenomenal reality. Again the doctrine of Psycho-Physical Parallelism has been criticised in a destructive sense in the interests of the *Influxus Psychicus* by various philosophic writers, in this country notably by Professor James Ward. The researches of Dr Hans Driesch have marked an epoch in the question of Psycho-Physical Parallelism. His distinction between the singular—*i.e.* the one-sided or mechanical Cause—and the individualising or unifying Cause as worked out and illustrated from a biological and sociological point of view, is instructive and highly suggestive. It is, however, *au fond*, based on the familiar distinction, which we owe to Kant, between the category of " Cause and Effect " and that of " Action and Reaction " (*Wechselwirkung*). The application of this latter category, within the domain of biology, was also made in many respects on the lines of Professor Driesch by Dr J. S. Haldane in an article in *Mind* (July, 1884). But the fact that Professor Driesch has been anticipated, in some respects, by Dr Haldane in the application of the Kantian category of *Wechselwirkung* to the processes of biology does not detract from the suggestiveness and originality of much of his work. The type of what he calls " unifying causality " is to be found in vitalism. The distinction between this unifying causality—as discoverable in biological and, up to a certain point, in sociological and historical processes and " singular causation "—*i.e.* the causation typical of the inorganic world—is reducible to the presence in the former of what the author terms an " Entelechy," by which he understands a formative element which in some sense may be said to direct the plan of the structural processes of biology. The

exact meaning attached to the term " Entelechy " is not quite clear. Professor Driesch sometimes speaks of it as responsible for order and arrangement in organic evolution, but, on the other hand, deprecates at other times its being regarded, after the manner of Aristotle, as a force or energy. And yet it is difficult to see how it can dominate matter except by virtue of being a force or energy. As it stands Professor Driesch's " Entelechy " would seem to be simply another name for the process itself. The " Unifying Cause " of Professor Driesch strikes us, most assuredly, as being little more than the hypostasis of the course of the development, to which Professor Driesch gives the name of Entelechy. He himself hints at times doubts as to the validity of his theory. He asks the question (*Problem of Individuality*, p. 80): " Does not our postulating the entelechial predetermination of suprapersonal processes simply mark the limits of our understanding? "

It is clear that the postulation of this entelechial principle as an ultimate doctrine of metaphysic leads to a pallogistic pantheism of a thinly veiled character. For in this case order or the logical is, after all, final in the manner of Hegel, although we might at first sight suppose the contrary. For the entelechy represents, it would appear, for Professor Driesch, the principle of order or the logical itself, and hence when pushed to its ultimate extreme the doctrine, as with other expressions of pallogism, leaves no room for the alogical as a co-ordinate factor in reality. Like the Hegelian *Idee* it stands for a predetermination of the becoming in time, contrary to the phase of Professor Bergson *Dieu se fait*, which implies the introduction of *solvitur ambulando* as a metaphysical principle. This *Deus sive natura* of Bergson is given as undetermined *a parte post*, but as one with his *Durée* in the total process, to which Bergson has given the name of " Creative Evolution " (Evolution Créatrice).

But Professor Driesch, though willing to admit his " wholeness " or the " unifying cause " in metaphysic as a mere matter of speculation and personal belief, depending on the value attributed to the logical principle by the individual thinker, nevertheless, would probably concede that it is not sufficiently established as a principle in nature by biological research as to

justify us in regarding Psycho-Physical Parallelism as a discredited doctrine.

While to have omitted all mention of the problem of which Psycho-Physical Parallelism as the most popular solution might have seemed unjustifiable, nevertheless, any more detailed examination of the problem and of the current hypotheses respecting it, with the elaborate physiological and psychological discussions therein involved, would lie outside the range of the present work. Speaking generally, and in this matter as a layman, the present writer cannot but regard the theory of Psycho-Physical Parallelism, with all its difficulties and apparent insufficiencies, as notwithstanding less unsatisfactory, viewed as a working hypothesis, than any contra doctrine as yet put forward as a solution. That it is vulnerable to the shafts of criticism at many points is undeniable, but whether these weak spots are fatal to the theory as a whole, in whatever way it may be formulated, is by no means so certain. In any case, since the need for envisaging the real world from this point of view in some way or other is an urgent one to the speculative mind, we should hardly be justified in completely throwing overboard an hypothesis which proves serviceable in so many directions, for anything less than a demonstration of its complete untenability on the one hand, or on the other, the establishment of a counter-theory more satisfactory to our speculative intelligence and more serviceable in the working out of psycho-physical results.

CHAPTER IX

SURVEY OF RESULTS

The foregoing pages make no pretensions to embody a new *system* of philosophy, even in outline. None the less, the analysis we have undertaken of the roots of reality has had for its object to furnish results that might serve as stepping-stones to be utilised in the building up, when the time is ripe, of such a philosophic reconstruction. In this chapter we propose to survey as concisely as possible these general results themselves, and thus aid the reader to understand their inter-connection in a way that was not so easy to effect in the course of the analysis itself.

We started with the endeavour to discover certain ultimate postulates, constituting, so to say, the residual certainties arrived at by philosophic thought up to the present time. The ultimate test of certainty or of truth we have defined as the complete self-consistency of consciousness, which is shown in its application when the mere *adequate apprehension* of a problem *carries* with it irresistible assent to the solution offered.[1] We found, firstly, an absolutely unassailable principle at the basis of what is known as Modern Idealism—namely, that conscious experience, possible or actual, embraces all that is or can be; that the postulation of existence independent of consciousness is meaningless, being in fact a self-contradictory absurdity.[2] This,

[1] As illustration of what is said in the text, I may again remind the reader of the statement of G. H. Lewes before referred to, that a friend of his alleged that he could conceive that causation might not obtain in the moon—in other words, that an uncaused event might occur in some, to him unknown, part of the spacial universe. Lewes, as a good Empiricist, naturally quoted this as an argument against the *a priori* nature of the category of causation. The real state of the case, of course, was that Lewes's friend did not really appreciate the problem at all.

[2] The recent so-called refutations of Idealism amount, generally, to its refutation only in the sense of what I have termed in this book Pallogism.

the postulate of Modern Idealism, is really the foundation of all the great constructive systems of metaphysic from Plato downward. Whether explicitly recognised or not, it is the assumption underlying all those systems that have attempted to offer a solution of the larger problem of existence. Starting, then, from this basis, we next sought to discover the ultimate nature of conscious experience. Analysis disclosed to us that consciousness-in-general, no less than any given determination of consciousness as particular object, consists ultimately of a synthesis of two elements or terms in a reciprocal relation. We found further that this relation, constituting a synthetic unity of these two elements, is not, as Hegel would have it, a relation *in vacuo*, a bridge without ends (*cf.* Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*), but that it always presupposes these elements. It is, in other words, not independent, but is always the relation of its terms. The primordial synthesis of consciousness-in-general, which is presupposed in all particular consciousness, we have found to consist in (1) a *that* which feels; (2) a *somewhat* felt, and (3) the reciprocal *relation* termed thought, the reaction

This is notably the case with Mr G. E. Moore's "Refutation of Idealism." which appeared in *Mind* (vol. xii., p. 143 *sqq.*), as was, in fact, pointed out by another writer, Mr C. A. Strong, who criticised it in a subsequent number of the same periodical (vol. xiv., p. 174 *sqq.*). Such would-be refuters of Idealism are fond of emphasising the distinction between the actual *this-ness* of consciousness and its *material content*, which appears in the concrete conscious synthesis as its *other-ness*. The latter is, of course, only the Fichtean *Anstoss* in another guise. But no amount of emphasis, either on the distinction between the concept and the sensible impression—"the permanent possibility of sensation"—nor on that between the immediacy or *this-ness* of apprehension and the potentiality of the content, will carry us a step towards "refuting" that Idealism that proclaims consciousness-in-general, possible and actual, for the final and most comprehensive term to which reality can be reduced. A distinction is sometimes made between the epistemological assertion that we know nothing but "conscious states" and the metaphysical assertion, as it is termed, that the external world exists merely as modifications of consciousness. When closely viewed this objection will be seen to be invalid, and this for the simple reason that, Idealism once admitted as epistemological postulate, the attempt to rehabilitate realism as a bare metaphysical possibility is meaningless. That which, if admitted at all, is *ex-hypothesi* incapable of entering into any possible experience clearly cannot exist for any system of possible experience. It is for such a system a nonentity. If its existence cannot be shown to be involved in the self-consistency of consciousness, it is nothing at all. The assertion of the *bare possibility* is merely *formal* and illusory. It has no *real* validity.

of the former on the latter, and *vice versa*. Treating the interaction of the two basic elements in this primordial synthesis as itself an element, we find that the analysis of consciousness gives us in the last resort three elements. But if we examine the matter more nearly, we further find that they resolve themselves into the first element mentioned—namely, into the *that* which feels, or the ego which *becomes* conscious. For the second element, the *somewhat* felt, is seen to be no more than the projection or inversion of the feeling ego. It has no meaning save as a determination of a conscious subject.[1]

Taking consciousness in its primary synthesis, as above disclosed, we can distinguish clearly the first two elements from the third, the terms related from the relation—feeling, sensating, immediacy, from the thought, the essence of which is relation pure and simple. In this way we arrived at the antithesis of alogical and logical as at once the deepest and most wide-reaching antithesis in conscious experience. This antithesis, it is necessary to bear in mind, in no sense amounts to a dualism as implying mutual independence of its terms. It is an antithesis *within* the synthetic unity of conscious experience itself. The very relating activity, the outcome of which is the thought-form, is the activity of the Subject of consciousness itself, while it is only relatively and not absolutely distinct from the discrimination of agreement and difference within the region of feltness or of objective sensation (*cf.* p. 201).

This antithesis of alogical and logical, having its ground in the elements at the root of all consciousness, can be traced throughout the whole system of experience—*i.e.* in every phase of reality. We have been able to distinguish four main modes in which the antithesis manifests itself—namely, *particular and universal, being and appearance, infinite and finite, and chance and law*. There are countless minor antitheses, but these are

[1] In the course of the foregoing discussion the objections raised by modern thinkers to the recognition of a primary ego or subject have been answered, especially Dr Bradley's contention, that the ego is a subsequent construction within consciousness, has been indicated as resting on a *hysteron proteron*. He is confounding, as we maintain, the ego in its "second intention," as concept, with the ego as primary *datum*. The ego as philosophic concept may be even a very late construction, but this does not alter the fact that all consciousness presupposes ego in the former sense.

either deducible from one or other of the above four pairs, or, if not, from some sort of cross-union between two or more of them. We have found that the particular itself has an *intensive* or *qualitative* and an *extensive* or *quantitative* character. As intensive, particularity is identical with the *this-ness* of intuition —with the absolute self-centred uniqueness of the content of any given moment of actual consciousness. The *this-ness* or *self-centredness* of the particular, in this qualitative aspect, is absolute *per se* and knows no limit. The particular, as " this thing," seems as if it could never shrink into itself enough—so absolute is its uniqueness. But there is another aspect of particularity—that is, its aspect as *infinite repetition* in time and space. Thus, in this sense, the time-honoured antithesis of the one and the many is itself contained within the mode of the Alogical termed Particularity. This second or quantitative character of the particular already touches the antithetic mode—namely, the universal. Just as the particular is through and through alogical, so the universal is through and through logical. The logical universal embraces three forms, the class-name, the abstract quality, and the relation pure and simple. The universal as class-name, while descending in countless gradations, never reaches the concrete, for the simple reason that however it may come down towards the concrete it always remains universal and hence abstract ; it never touches the particular. The second form of the logical universal, quality *per se*, is quite obviously an abstraction—in fact, in some respects the type of abstraction. The third form, the relation-universal, is the basis of those concept-forms termed categories in the technical sense, as entering into the construction of sensible experience itself, the Kantian and Hegelian categories, etc.

The second modal antithesis of the alogical and logical referred to—namely, that of being and appearance—so important for speculative thought, is the subject of much confusion in philosophy. The word " being " is sometimes used as synonymous with reality and sometimes not. I have defined " being," in the sense in which I use the word, as meaning merely the *that* in the object in contradistinction to the *what*. The *that* in the object is alogical ; the *what* involves some form of relation.

Hence I distinguish between being and existence. The term existence, by which I understand the synthesis of being and appearance, is therefore equivalent to the term reality. Being, I have pointed out, when analysed means subjectivity. Thus, when we say that a thing *is*, when we use the verb-substantive not merely as the grammatical copula but as affirming *being* of an object, we thereby impute the principle of subjectivity to this object—that is, we impute thereto an *ego-noumenon*. This is interesting in its bearing on the Materialism of modern science, which would attribute a "subjective side" to all matter. The reference in this connection to physical substance as "blind unconscious matter" opens up a further point of interest to the philosophic thinker—namely, the distinction between the *un*-conscious and the *extra*-conscious. Consciousness and unconsciousness in this connection are both within the realm of subjectivity—that is, of *possible* consciousness. In so far as we postulate being of a stone, we assume the possibility of consciousness as inherent in the stone; in other words, although we may assume the stone to be *un*-conscious, we do not assume it to be *extra*-conscious. An abstraction alone is extra-conscious in this sense. Justice, beauty, weight, height, ideal mathematical constructions have no subjectivity imputed to them. They have no *being*; they are conceived of as *per se* extra-conscious.

The third mode of the alogical and logical is represented by the antithetic elements of infinite and finite. Infinity always falls to the side of the alogical. I am aware, of course, of the distinction drawn between the "true" and the "false" infinite, the former being applied from Plato downwards, to the universal concept, the latter to the manifold of sense. But, if closely viewed, the infinity attributed to the logical universal, whether hypostatised as the Platonic idea or otherwise, will be found to fall, strictly speaking, not to the logical concept itself, but to the "limitless repetition of instances" that it covers. This means, of course, that the infinity properly falls to the particular. The logical universal, as such, is necessarily a formal principle of limitation—*i.e.* of finitude. It is *con*notation, not *de*notation, to use the old logical expressions. It *ex*cludes, by the very fact of its *in*cluding. Hence it is

clearly *per se*, not infinite, and infinity can only be predicated of the potentiality of instances falling under it. I am also not-unaware of Professor Royce's theory of the infinity of a " self representative system," as based upon the number-series, of Dedekind's " Kette," etc. But I am unable, after careful perusal of Royce's argument as stated in *The World and the Individual* (vol. i. Appendix), to see that he makes out his case for regarding his so-called self-representative system as anything else than a special instance of the potential repetition to infinity of quantitative particularity (*cf. supra*, Chapter III., note on Infinity, at end). I contend for the acceptance of the word infinite as far as possible in accordance with current usage—that is, as unending continuance in time, space, or both.

The most popular and sensational of the four chief pairs of modes into which the cardinal antithesis of alogical and logical falls is that of chance and law. This is, perhaps, the solitary instance in which the theory of Pallogism has entered into popular thought. We constantly hear the pseudo-philosophic *dictum* from the " half-baked " man of culture, or even from the " man-in-the-street," that there is no such thing as chance in the world, the term chance merely being a word denoting our ignorance. It is unnecessary here to repeat the detailed discussion, in which I have shown the fallacy of this point of view (see pp. 79-89). Suffice it to say that the theory in question would eliminate the whole *material* element in the processes of the real world, with all that it contributes to the total result, and reduce that result to the expression of a formal abstraction. The reality and life of the changing world would be converted into a barren abstract formula for an applied category.

Let us now turn for a moment to the most popular and historically important form of the opposite fallacy to that which we have just been considering. The doctrine known as " Empiricism " or " Associationalism " has at the present time so few defenders within the inner circles of philosophical thinkers that the attempt to criticise it may seem to many like flogging a dead horse. But, if dead within the inner circles of philosophy, it is by no means quite dead in the thought of the

average cultured man. It still, consciously or unconsciously, influences his judgments in matters bearing on philosophy and pervades much of the popular literature of the day in such matters. It may, therefore, be as well to point out once more, in relation to the positions forming the basis of the present work, the fundamental fallacy underlying the associational standpoint. The associational psychologists or empirical philosophers (according as we may choose to call them) [1] postulate under one formula or another, that the external perception is a positive given *somewhat*, accruing to the individual mind from without, apart from the co-operation of any conscious activity. Their cardinal distinction is between the perceived object and the mental concept, based on the scholastic formula, *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu fuerit.* Their position was therefore, *au fond*, that of Dualism. The "impressions and ideas" of Hume were interpreted in the sense of perceptions and notions. The first were the source of truth, science, and intellectual soundness; the second of error, metaphysics, and intellectual rottenness. The notions of the mind were compounded of the memory and association of external perceptions. The external sense-perception was the solid, true, and real particular; the mental concept was the false, fleeting, and illusory universal. But the empiricist did not see, in making the foregoing assumption, that the sense-perception, constituting the eternal object for him, was itself neither a simple particular nor a simple sense-impression, but a synthesis of particular and universal, of sensation and thought. The content of any external perception, this desk, for instance, is not a mere sensation, not even a mere sensation of *other-ness* (*Ansloss*), but as completed object it involves a definite synthesis. The undifferentiated "bundle" of sensations at the basis of my perception of this desk have to be subsumed under certain apperceptive syntheses or categories—*e.g.* the relation of substance-accident, existence in space, relationship to and differentiation from other objects, possible or actual, in the

[1] It is scarcely necessary to remind the reader that this school claims descent from Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, through Reid and the Scottish school, and has been represented in recent times by Mill and his nominal opponent, Hamilton, by Bain, Lewes, and also, in the main, by Herbert Spencer, Taine, Comte, and *epigoni* too numerous to mention, of the nineteenth century.

same space, etc., before the desk is constituted for consciousness as perceived object. When once this is recognised, it becomes evident that the elaborately constructed house of cards, by which a mere law of empirical psychology is made to do duty for a theory of knowledge, falls to pieces at the touch of criticism. It is seen that the distinction, paraded with so much pomp and circumstance, between sense-object and mental concept has not, after all, quite that cardinal importance that the Associational school gives to it—that the sense-perception, as constituting object, already contains a thought-element, that it is no mere uncategorised sensation (sense-impression).

It is similar with the distinction between particular and universal in this connection, by which the sense-perception is lauded as the safe and sane particular as against the vain and unreliable universal. Here also, of course, and on the same grounds, an accurate analysis shows the barest perception of the sense-object to be already a synthesis of particular and universal. These Mid-Victorian British empiricists represent, in a manner, the antithetic counterpart to the pallogists of the orthodox Hegelian right and its offshoots. While the pallogist would resolve the real world into thought-universals, the empiricist would resolve it into sense-particulars. In so doing they alike abolish the synthesis in which alone reality consists. The sense-particular *per se* in which the empiricist thinks he finds the only genuine reality is, in truth, no more reality, *per se*, than is the logical universal so much despised by him. The real, the object, necessarily implies a union in synthesis of both elements. The truth at the back of Empiricism is simply to be found in the confused recognition of the genetic priority of the alogical over the logical. But this element of truth in the empiricist's position the empiricist himself has succeeded in travestying beyond all recognition. The notion that sense without thought can furnish reality is not a whit less absurd than the notion against which the empiricist inveighs that thought without sense can furnish reality. He is further led into confusion and his whole statement vitiated, as already shown, by his confining the notion of thought to the mental concept of reproductive thought, to the neglect of the thought element in perception itself. All this Kant might have taught

him, if he had but studied the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* with understanding.

When we use the word *process* in a philosophical connection, we do not necessarily mean a process involving a time-series, but an organic or systematic order of elements going to make up a definite synthesis. In this sense I have pointed out that there is no break, no *hiatus*, in the system of articulations constituting the conscious process. At each stage we find the absoluteness of the alogical elements therein being sucked up and metamorphosed by the relativeness of thought-activity. We see that the individual consciousness, the personal ego or mind, presupposes a process substantially identical with that which is proceeding on its own psychological plane, as being already complete, and, from *its* point of view, as it were ready-made. This consciousness which the individual mind presupposes, we may—if we do not fear the small wit of the Philistine—term a timeless transcendental process. Of this process, we have pointed out, the activity of the individual mind is but the continuation. We have also further shown that we have no reason for assuming any finality in the order of the conscious process as we know it.[1] On the contrary, we have given grounds for thinking that, as realised in organic and psychical evolution in time, we may assume the possibility of a mode of consciousness whose " organ " should be a sociological or super-organic system based on the human individual as its unit, just as the human individual itself is based on the organic cell as *its* unit.

In connection with the analysis of the individual consciousness, I have pointed out that self-identity simply means the unbroken continuity of a personal memory-synthesis, and this again means the extension of the moment of immediacy, of *this-ness*, in time. The word " self " or " personality " is very often used as meaning the character and disposition (*i.e.* the concrete sum of tendencies) as well as the particular experience-content, associated with a given memory-synthesis. Thus,

[1] The complete synthesis spoken of, I may remind the reader, does not necessarily imply a finality, but may in its turn be looked upon as element in a more advanced synthesis. Its completeness may well be conceived as relative rather than as absolute.

represented by the same human body, as their instrument, you may have various and even contradictory dispositions of character, or " selves," if we like to use this term for them. For example, the personality or self under strong emotion, or during insanity, or in drink, is different from the average self, and yet those varying selves are clearly bound up in the same memory-synthesis. More than this, if we trust the accuracy of results alleged to have been obtained by recent scientific investigators of hypnotism, it would seem that the same objective side—to wit, the human body—which we are accustomed to regard as representing *one* memory-synthesis to the exclusion of all others, may possibly, under exceptional conditions, do duty for more than one. However, this subject—for the present, at least—is in too inchoate a stage of elucidation to be fit for treatment as a part of general scientific psychology.

The antitheses material and formal, potential and actual, are nearly, although not quite, coincident with the antithesis of alogical and logical. The pallogist, just as he hypostatises the logical at the expense of the alogical, hypostatises the actual at the expense of the potential, and form at the expense of matter.[1] That he should do so is only to be expected, for the fallacy of abstraction which he commits is at basis the same in both cases. Yet the attempt to argue away one side of these antitheses would seem to be irresistible to many constructive thinkers. I have shown in Chapter V. that the purely negative value that philosophers have been wont to ascribe to the first of the antithetical terms in question is explained by their priority of value, metaphysically, for which reason the said terms are mainly expressible, in the language of reflective

[1] In the course of our investigations we have had occasion to discuss the system of Pallogism generally, as embodied in the philosophy of Hegel, its greatest representative. It may be added here that the attempt sometimes made to show that Hegel was *au fond* not a pallogist by citing his remark that the " logic " was a " realm of shadows " is really no disproof of his Pallogism. Hegel said, in effect : " In the *logic* I only give you the skeleton of the system of reality—not that the filling-in of the picture, the flesh and blood of the skeleton, consists of something other than categories, consists of something essentially different from the skeleton ; it is only a continuation of the same process, the generation of subordinate categories in an indefinite gradation." But for Hegel the alogical, the particular, does not exist *as such*.

thought, and *a fortiori* in that of philosophy, by negatives. The philosophers in question cannot see that these negative-seeming terms connote a positive element—an element constituting the root and pre-supposition of the logical, the formal, and the actual. They are the *warp* which the " eternal loom of time " weaves into reality. To take an instance from the potential and the actual (Aristotle's antithesis, for most purposes identifiable with his other antithesis of matter and form). The actuality of any given moment of consciousness is the smallest part of the total content of that moment. As I write at the present time, what is *actual* to my consciousness is limited to the pigeon-holes of the writing-desk before me, but I am *potentially* conscious of the whole room, nay, of a whole world outside. But for the practically infinite range of this potential consciousness the mere actuality of the pigeon-holes of the desk before me would have no significance. It is as the actual sign or phenomenon of a potentially objective real outside themselves that they possess significance for me. The same with every moment of consciousness ; the *actual* side only possesses value or meaning as a token of the vast *potentiality* beyond itself.

There are three chief senses in which the term reality is used. First of all, we have the ordinary empirical sense of the " man-in-the street," that reality which is dominated by the common-sense consciousness and its categories. Secondly, we have the acceptation specially consecrated by Mr Bradley in his *Appearance and Reality*, although often employed before—namely, as the highest possible unfolding or perfection of the essence of a thing, or *a fortiori* of concrete consciousness throughout its entire range. The third sense of the word reality is that largely employed in this book, and is exclusively philosophical—namely, that of a synthesis of elements to constitute a unity other than themselves. Such a synthesis is, as I have repeatedly insisted upon in the present work, clearly not reducible to less than two antithetic terms without ceasing at once to be a synthesis, and therefore becoming a mere abstraction having no connection with reality. This, when stated in so many words, may seem a platitude, but, if it be so, there are few platitudes the insistence upon which is more necessary in view of the fallacies that its neglect has engendered. The synthesis of reality, viewed as a

whole, either as a relative whole (as any special reality), or as an absolute whole, as conscious experience throughout its entire range, implies an articulated system of syntheses, each involving its own antithesis. The aim of philosophic analysis is to ascertain the ultimate and most comprehensive antithesis discoverable in conscious experience, a cardinal antithesis to which all other antitheses may be reduced. This we have found to be the antithesis of the alogical and logical. If our analysis be correct, it would appear that the category, using the word in its epistemological—*i.e.* Kantian and post-Kantian—sense, as the thought-element involved in the reality of common-sense perception, is itself derivative from antithetic elements more deep-lying than itself. For example, in Chapter III. we have shown that the salient category of cause and effect is itself one element of an antithesis of which chance is the other, and that this antithesis itself is but a mode of the antithesis of the alogical and logical that lies at the root of all consciousness.

Pallogistic systems of theory-of-knowledge and metaphysic have ignored the alogical side of reality. Their authors have been led by the fact that philosophy means a formulation in the terms of reflective thought, and by the fact that the medium of reflective thought, as such, is necessarily the logical universal, into assuming that knowledge generally, and especially that purest form of knowledge represented by philosophic speculation, can never be concerned with aught but logical forms; that the alogical (sensation, will, being, agency, *thisness*) must inevitably be excluded from its domain. They ignore the fact that though the alogical, it is true, cannot be *expressed* in the concepts of reflective thought, yet it can nevertheless be *indicated* in the concept-form. The true concept is the expression of a relation between terms, and though the terms themselves cannot be expressed in the way the relation between them is expressed, yet they can undoubtedly be indicated conceptually in the form, as it were, of a symbol. This is the case whenever we think or speak of an abstract quality or sensation. The general terms used by abstract thought to express alogicals do not really express them at all, but merely indicate them. Unlike universals proper, they express nothing. The "universal" as class-name expresses definite relations amongst

an assemblage of qualities. A category (in the Kantian sense), such as cause, expresses a pure relation *per se*. But when it comes to the ultimate termini of these relations, reflective thought, whose medium is necessarily the universal thought-form or concept, can only get at them, so to speak, by means of a concept through which they are more or less arbitrarily symbolised. Reflective thought, however, can and does effect this, and hence the possibility of recognising the alogical in the psuedo-concept that represents it in reflection, and hence again the possibility of its inclusion in a philosophical formula.

Reflective thought, as represented in its highest manifestation, as philosophy, is not the only form in which empirical consciousness becomes translated, acquiring a higher value. In the art-consciousness we have this takes place under the form of sense-perception, with its standard of beauty, and in the ethical consciousness under the forms of emotion, represented by social sympathy (human love), with its standard of goodness. In both these cases, no less than in the philosophical consciousness, with its standard of truth, alike the ultimate test and the ultimate goal is the same—namely, the self-consistency, the harmony, of consciousness-in-general with itself. In all three cases, moreover, the ultimate appeal is to immediacy, to feeling. It might be supposed at first sight that, whatever might be the case with æsthetic beauty or moral goodness, philosophical truth at least had logical reason for its final arbiter. Such is, however, not quite the case. If we consider the matter closely, we shall see that the conviction of the truth of a given philosophical formulation, or, in other words, the conviction of the adequacy of the formulation as expressing in the terms of abstract thought the self-consistency of consciousness, rests in the last resort upon feeling—namely, the feeling of intellectual satisfaction it affords. Hence here also, no less than in the sphere of art or ethics, we are forced back upon the bedrock of the alogical as our ultimate arbiter.

The disengagement of the mere many-ness of the world from the essence of its reality is the main task of human culture, whether as philosophy, art, or ethics.[1] Quantitative particu-

[1] It may be noticed here that I have given no special place to the so-called religious consciousness. I have not done so, since there is nothing in any form

larity is the enemy against which the higher consciousness in all its forms is waging incessant warfare. This point has been dealt with in Chapter VI., as regards philosophy (including, of course, in this connection, science), art, and ethics. In the same chapter we have dealt exhaustively with the question of the ultimacy of the alogical above alluded to. The very important fact of the unique *thisness* (immediacy) of the ultimate judgment in philosophical, æsthetic, and ethical matters, as opposed to the "commonness," the necessity of assent for all men, attaching to the judgments of the ordinary empirical consciousness, will also be found discussed in that chapter. As regards this, the "Pragmatists" would probably maintain that the distinction between the two orders of judgments was based upon practical sanction; that the needs of existence up to date had produced the "object common to all," about which all men *must* be substantially agreed, and that this was not the case with the judgments of æsthetics or ethics, or at least not in the same degree. We have already discussed the validity of this point of view at the opening of Chapter VII., and so need not enter into it again here.

We have seen that historically, from the period when civilisation began to break down the group-society of early man, the tendency has been towards what I term the mystical ideal—towards conceiving the *telos* as a direct relation between the finite soul of the individual and the infinite world-consciousness. With early man, on the contrary, the supreme end presented itself in the form of a glorious life of clan, tribe, or people, conceived as a continuity of deified ancestors, existing tribesmen, and their descendants. In the thought of this state of society the individual only had a meaning in so far as he represented the collectivity to which he belonged. In other words, the ideal of the *telos* of life for early man was a social and not a personal ideal. This view continued more or less dominant

of the religious consciousness that cannot be reduced to a combination of factors derived from the æsthetic or ethical consciousness respectively. The values of these latter in their highest potency as referable to the *telos* of existence give us the whole content of the religious consciousness. The expression "religious consciousness" may be justifiable as denoting the highest potency above referred to, but this has fallen to be dealt with in its proper place, notably Chapter VII., although under other headings.

during the earlier stages of civilisation, and hence the ancient world generally is largely coloured by it. The former view, on the contrary, is most fully expressed in what are known as the great ethical religions, as well as in those various cults that arose in the later period of ancient civilisation. Under the form of Christianity it has dominated Western culture up to recent times, and nominally does so still.

But we see to-day another conception of the world-destiny gradually supplanting the individualist-introspective one. We see a new conviction becoming stronger and manifesting itself, implicitly where not explicitly, in various ways. This view no longer finds the solution of the *telos* in a direct relation of the individual consciousness to a world-principle, but comes to regard it as realisable only as the resultant of a long process of social development, in which the individual as such plays a secondary rôle. With this conviction is connected a doubt as to the possibility of arriving at an adequate theoretical formula for the *summum bonum* at all. The latter view, like the former, seems to us a sign of progress, for it is clear that to be able to state the world-purpose within the limits of any formula must imply the notion of finality as attaching thereto. But, as we have pointed out, happiness, if not *per se* the *telos* itself, is at least so *per aliud—i.e.* it must necessarily enter as integral element into any life-purpose or world-purpose conceivable. Now happiness, to endure as happiness, we have seen, cannot be a finality ; it cannot be something fixed once for all and unchanging. What applies to happiness as element of the *telos* applies also to the *telos* itself, viewed as concrete, and to the Absolute, of which it may be conceived as the highest expression.

Happiness, though not the whole purpose comprised in the *telos*, is nevertheless so integral a part of it that it may well be taken as the touchstone of progress, understanding thereby movement towards the *telos*. In this way happiness (pleasure) becomes practically identified with good, and its contrary unhappiness (pain) with evil, the first term being applied to all that makes for the *telos* and the second to all that hinders its realisation. In this connection we have found that there is a special dialectic of good and evil (pleasure and pain). All good or all evil that has become incarnate in the time-process, that

has become particularised as this good thing or this evil thing, in so doing puts on the vesture of mortality. It makes its appearance with its own death-warrant written upon it. For it then belongs to the essence of the time-content. Now it is the deepest principle of the time-content that all that begins therein must also end therein; what arises in time must also perish in time. "There is nothing that comes into being but ceases to be," says Herakleitos of Ephesus. But it might be said that, if realised good and realised evil are, by the very fact of their being realised, alike involved in the same condemnation, the best we can claim is that the one has no advantage over the other. A nearer consideration of the process, however, shows us that this is not the case; there is a difference between the two. As we have pointed out (pp. 188-192), concrete "evil" appears as the beginning or first term of a given cycle of the time-process, whilst the "good" appears as the termination, as the goal or completion of the process. The "good" attained in the elimination or transformation of the specific "evil" discloses itself as the goal and purpose of the cycle in question. But if this be so, it is clear that all concrete "evil" issues in concrete "good" and not conversely. It is, nevertheless, further true that out of this realised "good" a new "evil," differing in character from the previous one, begins soon to body itself forth. The new "evil" becomes realised, in its turn, as a definite evil thing (institution, etc). It becomes particularised and the same process begins anew. But each time that the "good" is realised and the "evil" eliminated or transformed there is a positive gain. In the moment of realisation there is a positive increment of "good" gained at the expense of "evil," of happiness at the expense of its opposite.

The antithesis of "good" and "evil" lies deep down in the nature of reality itself, viewed in its pragmatic aspect, and, it would seem, cannot be got rid of without abolishing reality. The most we can predicate as the result of our analysis is a progressive approximation towards the "good." In the same way our analysis of the conditions of reality as knowledge leads us to postulate a progressive absorption or transformation of the alogical by the logical, of matter by form, of the potential by the actual, without, nevertheless, our being able to conceive

a point at which this process is completed—a point at which the alogical (or the material or the potential) element has vanished. As we have often said, the moment we have postulated this, we have left reality and sought refuge in an abstraction.

We have, in the main and with one or two exceptions only, been concerned in the foregoing pages with a strictly scientific analysis of the conditions of the real, or, which is the same thing, of conscious experience potential and actual. There are, however, problems raised and indeed forced upon us by this very analysis that go beyond the analysis itself, and are essentially speculative in their character.

Meanwhile, we may remind the reader that the present work makes no pretension even to a complete analysis of all questions arising out of the conditions of reality themselves. For example, the question of qualitative difference in sensation has scarcely been touched upon. This would naturally lead to a consideration of distinction of quality as obtaining in the alogical generally. Distinction of quality is the special formative aspect of the alogical *per se*. The alogical—*e.g.* as sensation, though in its relation to the total synthesis of reality it falls in general to the side of matter, just as the logical falls to the side of form—nevertheless possesses *per se* in its character of simple element, a formal aspect. This is an interesting point and one well worthy of detailed elucidation. The differentiation of mere homogeneous sensation into the widest qualitative distinctions—distinctions that cannot be referred to any logical relation, but are apparently inherent in the sense element itself—is a significant subject, upon which, doubtless, much remains yet to be written. Similarly, there are many other questions, especially on the border-land between psychology and theory of knowledge or metaphysic, which we have not dealt with or only lightly touched upon. Our object has been to offer suggestions for a future systematic philosophical construction and not to elaborate any completed system.

One point, I think, the foregoing chapters have made clear, and that is not merely that the alogical has a certain genetic priority over the logical, but that the driving force of all process in reality resides in the alogical—in sensation, in feeling, in will, and not in reason or pure thought-activity. In the actual

course of evolution in time, though we find indeed, viewed in its broader issues, a progression according to law, yet the actual originating force of change in time, we discover in the spontaneity of the particular. It was in the freak-individual that Darwin saw the prime factor in the differentiation of species. Again, in historical development, though we can discern certain categories or laws, under which social change takes place, when we view the matter abstractly ; yet, taken in the concrete, the actual happening, and its initiation, is always due to the actions and passions of individuals and social groups.

In dealing with the individual consciousness, it has been pointed out that there is no discontinuity, no hiatus, between the fundamental conscious process presupposed in consciousness-in-general and this individual consciousness itself. Hence there is no hard and fast line dividing the several departments of philosophy from one another—*e.g.* metaphysics from theory of knowledge (epistemology) or theory of knowledge from psychology (*i.e.* from psychology in its philosophical aspect, as opposed to psychology in its relation to physiology). In the same chapter (Chapter IV.) in which the individual consciousness is discussed, we have also considered the question at the basis of all Mysticism, and even of all ethical practice—namely, the reaching-out of the individual to a realisation of self outside the empirical self actually given. We have discussed this as regards the possible transcendence of the empirical self in a Divine personality, and also, supposing any metaphysical hypothesis of this sort to be rejected as unsatisfactory, we have dealt with the hypothesis of a transcendental-sociological entity as the objective of the realisability of the existing human personality.

The highly important distinction between reality and truth has been sufficiently dealt with as throwing light on various problems of knowledge. The analysis of this leads up to a general discussion of the higher consciousness in its three aspects —philosophic, æsthetic, and ethical. The higher consciousness, as being concerned primarily with values, opens up a different world or, if one will, three worlds, all alike differing from the world which they presuppose and on which they are based—namely, the world of common-sense consciousness and of science,

at least in their lower and more partial aspects. The value-judgment in all three worlds we have shown to have an alogical foundation—that is, it is based on something outside reason, outside thought and the processes of thought—it is based on immediacy, on apprehension, on the intuitiveness, the *thisness*, of feeling, and on will-impulse—(feeling being static will, and will dynamic feeling). This applies even to that which, as a whole, is specially the realm of the logical—namely, philosophic truth. Even this presupposes axioms and postulates that reason is incapable of establishing, notwithstanding that it assumes them in all its operations as the material with which it works. Hence even truth is grounded in the alogical. Still more obviously may this be seen in the case of æsthetic and ethical value-judgments, in all of which the alogical clearly predominates. By no ratiocinative process can you prove a thing to be beautiful. Immediate feeling is the first and last court of appeal. You may, of course, formulate on the basis of this feeling canons of taste which serve to represent it in thought, and thus generalise it. In this way you may bring a certain logical consistency into the realm of æsthetic values, but the alogical asserts its primacy everywhere throughout the world of æsthetic judgment.

In moral judgments the alogical root is, if anything, still more plain, but the alogical root in moral judgments is different from the alogical root in æsthetic judgments, as both are disparate from the pre-eminently logical value-judgments of philosophic truth. The aim of philosophy is to transmute the immediacy of reality into logical constructions or truths. The function of art is to transmute the pleasure-pain element in the perception of reality into what we call beauty, or, at least, into that which excites æsthetic emotion. The goal of ethics is again the transmutation of conduct in accordance with a standard or ideal itself based on immediate feeling, and hence on the alogical, akin in some respects to the æsthetic value-standard, but totally alien to the philosophical. This last point is seldom recognised.[1]

[1] As illustration may be taken the following fact. In a historical work published some years ago by the present writer, an ethical judgment was ventured upon to the effect of describing Prince-Bishop Waldeck, on the

We have asked the question, what are the most comprehensive terms in which we can, if not define, at least indicate, the goal of reality and *a fortiori* of human life. Can this enter the empirical consciousness in a flash of immediate feeling? Is this, the solution of Mysticism, the right one? Or can we learn anything concerning the *telos* by an analysis through reasoned reflection, of means, end, purpose and happiness? Or must we again accept the attitude of pure Scepticism or Agnosticism and renounce all attempt at any solution? To do so would seem like burking the most vital of all matters—that of the ultimate meaning and value of consciousness. If we do attempt to analyse the conditions of this problem, we are confronted with the questions how far all purpose is the exclusive appanage of an individual consciousness, of the relation of happiness to the *telos*, and of the possible nature of the *telos* generally.

The groups of problems to which the consideration of the *telos* of human life and all existence, gives rise, have been already discussed. It has been shown that in these ultimate questions of will and of feeling, human thought has been equally under

ground of the barbarities committed on his fallen Anabaptist foes, as a "monster." In a criticism on the work in question, an evening organ of cultured Liberalism took the author to task for not recognising that it was "unphilosophical" to describe prince-bishops as monsters. The reviewer was evidently unaware of the naïve crudity of his criticism. Apart from the fact that the same organ would probably have no philosophical scruples in stigmatising some bomb-throwing anarchist as a monster, the absurdity of expecting an ethical judgment to be philosophical needs no demonstration here. An ethical judgment, by the very fact of its being such, must necessarily be non-philosophical. Philosophy means, as we know, the reduction of reality to logical terms, while every ethical judgment, as such, is pre-eminently alogical. The attempt to make a philosophical judgment ethical, or an ethical judgment philosophical, is to misconceive entirely the meaning of both the one and the other. In ethics, as in æsthetics, the predominant note is alogical. Philosophy, in its judgments of actions, knows no praise or blame; or if it praises or blames it does so merely, so to say, mechanically, as a cold corollary from certain rules with which it starts. Ethical judgments, on the other hand, are exclusively concerned with praise or blame as dictated by the alogical feeling-element in the ethical consciousness—indignation, admiration, etc. To *comment* upon an ethical judgment, therefore, that it is "unphilosophical" is to propound a truism. To *reproach* an ethical judgment for not being philosophical indicates a critic in the very last stage of muddle-headedness. Ethical judgments and philosophical judgments are doubtless alike excellent things, but to blame one for not being the other is about as unreasonable as to blame a raven for not having the voice of a turtle-dove.

the ban of hypostatised abstraction as in that of theory-of-knowledge and of metaphysic. It has been shown that the *telos* must be a synthesis and that not even its most salient element, not even happiness itself, as undetermined abstraction, represents the *telos*, conceived as realisable. The elucidation of this point has involved a criticism of the religious ideals of the world hitherto obtaining, as well as a criticism of Pessimism considered as a philosophical theory. The issue of this has been to show that Pessimism, no less than Optimism, implies an abstract and one-sided view of the dynamic of progress, a view, moreover, which professedly bases itself upon generalisations drawn from manifestly insufficient data. Reflection on the unfolding of reality in the time-series shows us a perpetual passing away of evil and a continuous realisation of good, and although in a sense the converse is also true, yet there is an essential difference between the two cases, inasmuch as good, and not evil, constitutes the end of every dialectical cycle, through which the process of reality, considered in its relation to good and evil, works. The complete attainment of a *summum bonum*, the exhaustion of all possibilities of the good in all or in any of its aspects in any realised *now*, must appear, in the light of our reflective consciousness, as a chimera. The infinite and eternal approximation to this, however, is no chimera, but an assumption involved in the self-consistency of consciousness itself. This infinite process, conceived as a realisation in time, cannot be regarded as in reality circular, as returning in upon itself. Its infinity is that of a forward movement. Each cycle may return up to a certain point upon itself, in so far as it obtains a richer content than it had at the beginning, a content upon a higher plane, but with the general movement, conceived as infinite, this is not the case. It is this alogical notion of infinity that gives us the only clue out of the labyrinth of the whence and the whither.[1]

[1] Cosmological theories of world-process often halt and become meaningless through a refusal to introduce the notion of infinity. Thus Herbert Spencer, like many other physicists, seems to have regarded the universe as a rounded-off whole in space, as a determinate sum of matter in motion. Then, again, in Spencer's conception, the great evolutionary process of this universe in time has a determinate beginning and a determinate ending, and thus, since it is finite in space, its infinity in time becomes merely formal, consisting in

If there be one thing that we must learn to give up, it is the notion of finality. Yet eternal process can never be formulated in thought. It can be dimly apprehended in feeling, that is all. The notion of direction, of tendency, must take the place of that of complete actualisation. Full realisation is not for us, even as ideal, in that stadium of consciousness in which we, finite individuals, with an animal-body basis, live, and move, and have our being. The suggestions given us by our higher consciousness, with its ideal values, of a "something beyond," must for us ever remain merely glimpses of possibilities, passing echoes, indicating direction. These should never seduce us into futile attempts at a dogmatic construction of the nature of the final goal of all things. So far as this goal is concerned, for us at least, beyond these passing echoes, "the rest is silence."

the never-ending recurrence of the same process, a process which, although its successive steps might take æons to accomplish themselves, nevertheless, as already said, has definite and, in a sense, absolute termini *a quo* and *ad quem*. This stagnation and somewhat banal result of the Spencerian cosmology is only to be avoided by the assumption, to which, in the last resort, we are really driven by the necessities of thought, of an infinity of such world-systems in space, inter-connected with each other, corresponding to the diversity of bodies existing within each such system—systems occupying infinite space and evolving throughout eternal time. In this way, any process of evolution as given will never repeat itself *merely*, but will always be determined by systems *outside* itself, just as, in our own cosmos, the evolution of individual bodies is determined by, and dependent on, the evolution of bodies outside themselves and in the last resort determined by the whole of the special cosmic system into which they enter.

APPENDIX

Since *The Roots of Reality* was published, Mr Bernard Bosanquet's work, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, has appeared. This work may be taken as typical of much English philosophical writing of a certain academical school of the present day. There is much, of course, that is interesting and stimulating to thought in the work in question, as in many other works of a similar kind. If one might make a general criticism of current academic philosophical literature, one would point out that one observes a strong tendency in all such writing to the multiplication of words and special literary terms of phrase. The purely philosophical interest seems in a large measure subordinated to the purely literary. Mr Bosanquet, like Mr Bradley, seems to hold to the doctrine of an eternal actual Absolute into which the individual enters. This Absolute always appears as something statically complete in which, as such, there is no development, no becoming. Now this question of the Absolute has been so persistently discussed by recent English thinkers, and the views of Bergson and others have such an important bearing on it, that even at the risk of repetition I must ask the reader's forbearance for some further remarks on the subject. As Mr Bosanquet in Lecture VI. urges: "the approximation of self-consciousness to an absolute experience must be determined by two well-known phases of experience—contradiction and a negativity which survives in the satisfaction felt in the solution of the contradiction."

This, he maintains, points to the conclusion that a perfect experience maintains the positive sense of the self as something which continually passes out of and regains itself. With Mr Bosanquet as with others of the modern school of those who have come out of the neo-Hegelian movement, strong emphasis is laid on the truth, properly speaking, that reality does not obtain short of the Absolute, and that the Absolute embraces the complete synthesis of all reality. This is a position which

modern writers on philosophy are never tired of pressing home. In doing so they sometimes neglect the analysis, such as we find in Kant and Fichte, of the "weak and beggarly elements" (so to say) discoverable at the foundation of all consciousness, which elements nevertheless furnish the clue to the whole dynamic movement of experience. These elements give us a *terminus a quo* furnishing at the same time our guide as to the method of experience in all its labyrinthine stages. But the question arises: Can we find a *terminus ad quem*? Mr Bradley and Mr Bosanquet seem to postulate such and would seek it in the higher possibilities of intellectual and æsthetic life. But the question arises: Are these "spiritual" aspects of conscious experience, in so far as we know them at all, more than stages giving place to something higher than themselves? Can we find in them, or in any other way of looking at the Absolute, as *terminus ad quem*, a completed realisation of all the possibilities immanent in experience? This notion of a wound-up, eternally complete, actualised Absolute is, I contend, not merely an unproven and unprovable assumption, but is really in the last resort unthinkable and self-contradictory; which means, in other words, that the Absolute is only conceivable as a potentiality, an eternal Becoming, a *principle* of realisation, rather than a completed actuality—*i.e.* a *terminus ad quem* of reality.

There is another point to consider as regards the position and exposition of thinkers like Mr Bradley and Mr Bosanquet, who follow, in their own way, on pallogistic lines. What really interests men, at least in the first instance, is not the superior and transcendent character of the Absolute, as representing, in some way or other not defined, the transmutation of the dross of ordinary conscious life into the refined gold of higher spiritual "values." It is the relation of the finite self, the self-identifying focus of consciousness, to the infinite ground of all apprehension, of all consciousness, "the primordial and eternal 'I'" as Jaurès had it. It is this problem of the *terminus a quo* of experience that comes home to the natural man more than that of all the glories of the Absolute, as a system of transmuted reality, as a vague perfection, which leaves the former point undiscussed.

I look in vain in Mr Bosanquet's work for any suggestion of

the problem as to the *pointe d'attache* between the individual consciousness here and now and the Absolute as the perfection of all consciousness. If Mr Bosanquet's Absolute is not connected with the bare fact of my personal consciousness, of my empirical conscious focus, for me its intellectual, æsthetic, or moral value is *nil*. It is this question of the *terminus a quo* that the modern school of literary English philosophy seems to me to shirk and to take refuge from its discussion behind a cloud of words and minor issues. To me it is perfectly clear that, ignore it as you may, and obscure it how you may, by building up a body of doctrine on assumptions which leave it out of account, philosophy is bound in the long run to revert to the recognition of Subject, Object and Relation between them—to the ultimate unity in differentiation of ego and non-ego—as the starting-point of all inquiries concerning the nature of reality.

I am well aware, of course, of the answer that some will give to the above proposition. This, it will be said, is reducing the problem to a psychological issue. We have got beyond this stage, it will be said, in recent philosophic thought. My answer is: You think you have got beyond this fundamental postulate of reality by ignoring it and reverting to old oppositions which belong essentially to pre-Kantian thought. The position in question, though it is, it is quite true, psychological—*i.e.* it may be treated as a psychological issue—is also epistemological and in the last resort metaphysical. The truth is that the deepest and the most ultimate expression of reality, which is nothing other than consciousness or experience, so far as we assign to the term "reality" any meaning at all, is ultimately reducible to this primary synthesis. The position taken up here points to the conclusion, however, that the analysis of the vast complexity of the known and conceived real world into these, its primary elements, is not a mere barren piece of speculative casuistry but affords the clue to the whole structure of reality. As has been pointed out in the present work, these same elements recur in transmuted guise on every plane of reality. This is the inner meaning of the Hegelian dialectic with its position, negation, and reaffirmation, through the negation of the negation.

Turn and twist the matter as we may, there is in the last resort no getting away from or going behind the positions established by the earlier phases of modern philosophy—*e.g.* by Berkeley, Hume, and, above all, by Kant. The latest fashions in philosophy—such, for instance, as the "New Realism" and "Pragmatism"—only succeed for a time in capturing the attention of the philosophic public by ignoring or quite obviously misunderstanding the main issues of philosophic Idealism. The latter is noticeably true of the attempt to resuscitate the crude theory of an object independent of consciousness. It is said, of course, that there is no possibility of disproof of an object outside all possible consciousness as the ground or occasion of the objective reality appearing in and for consciousness. This is but the revived doctrine of the pre-Kantian and early Kantian "*things in themselves*" which Kant himself found in his way, and later on practically abandoned, and which was finally demolished by Kant's successors. The point of the argument is, of course, that a thing outside all possible knowledge is a meaningless and self-contradictory assumption, since a very little analysis *à la* Berkeley shows that what we mean by the words "thing," or "object," is simply certain systematic modifications of a self-conscious subject or ego. Any notion, therefore, of independence in the sense of the so-called "New Realism" when stripped of its modern phraseology, evinces itself as an old and exploded fallacy.

As regards the question which obtrudes itself at the threshold of any discussion of philosophic Idealism—viz. that of Solipsism —the following observations may be made. The "I" which perceives, which is the presupposition of all consciousness whatever, that innermost depth in and for which the whole world of experience is, quite obviously is distinguishable from the "I" of reflection which is itself object for the former, albeit inseparably united with it. This "I" of reflection which emerges in the fact of self-consciousness, and which is the central point in the memory-synthesis of personal identity in time—is limited, is finite. Whereas that potentiality of consciousness which is the condition out of which it emerges is infinite. The latter ultimate metaphysical element—call it "Pure Ego" (Fichte), "Will-to-Live" (Schopenhauer),

"Absolute Identity" (Schelling), "Transcendental Subject" or what not—constituting as it does the basal element in all reality, cannot be lost sight of for a moment without essentially vitiating any philosophical construction.

The question as against those modern thinkers of whom Professor Bosanquet and Mr Bradley may be taken as a type would seem to be whether they are entitled to postulate this ultimate ground or element of experience, as realising itself in a fully complete and all-embracing totality—the "*Ens Realissimum*" of Kant, the "*Idee*" of Hegel, probably also the "*Unica Substantia*" of Spinoza. The writers in question assume that we are justified in postulating such an actual self-subsistent reality apart from the *foci* of particular personalities or conscious centres. The Absolute is for them an actual perfect and concrete existence of which all lesser realities are simply imperfect phases or aspects. To the present writer the Absolute is merely the implied groundwork, the basal principle of connection in all experience. Whether this ultimate principle of consciousness realises itself otherwise than in individual centres of consciousness, in which its infinite possibilities are at once revealed and hidden in the finite focusing itself, would seem a question to which an agnostic answer must be given. That there is something beyond my individual consciousness is a certainty, as Mr Bradley rightly insists, given in the very fact of that individual consciousness itself. "Reality," as Mr Bradley says, "is present in, and is my feeling; and hence to that extent, what I feel is the being of the universe. But when I go on to deny that this universe is more, I turn truth into error" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 253). As against Solipsistic doctrines this is all right. But Mr Bradley has already insisted in accordance with the theory to establishing which the main argument of his book is directed—to wit, that "the Reality, to which all content in the end must belong, is . . . a direct all-embracing experience." Now as to the possibility of proving that this direct all-embracing experience obtains, is precisely where one may join issue with him. I cannot myself see that Mr Bradley's argument for this wound-up Absolute of complete static perfection is conclusive. The very conception of an all-embracing completeness which must

be *ex-hypothesi* actual and static, seems to me more than doubtful. Is a whole beyond which there is no greater whole thinkable? If not, this criticism surely touches Mr Bradley's doctrine at a vital point. Now what is the alternative to the notion of a static, self-complete, eternally perfect Absolute? Surely the one above suggested, which is akin to that of the earlier formulations of modern Idealism—viz. the Absolute as *principle* merely of all consciousness, of which the individual consciousness is merely a mode (in the sense of Spinoza), a focusing in time, and the recognition that all that we can certainly postulate is a progressive realisation of this Absolute in time. I may point out here that this view by no means necessarily contradicts that of Mr Bradley, but merely relegates it to the position of an unproven and perhaps unprovable hypothesis. On the other hand, it accords perfectly well with the doctrine of Monsieur Bergson as expounded in *L'Évolution Créatrice*. Mr Bradley postulates an Absolute Reality in relation to which supreme synthesis all realities that we are accustomed to regard as such are simply incomplete aspects, and hence, taken by themselves, more or less illusory appearances. But the question here surely arises whether the notion of the Absolute as an all-completeness, an "*Ens Realissimum*," is not itself an illusion? Is it possible to form a coherent idea either qualitatively or quantitatively of a synthesis, of a whole, which is all-embracing—that is, beyond which there is no greater whole conceivable?

It is all very well to talk of the false Infinite. But is it possible to formulate any coherent notion of Reality at all which does not involve time, or into which time, M. Bergson's "*Durée*," does not enter? It seems to me that at this point intellectual abstraction gives out—in short, that the complete static Absolute of Mr Bradley's philosophy is but a pseudo-concept, whose formulation in thought as intelligible is hopelessly impossible. But admitting this by no means involves the denial of value to Mr Bradley's investigation and analysis, the idea of this pseudo-concept, as I consider it, must always be before us as what Kant would have called a "regulative conception," even though we are unable to recognise it as positive in the sense of Mr Bradley. The analysis which

demonstrates essential imperfection, the "adjectiveness," to adopt Mr Bradley's phraseology, of every given synthesis within the purview of our conscious experience, can never be without its value. To show the inadequacy of any given reality is an important function of philosophic exposition. But the point is, of course, whether the inadequacy of any given real synthesis, or of the concept based upon it, can ever be overcome more than relatively. You may demonstrate the inadequacy, you may show *ad hoc* what is necessary to get rid of this inadequacy, but you cannot show that the new synthesis thence arising will not again have its own inadequacy, its own adjectival character, and so on indefinitively. Mr Bradley would arbitrarily bring this process to an end in his Absolute, but, as it seems to me, by abstaining from all positive definition. It is "an infinite whole of perfection," we are told, but Mr Bradley nowhere, so far as I can see, adequately discusses the reconcilability of infinitude with totality. Yet upon this point hinges the ultimate validity of Mr Bradley's entire theory. Is there anything in the book, *Appearance and Reality*, which goes to establish on philosophical grounds the contention of an Absolute that is infinite and complete perfection? I cannot find it. I find plenty of able and valuable analyses showing the incomplete "adjectival" character of our "reals" and of our notions concerning them, but nothing which establishes the position of an eternally complete and finished Absolute, in which ourselves and all our experience are gathered up into a perfect synthesis. The answer may be, of course, that the whole argument is at once based upon and illustrates the fact that this absolute perfection is a necessity of thought. But is it? It would seem, on the contrary, that, plausible as this view may appear at first sight, if we do but probe it far enough, we are confronted not with one necessity of thought but with two alternative impossibilities of thought—two "antinomies," in fact. Though it may be difficult for the mind to rest in a never-ending process, and in fact impossible positively to conceive such—for the simple reason that Thought, the Logical is by its nature *de*-finite and hence can never grasp the *in*-finite—yet its bare acceptance involves no contradiction.

But as against this negative way of looking at the matter,

we have in Mr Bradley's Absolute the obligation to form a positive notion, however vague—to wit, that of an infinite all-embracing totality of perfection. Now here we have surely more than an impossibility of forming a positive conception; we have contradictions as glaring as those criticised and disposed of by Mr Bradley on the lower and avowedly partial and incomplete planes of reality. There is the obvious contradiction between infinitude and totality involving the psychological impossibility of conceiving, as already said, either qualitatively or quantitatively, a complete finality. Then there is the contradiction involved in perfection being applied as an attribute to that, the content of which involves elements which are the negation of perfection in any sense in which the word retains an intelligible meaning. If the Absolute involves, as the author of *Appearance and Reality* says it does, error, evil, and ugliness as elements in its content, then any exposition which assumes or seeks to justify its perfection seems scarcely distinguishable from mere word-jugglery. All these difficulties are got rid of if, instead of postulating the Absolute as a concrete, an actual all-embracing fact, we are content to regard it merely as the ultimate elementary principle which all Reality presupposes as its core and marrow, but which, as regards its self-realisation, is infinite in the sense of knowing no finality. The whole question connects itself with the view we take of potentiality and actuality. If, as Mr Bradley explicitly does, we deny the legitimacy of the notion of potentiality altogether, then, of course, it goes without saying that it is ruled out as ultimate principle. For the view presented in this book which assumes the Absolute as *principle* of all experience regards it as primarily and saliently an eternal potentiality, of which the given actual realisations are transient and secondary.

Mr Bradley's view of potentiality as a pure negation, and hence illegitimate when spoken of as a positive principle, is of course explicitly traversed in the course of the argument of the present work. It is to my mind perfectly clear that the analysis of experience—or concrete consciousness—shows us that the primary factor in reality, as opposed to illusion, lies not in the actual moment of apprehension but in the infinite possibilities of apprehension which this moment implies and of which *qua*

actual moment it is the sign. Such an analysis of experience, I contend, discloses the truth that it is in the infinite possibility of experience that the driving force of reality lies, and not in the finite actuality of any number of given experiences. It is in the *nisus* of potentiality and not in the exhaustion and instability of actuality that the ultimate principle of reality is to be sought.

I do not deny, of course, that either of these views, the *static* view of the Absolute as an eternal self-complete reality, and the *dynamic* view of it as the eternal principle of a reality of which we have no right to postulate any final completeness or perfection—that is, any beyond which there is none greater, more complete, more perfect (if I may be again excused the solecism) —both these views, I say, may be so far alike as to be unimaginable, but they are different in so far, I contend, as the first is not merely unpresentable to the mind and imagination but also involves positive contradictions, while the second, even if alleged to be equally unimaginable with the first, does not in itself involve contradictions.

The above criticism of Mr Bradley states points which I regard as important in view of the fact of Mr Bradley's standing as a serious thinker and of the position he occupies in modern English philosophic thought.

The foregoing objections to Mr Bradley's interpretation of the problem of reality would seem to be fatal to his philosophy *in limine*. I say this, not without due consideration, and not without having carefully read and weighed his ingenious and elaborate defences of his position, with their anticipation of possible objections.

Before leaving Mr Bradley there is one point on which I would like to say a few words. Mr Bradley falls foul (in a criticism of an article by Mr James Ward) in his recent volume of *Essays* (p. 192 *sqq.*) of the identification of Experience with Consciousness. But it is difficult to see any justification for the distinction he endeavours to draw between the two expressions. Mr Bradley says that to his mind consciousness is not co-extensive with experience, but when he comes to state his case it is by no means clear in what sense he differentiates between experience and consciousness. His arguments seem to me

altogether beside the point so far as the justification for distinguishing experience from consciousness is concerned. How an experience can obtain, save as a determination of consciousness, is difficult to see. I can only imagine that Mr Bradley would confine the word " consciousness " to the actual moment of consciousness, reserving the word " experience " for the whole range of what I should term possible or potential consciousness. But I fail to see that this use of the terms is warranted by current or traditional usage or subserves any useful purpose. Says Mr Bradley : " We have an object, something given, and it is given to the subject. Is the subject given ? No ! for if so, it would itself be an object. We seem then to have one term, a relation without a second term." Not so at all ! In the primary synthesis of the consciousness, the term opposed to the given object is the subject which negates itself in its own determination as object. It is a unique form of relation which accompanies every conscious moment. It is a pure assumption that the Subject of Consciousness, because it is not Object, cannot therefore constitute the original term of relation. To employ a favourite antithesis of Mr Bradley, the determining subject gives the element of " thatness," the determined object that of " whatness," to the experience considered as a whole. The subject though not given in the relation as the object is given, is nevertheless presupposed in the relation. In reflexion, therefore, it assumes the form of a quasi-object. On p. 194 of his *Essays*, Mr Bradley distinguishes between Consciousness and Feeling, but what is feeling but a stage of consciousness ? How feeling can obtain except as an element of consciousness Mr Bradley does not tell us. Does he postulate a feeling *in vacuo* apart from that which feels? What is this undifferentiated feeling spoken of but the first form of the Objectivation of the Absolute Subject ? This whole question of distinguishing between Consciousness and Experience seems to me to be nothing better than a metaphysical " mare's nest."

We have already, in discussing Mr Bradley's static Absolute, touched upon the question of time in the sense of M. Bergson's " *Durée* " as an attribute of the Absolute. If we admit this we can truly regard the Absolute, which for me is primarily the subject at the root of the conscious synthesis, as containing

implicitly an infinite perfection. But then we have to revise our concept of perfection, eliminating the notion of static ultimateness. Of course at first sight we have here a contradiction, but it is one of those contradictions which seem inevitable whenever we seek to envisage in concepts ultimate reality.

With the fall of the doctrine of a static Absolute our notion of the " potential " changes. For thinkers like Mr Bradley, of course, the word " potential," if admitted at all, " is used for that which actually is, and which under certain conditions is not manifest." For those with whom the Absolute is not a static all-embracing whole but a dynamic principle merely, the notion of the " potential " ceases to be simply privative and becomes a positive factor in the synthesis of reality. We see then that no reality is conceivable without a potential element. We see that in all reality the " potential " as a positive element plays a most important rôle, and that the view that all reality must be actual is a pure assumption, and an assumption that is not borne out by a critical analysis of consciousness as concrete. The " potential," of course, being an alogical factor, naturally cannot be expressed or dealt with adequately as a concept. Like all alogical elements, reflective thought can only deal with it symbolically. Reflective thought cannot grasp the alogical *per se*. It can only express it in the form of a sign or pseudo-concept. This fact, if I mistake not, has given colour to the assumption we often meet with to the effect that the word " potentiality " is no more than a meaningless phrase. In any analysis of given reality we find that the actuality immediately present in consciousness is but a small part of the total apperception. In some cases, of course, the argument that the " potential " is but implicit actuality may hold good. For instance, at the present moment I am actually conscious of the books on the shelves of my library. This is obviously the least important part of the reality of the books. The contents of the books, the more essential element in their reality, are for my immediate consciousness potential merely. But these contents are implicitly actual in so far as with my apperception of the books on the shelves is bound up the conviction that following a certain action on my part the

contents will also appear as actual in my consciousness. But this only applies to a limited reality apperceived by me psychologically as an individual here and now. If we take reality as the object of consciousness-in-general—*i.e.* apart from limitations of a particular time space and personality—we shall find that in all possible apperception with an objective reference, the most important part of the apperception invariably consists in the recognition implied in the actual sense-perception, of a potentiality behind it, a potentiality which is in no way actualised, or, for the individual consciousness, actualisable. The reality present to consciousness involves always two elements : the actual appearance and the infinite background of possibility which is, as it were, " the power behind the throne " of the actual appearance. On the analogy of the fact that in particular instances, such as the one above given, potentiality may be viewed as merely relative and privative, Mr Bradley and those who think with him assume that this applies to reality in its wider and deeper aspect as the content of experience considered, *per se*. Potentiality, in its primary aspect, means the *nisus* of being and becoming, which is the core of all reality and which is eternally actualising itself in the *this* and *now* of the process of consciousness. As already observed, it is impossible to fix or adequately define this *nisus* in reflective thought or its vehicle, language, since it is alogical, and for this reason it is easy to stigmatise the word potentiality as a meaningless phrase. But the assumption of the non-positive character of potentiality as an element in all reality remains a pure assumption and an assumption which is, as I contend, contradicted by an adequate analysis of the meaning and interpretation of reality. I should point out here that the fact I have more than once insisted upon—viz. that the alogical side of reality can never be adequately fixed in reflective thought —has as its consequence that in metaphysic which is primarily concerned with the first elements of experience or (which is the same thing for me) of consciousness, we are compelled up to a certain point to rest satisfied with concepts which, since they are symbols merely, necessarily lack the precision obtaining in the primary relations and relational aspects of things. This applies here obviously to the pseudo-concept potentiality.

This is the explanation of the seeming plausibility of the destructive criticism to which the notion of the potential is so frequently subjected The same applies, of course, to other similar attempts of reflective thought to express alogical terms in its own medium—such, for instance, as pure subject, feeling, will-*nisus*, etc.

The idea of (what I have termed) the static Absolute, that of an all-embracing perfection, of no development, increase, or addition, an idea which with older philosophers coincided with the pallogistic view that would resolve ultimate reality into the forms of pure thought, is so attractive and seemingly self-evident to many serious thinkers that it is worth while recurring to it, with a view to noting one or two consequences involved in it. Now taken in the older pallogistic sense, this view has been sufficiently criticised elsewhere in the present volume. It has been endeavoured to show that thought, the relational form *per se*, can never give us reality. But in its more recent guise—a guise of which Mr Bradley and Professor Bosanquet may be taken as the chief exponents in this country—this notion of a static Absolute is apparently taken as not involving pallogism. But in the sense in which Mr Bradley and Professor Bosanquet use it, I understand it to absorb within itself the whole time content. It is only thus that I can attach any meaning to their expressions concerning it. But then, think what this involves ! It is still a form of the " eternal glance " theory referred to elsewhere. It must mean surely, in other words, that the whole content, not merely of the present but of the past and future as well, is somehow actualised for the Absolute. It is thus, we may remark by the way, the direct antithesis of M. Bergson's creative " *Durée* " as expounded in his *Évolution Créatrice*. If it be accepted, we must surely admit as a consequence, let us say, the whole of history and of pre-history, the fauna and flora of the three great geological periods, the stone age, the great civilisations of antiquity, the cities of Babylon, Nineveh, Memphis, Thebes, the classical world with all its artistic splendour, as somehow or other eternally actualised, eternally present in their entirety at every stage of their development in the Absolute, which *ex-hypothesi* regarded *per se* is independent of time (time apart). Is this a possible conception ?

It might indeed fit in with the theory of the possibility of prediction, and as the explanation of the accuracy of Madame Thèbes' prognostication of the war and similar cases, which a rationalistic attitude bids us regard merely in the light of striking and unusual coincidences. But barring this, I must confess, the view, even considered merely as admissible hypothesis, when its consequences are taken into account, seems to offer insuperable difficulties in the way of acceptance, notwithstanding a certan attractive plausibility about it at first sight.

On the other hand, what does the analysis of experience as such give us ? If it does not compel us to the assumption of an all-embracing actual Absolute, it does at least disclose to us the original elements which are the *sine qua non* of that conscious experience of which reality consists. Of these elements we find that the most fundamental, containing as it does *implicitur* in itself all the rest, is the Subject, the pure In-it-selfness, of which Consciousness, the synthesis of the real or the Object, is at once the determination and the expansion. To be offered a principle or element merely may seem a poor substitute for those who are seeking an actual all-embracing synthesis. But when this principle is recognised as that which is the potency of all progress and when progress is recognised as the unfolding of this principle, which is that of all life from the inner side or from the side of its "being," then the principle in question will be seen to furnish us with a clue to the interpretation of reality which the more pretentious hypothesis fails to afford us. So at least it seems to the present writer. For me, continuity for the individual in the universe of which Professor Bosanquet speaks in his book, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, is a continuity of principle, not a continuity with an already perfect and complete Absolute. The indifferentiated principle or subject, which forms the basis of every individual centre of consciousness, *per se* a mere potency, unfolds itself as a reality in time in an infinite number of particular finite conscious *foci*. It is this pure subject of Kant and Fichte which we may identify with the will of Schopenhauer, the " moi premier et eternal," as the late Jean Jaurès termed it, which is the common ground and unifying factor in all consciousness. Whether this undifferentiated ground of consciousness realises itself apart from

its finite *foci* we know not. The question is, for us at present, a purely speculative one and does not enter the framework of a strictly philosophical analysis which is either an accurate retracing in reflective thought of the conditions of our experience here and now, or it is nothing.

Speaking of the individual as finite centre of consciousness, Mr Bosanquet, in the work before mentioned (pp. 287-288), says: "He is a world that realises, in a limited matter, the logic and spirit of the whole; and, in principle, there is no increase of comprehension, and no transformation of the self, that is inconceivable as happening to him. Whether he even continues to be a self in our limited sense of the term is a matter of degree. Why and how there comes to be these separate microcosms which we call finite selves, or (improperly) individuals is a question we cannot answer. But we can see that by its being so a certain completeness, through incompleteness, is attained. Every degree, and every distinct centre or origin of individuality or comprehension necessarily constitutes a different vision and interpretation of things, and through all these incompletenesses a totality of differences must emerge which, so far as we can grasp, could not be attained in any other way." But Professor Bosanquet, notwithstanding, like Mr Bradley, postulates, as I understand, an actual complete and perfectly "wound-up" Absolute as actually existent. His illustration from the world of literature and art, I confess, does not impress me as altogether satisfactory. Because in the creations of genius reality is raised, according to our best accredited standard of value, to a higher level, I do not see that this helps us in the matter of a static Absolute which is, after all, *qua* finite consciousness, transcendent. The whole crux is as to the actuality and transcendence. It is all very well for Professor Bosanquet to tell us that "the Absolute is simply the higher watermark of fluctuations and experience of which in general we are daily and normally aware." But this, if I may be allowed to say so, is rather talking in the air. The question is, does the Absolute obtain, with Mr Bosanquet as with Mr Bradley, as a perfect reality *per se*, in a sense overreaching the world of finite conscious centres? In the work under discussion, save for certain vague phrases, hints, and

suggestions, in the definition and illustration of the Absolute, we never get out of the range of the individual mind, the finite consciousness. It is all very well to identify the Absolute with "the true, the good and the beautiful" in nature, life, and mind as is done by Mr Bosanquet, and on the other hand, to affirm that "the Absolute we experience in everything." All this, to my mind, does not afford us any light as to how we are to interpret the meaning and the being of the Absolute as such. This way of dealing with the central problem of metaphysic may be very good as literary art, but seems to lack the exactitude of philosophical analysis. We all agree, of course, that the intellectual, ethical and æsthetic values spoken of imply the raising of reality to a higher plane. Those who, like the present writer, find the Absolute *per se* solely as principle rather than, as by Mr Bradley and others, as an all-embracing concrete existence, none the less recognise the fact that the unfolding of the Absolute principle of conscious experience in time means the realisation of these higher values. There is this difference however: while to the upholder of the static perfect Absolute these values are already in some undefined manner eternally realised, for those who hold the contrary view they are progressively realised as time-content, M. Bergson's "*Durée*." This has no limits, and hence no static perfection can be ascribed to the eternal self-realisation of the Absolute, considered as the ultimate subject and in-it-selfness of Experience-in-general working through time.

The whole practical importance of this problem of the Absolute would seem to hinge upon regarding the ultimate nature of things as (to use convenient terms) static or dynamic. Mr Bradley's Absolute has no principle of progress; it is eternally there. To our Absolute as the ground principle of consciousness, on the contrary, there is no limit of expansion, objectivation, or self-realisation—in a word, progress from the potential to the actual is its inmost nature. This distinction is worth noting over and above the point just insisted upon—viz. the apparent failure of the exponents of the former view to intelligibly define, be it even in a general way, the manner in which they conceive their static Absolute as obtaining *per se* outside the limits of particular finite intelligences.

This last is a crucial point, and ought not to be shirked under cover of rhetoric and literary devices. If the Absolute only realises itself in the finite centres of consciousness arising and perishing in time, then it is no more than a literary phrase, and the reader in quest of philosophic truth has surely some justification for feeling that he is being played with. On the other hand if, as it is implied by the writers in question, it does realise itself in a manner overreaching all individual centres of consciousness, how are we to conceive of such realisation? For conceive it in some way or other we must, if it is to be effective in any sense. Independence of the finite I understand to be excluded *ex-hypothesi*. The static Absolute of Mr Bradley certainly, it is repeatedly insisted, includes finite intelligences and their contents. But in what way is nowhere made clear, so far as I can see. Its definition as an all-embracing perfection does not seem to help matters so long as its relation to the individual intelligence remains undefined. The case is otherwise with the Absolute conceived as potential principle merely and not as actual reality—conceived, *i.e.* as the ultimate principle of all experience. The connection with the finite consciousness of the individual is, so far as it reaches, obvious enough. It is that element in our being which becomes conscious and which we ambiguously term "I," Kant's "I" of "transcendental apperception." I say "ambiguously," since common language uses the same term alike for the "I" which recognises its own perceptions as part of a real world of objects, and the individual "I," or rather "Me," of psychology, the individual self, consisting in thoughts, feelings, and volitions, which has arisen in time as a particular mental system, and which, though it identifies itself with the original subject of all consciousness, is really object. The pure subject of all consciousness is, on the other hand, never object *per se* but remains the ground of the consciousness of all objects which are indeed, in the last resort, merely its own determination.

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